Loyola University Chicago

Loyola eCommons
Dissertations

Theses and Dissertations

1996

What Morality Requires: Re-Reading Kant's Highest Good
Cynthia A. Brincat
Loyola University Chicago

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss
Part of the Philosophy Commons

Recommended Citation
Brincat, Cynthia A., "What Morality Requires: Re-Reading Kant's Highest Good" (1996). Dissertations.
3588.
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/3588

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more
information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 1996 Cynthia A. Brincat

Loyola University Chicago

What Morality Requires:
Re-reading J(ant,s Highest Good

A Dissertation Submitted To
The Faculty Of The Graduate School
In Candidacy For The Degree Of
Doctor Of Philosophy
Department of Philosophy

By
Cynthia A Brincat

Chicago, Illinois
January 1996

Copyright by Cynthia A Brincat, 1995
All rights reserved.

ii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS:·
A dissertation is not merely a two hundred or .so page document, rather,

it is a symbc:>l ofthe culmination and end of an educatjonal process. like any

o,-.her process, a variety .of,so~es contribute to its successful completion.
Hence I would like to thank all of those people who have contributed to this
'

.

.

''

;!

r"

'

'

. •

' j ,, '

J

,· \

1

~

*

;

;

~

' • .',

fi.nai stcp.ff,,1.ih~)~y ~.unique ways. Thank you especially to my
gr~~at~ ~~~ Tu9~. BoW:Cn, :Catriona tt~ey,. M,mt Mol\Qrag6n ~
" -~

,,. ·,, " ' · ' ' ". .

"

.

•.

.

·~·

'< ,. ,. .

1,.

.

'

• ."

'

'

.

:

..

'

.

Aron Reppman, for their assistance in the last stages of this project. Also,
'\:;\

·!:

:u..·,:·1\,>>1 .. _:·.

thank yoy;

::_,f_\t... , :r . .

!. :,i:,

"

,.,. .;

tci:.~.:~ ,yxuior$.~• Misdom has always been sustaining

~ 1~ f~y~.,
, ',<_, ,.,,:•

I

r,,,_,

, 4' ( . ,

;,,

1'<••~,

•

't

.,.

•

bi -.idippn, I ~ .very h~ppy to ~clmowl~pge my; .
'«,

,;,

,.

e

•

•

•.

,

•

~

•

,

,

••

,

ivery supportive
th~ug1'qJf;my. gr~dqa~. ~er~ . espe.qally ·~~¢tµly ·in their·eff~rts to help me .
dissertati~n.c6mmittee; they have been wi~out ex~eption

~ ~. I>J;?~ as .clear. a& possible wi~,fi\\Y own funits, bot,h inteUectw¥
•'

••-

"

•• ... '

;

•~.

••

'

0

•

•

•

,-

• •

•

'

•

•

••

'

e

•

... ·
'

and temJ?(?iat I~ is lb.us I am grateful to Or. Adriaan Peperzak, Dr. Richard
Westley,,.~ ipy ~ctqr., Dr.. Vict,oria Wike., Finally, I. wqulq, ~~pe.cjaJ!y like

iii

REFERENCES
AB references to Kant's work are given in the form of footnotes. First, I
have put the title, as listed in the abbreviations below, followed by the page
number of the German text, followed by the page number and reference to
translator of the English translation. Rather than put the volume of the German
text in every cite, the volume is listed below, with all of the other pertinent
information. All references to the German translations are to the Royal Prussian
Academy edition of Kants Gesammelte Schriften, Konigliche preussische
Ak.ademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin and Leipzig: Walter de Gruyter & Co.,
1904- ). For present purposes, I will refer to this work as KgS. The abbreviations
for the English translations are the following:

CON Conflict.oft.be fagiJtits. [KgS, Volume 7) trans. Mary Gregor (New York:
Abaris Books, Inc, 1979).
CPR

Crit,iqpe of Ptact.ical Reason,. [KgS, Volume 5] trans. Lewis White Beck
(New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1956).

MM Metaph),sics of MQ11}s. [KgS, Volume 6] trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991).
PP

To Papetua) Peace:. A PhilosQphical Sketch. [KgS, Volume 8] trans. Ted
Humphrey (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983).

REL Religion Wi1:hin the Umit§ Qf Reason Alone. [KgS, Volume 6] trans.
Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (New York: Harper, 1960).

TIP On the Proved>: That May Be True in Theocy, but is .of No Practical Use.
[KgS, Volume S]trans. Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing
Company, 1983).
Note: .All quotes from Kant will be given directly, including any gender
exclusive pronouns. An attempt will be made, whenever possible, to remedy
. this exclusion in the text. This assumes an acceptance of the translation of
Mensch as man, while human being is a more appropriate translation for the
present day.
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INTRODUCTION
WHY RE-READ KANT'S HIGHEST GOOD?:
AN INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF THE PROJECT
Ver; t~ notions . in Kant scholarship have caused as 11\UC;h c;on.troversy
as .the highest good.

Is. it heteronoll)Ous7 Is it superfluous? Is it ~~ answer

and to.what quqtion? Wliat .is it apout l<a,nt's doctrine of the.ht.ghest good
'

~ t has ca\,lSeQ so :Wu.ch confusion? Much of the confusion sµrroup<:Ung the

highest gCK>d.~J bf. ~n to be a cq~quence of its presentation throusp,~t ..
tll,e ~~ corpus. That is, Kant devotes no one trea~ to a. ~F<f
tr(a~~t

of;~.objectof pm-e,practical reason.. In beingp~~~ted

uuou.~~ut, v~ous, works wh,ose tasks themselves vary as well, the highest
good often ~om~ a handmaid.t<? the general.t¥k with whicll Kant is

~Q~med. We are thus lFft with myriad co~eptions of the high~st good,:

whi<:4 in m.<,>st ~s. can each _be supported through their presence iil specific;:
texts...,This situa,tion has led. to c.onfli~g. albeit prolific, scholarsJiip relative
.to. the higl)est good. .

Sin<+ thc;re is so. much. controver~ and conflict with regard to the
highest good, it is ne~~ t~ take an integrated look at this object in order
to take Kant seriously. In doing so, we must appreciate that the various

2
manifestations of the highest good are obviously not random, but can appear

to be unrelated, especially when each manifestation of the highest good is
treated in isolation. As a consequence of this isolationist approach, there
appears a false notion of competing or exclusive concepts of the highest good.
Inst.cad of interpreting the highest good through its apparently isolated
instances, I- will argue for a new way of approaching and interpreting the

highest·good. Through this interpretation, I have· sought to overcome ·the
cacophony of conflicting interpretations and thereby offer a method towards
quieting the din•. In so doing, I have realized that much of contemporary

Kmtian scholarship-bu a decidedly Kantian flavor. Often it reads similarly to
the antinomies in that it addresses two competing solutions to the same
problem, denies each of them, then asserts a middle solution that contains the

best aspects of the two ,that were previously denied.
, The approach of this analysis is no exception, although its results in my

~ n of a middle solution is unique. What I have done, is to examine the
two predominant schools of thought with regard to the highest good: that of

µic highest good• unifier and that of the highest good as a moral ideal.
Undcc these two broad rubrics, all of the interpretations of the· highest good,
both pro and con, can be subsumed. After analyzing these conceptions of the
'

'

highest good; ·.1 have asserted that neither of them is completely correct in

3
isolation, yet both of them are correct to a certain extent. That is, both of

these viewpoints are a necessary part of the complete understanding of the
highest good: that of the ethical commonwealth. Furthermore, in
appreciating the ethical commonwealth as the consummate articulation of the
highest good ·my interpretation presents· Kant's develomental plan for

achieving this complex end

Thus,. to grasp the· highest good in its complete relation to the moral law
and moral )8#'ftts ~ tC> appreciate the moral object as it is manifested iri its

entirety: Kant tiltnselftiVes somcrpractical advice:m this regatd as he

...grasp rorrcctly the idea·of the whole, and then to stt all tho$e
parts in th~ir reciprocal interrelations, in the light of their
· derivation fmm the concept ofthe whole. 1
In genenl, this is the plan which I have attempted to follow. In the
organization ,of my project I, have attempted to correctly grasp the idea of the

highestigooct as·a ~neric whole determined by the moral law, and then to see
it spedfically manifested in its parts. After appreciating the highest good in its
parts·( a stage. where many studies are arrested thereby causing controversy

·ant0ng Kantian commentators since their individual· interpretations compete
1

CPR, 10-11 (Beck, 10). John Silber, in his article, "The Importance of the
Highest Good in Kant's Ethics," also cites ~ ·passage as a way to authentically
approach the highest good, (Ethics. April, 1963) 183.
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and are never reintegrated), I have proceeded to see the parts of the highest
good relative to their reciprocal interrelations deriving from their unifying
concept. As a result of this theoretical backdrop to the aforementioned
organization, .the outline of my project is as follows.
In Chapter One, I argue for an understanding of the highest good
centeinl around its presentation in -the Dialectic of the second Critique. This
is the.highest good as a dialectical ideal of reason. In· appearing as a dialectkal
ideal, the highest .good manifests .itself as a unifier through which the duality
of the human will as superscnsuously and sensuously determined is unified.
This is a conceptio1rof the highest good as the all inclusive. object of pure
practical reason. This undemanding of the highest good has met with the
critic:Bn that it is superfluous to the practical aspects of the moral project.
In Chapter Two, 1 argue for an understanding-Of the,highest good
centered aroWld its presentation in the Analytic of the ~nd·Critique. This is

the highest good ·as. a mor;ll· ideal insofar as it semes :3#1 a guide for. action. The
conreption ,of the highest good in· this manner comes about as a consequence
of Kant's command that,:we ,act in such a way to work towards making the

·highest good an actwdity in the world. This understanding of the highest
good has met with the criticism that in its implementation, it will have
hcteronomous constqucnces for the moral agent.

,

s

In Chapter Three, l wi11 demonstrate that the ethica1 cornrnonweahh,
Kant's social understanding of the highest good as it is contained primarily in
Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, contains both aspects of the
highest good disawed in Chapters One and Two. That is, a conception of the
highest good as the ethical commonwealth serves as a unifying ideal as well as
a moral ,ideal. ,In addition to including both of these strains of thought, the
ethical commonwealth oontributes an entirely new perspective· to the ,highest

good. ,For it· is through the ethical commonwealth that the highest good takes
on a dedde<ily social componen~ becoming a duty for all humanity.. Jn
addition,, it1.is through this.understanding oftheihiglwst goodYt:hat the
criticisms of supmfhtity, artEl: heteronomy are to· be met:as:they are addressed in

Chapter,five.

;

, r ,

,

,.

· :,·

·.. 1, Chapter Pour; l will dcmonstrattt the devclopmeI\tal plan contained

in the Kantianco:rip~;for the :rcalization,of the highest good as an ethical
commonwealth!based on perpetual peace. In so doing, I will demonstrate llow

it is that the ethical cominonwealth. includes the integration.of the
understandings of the highest good,previously.presented. · This integration
oonsists ,of thedewlopment of the ·hip.est good through the moments of the
individual, the state and the human race, in which the afore)J\CI\tioncd
articulations ofthe highest good are subsumed and brought to th.cir

6
cu1mination in the ethica1 commonwea1th based on perpetua1 peace.

Finally, in Chapter Five, I will further illustrate how it is we achieve the
consummate articulation of the highest good. That is, the ethical
commonwealth is brought about through the careful plan Kant articulates for
the manifestation of the Kingdom of God on earth. In concluding Chapter
Five, I will summarize the results of this analysis as they pertain to
contemporary scholarship on Kant's highest good and the shadow that these
sorts of reflections can cast relative to the Kantian project as I perceive it.
The above explains my overall goal, to articulate· the various faces of
Kant's moral object fairly and completely since it is through the notion of the
highest good that we are led most concretely to the requirements of the moral
law. A useful metaphor is the cube. Each of the typical articulations of the
highest good is a side of the cube which, seen in isolation, gives only a picture
of a square. This is a picture that is unsatisfying to anyone who is more than
two dimensional. I have attempted to not only delineate each of the squares,

but then to put them together in their natural form as a cube. The squares
taken as a whole and assembled properly make up this cube just as each facet
. of the highest good makes up the program of the ethical commonwealth based
on perpetual peace. This is an understanding of the highest good as the moral
object of the pure practical reason that is far from being empty, free from

7
heteronomy, and not superfluous. Instead, it is an object through which we

are given a vision of the Kantian moral system, including the concerns of
moral individuals, nations and the human race, thereby rounding out Kant's
vision of the object of the moral law as it articulates what morality truly
requires.

CHAPTER I
THE ORIGINS OF THE HIGHEST GOOD:
THE SUMMUM BONUM AS DIALECTICAL
IDEAL OF.REASON
Throughout his work, Kant was concerned with establishing how it is
that ·human moral agents were freely subject to the moral law. ·In the second •

Crltup,e, Kant begins to directly address this col\SUJtliag passion. How is it
that pure. reason·.(objective and necessary). is able to be the determining ·

grotlitd for our action?

In other words, how is the moral law, that which

reside$ in the noumenal realm able to serve· as a determinant for. actions which
take place in the anpirieal'world and hence reside in the practical or

phenomenal realm? Kant articulates the solution to how moral actions are to
take pl~ through :the· serond Critique, where Kant seeks to unify and
imcgrate the ·htdnan will as he M.ablishes how it ls that pure reason can be
practical. 'fhis:.establishment anchors the moral law as it demonstrates how we
att

subject to such a law, and in so doing, anchors and rcqui:res its object, the

highest good. In so mchoring the object of the law as necessitated by pure
practical reaso~dw highest good manifests itself as a unifying concept·insofar

as it theoreticaHy uniflcs the dual aspects·of the human will as supersensuously
8

9
and sensuously determined. This is its function as a dialectical ideal of reason.

The object of pure practical reason, the highest good as happiness in
proportion to worthiness to be happy, had up until the second Critique almost
never been treated in a concentrated manner. However in this work, through
the Dialectic of pure practical reason, Kant remedies this neglect. In the
Dialectic, he gives a concentrated, albeit comparatively brief as compared to
Kant's other interests (e.g., freedom, God, etc.), treatment of the highest good.
As.a result of this treatment, we are left with one of the few sustained
statements about the function of the highest good in the Kantian project.

Unlike its appearance inotherplaccs in the Kantian corpus, where the role of
~

highest<good must be :gleaned from a careful gathering of supporting

evidence, in the .Dialectic Kant generously delineates aspects of its role and
function.
Consequently, in this chapter I will concentrate on this manifestation of
the highest good in its appearance as a unifier of the legislation of our reason
through its function as a dialectical ideal of reason. It is. my thesis that in this
section of the second Critique where the highest good manifests itself as unifier
we are presented with one of the two major roles of Kant's highest good. In
addition, through this presentation we are given hints of the other major role
of the highest good, that of a-final end for moral action, and moral ideal which

IO
serves as a guide for conduct. 1 These two understandings of the highest good

exhaust the presentation of the highest good in the second Critique. That is, in
presenting both of them, we are left with a complete picture of Kant's highest
good as it appears in this text. Returning to the task of this chapter, I will

argue for my thesis through analysis of primarily the second Critil(lle, with its
theme of grounding the moral law for beings who are members of both a
superscnsuous and a sensuous realm; that the highest good in its role as a
dialectical ideal serves as . a unifier of the apparently disparate aspects of the

moral self.
Without the unification accomplished by the highest good the call to be
moral would fall .'on the deaf ears of impotent moral beings. That is, insofar as
moral agents heed the call of the law, and are not morally impotent, human
moral agents require the highest good as that object of the law which unifies
the duality of their wills as rational beings. This duality arises as a

consequence of Kant's conception of:
...the will of a rational being, as belonging to the .sensuous world,
recognizes itself to be, like all other efficient causes, necessarily
subject to the laws of causality, while in practical matters, in its
other aspect as a being in itself, it is conscious of its existence as

. I
1

The highest good as a moral ideal and guide for conduct will be treated in
Chapter Two.
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determinable in an intelligible order of things. 2
Hence in being human, moral agents reside in this sensuous world as well as in
that of the supersensuous. The command to be moral is heard by and heeded
by their supersensuous self, while the law, insofar as it is to be effective must
dictate actions able to be enacted in the sensuous realm, by the sensuous self.

Thus for the law to be enacted there must be some way for the theoretical
realm of the supersensuous to become real for the practical realm of the
sensuous. If the moral law is not to be regarded as sensuously ineffective, and
not merely as that which is binding for our supcrsensuous self, there must be
some means to .bridge our separate selves allowing for the supcrsensuous law to
be sensuously effective. l:n what follows, I will show that this seeming chasm

separating these two realms is bridged by the concept of the highest good as it
serves as a unifying concept able to bring together both aspects of the self of
the moral agent, thereby providing a means for the law to be effective in the
empirical realm.
In presenting the highest good as a unifier through its presentation as a
dialef;tical ideal of reason, I will address: I }the way in which the highest good

2
·!.•

~,w,,ilfr:ch Jer Wi~ eines JIC'fflu,,,,/tigen Wf'ens,. das, ·als ZUT Sinnenwelt gehorig,
1

sich gleich anderen wirksamen Ursachen notwendig den Gesetzen der Kausalitiit
untmw,,jen etkennt, im Prllktiseltm .d«J, zugleich sich a,if einer 11-,uleren Seite, nilmlich
,,ls Wesen ,,,, lid,. selbst, saws in einer inuJJigU,elm Ordnung der Dinge &stimmgarm
Dtuei1ls bewujJt ist, ... [CPR, 42 (Be~ 43)1.
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is established as a relationship of happiness in accordance with worth (virtue).
This will require a)an elucidation of "the good" [das Gute], that which Kant
refers to as the bonum supremum; and b )an elucidation of happiness as the other
concept under which all other objects of the moral will are organized. 3 Next, I
will ·treat 2 )the positive statement of the highest good as it is presented as a
dialectical ideal of reason that is made up of these two aforementioned
components; This discussion will consist of an analysis of the antinomy of
pure practical reason and its results. Finally, I will address 3 )the consequences
of this understanding of the highest good for Kant's project4
The·organization of this chapter follows Kant's criterion for analysis as
it was ~scussed in the introduction. That is, with a broad general

und:t!tStmding of the highest good as a whole, I will then analyze it relative to
its parts, after whlth, l will address,the. consequences of this interpretation

There is a certain ambiguity in the use of the term object throughout the
Critique. Happiness is an object of the will insofar as it is an object of
inclination. The good, or evil is an object of the will insofar as it is an object
· of practical reason. This ambiguity will be treated later in this chapter. See
Lewis White Beck, A·Commentaty on Kant's.Critit(Me ff;Practictd Reason.
(Chicago: University ofChicago .Press, 1960) 9 I fn and 92.
3

4

1n short, these consequences consist of interpreting the highest good under the
rubric of unifier, not only as it appears in the second Critique, but also as it
appears elsewhere in the corpus of Kantian commentary.
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relative to the function of these parts as they are reintegrated into the whole 5

The Summum Bonum and its Parts
Kant's treatment of the highest good in the second Critique could be said
to begin with his discussion of its primary component, "the good" [das Gute].
Kant's discussion of the good rests on his claim that even though a moral will
is to be determined purely by the law, that does not mean that this will is to
be without an object. The will must have an object as a consequence of its

form. The will, Kant says:
could be defined as the faculty of ends, since they are always
determining grounds of the faculty of desire according to
principles. 6

If the will were to be without objects, it would be a will without volitions, and
to be a human will is to be a will with volitions and ends. However, to be a
will with volitions and thus with objects, does not necessarily mean that the
will is dete'rmined by those volitions and objects. To quote Kant:

Now it is certainly undeniable that every volition must have an
5

As a reminder, Kant suggests that it is the task of analysis to:
..grasp correctly the idea of the whole, and then to see all those
parts in their reciprocal interrelations, in the light of their
derivation from the concept of the whole.
CPR, l 0-11 (Beck, 11 ).
. I
6

den Willen durch dlis VemuJgm der Zwecke definieren kmmte, indem. sie jederzeit
&stimmui,gsgriinde Jes. &gehrungwermogens nad, Prinzipien sintl... [Ibid., 59 (61) ].
: ••
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object and therefore a material; but the material cannot be
supposed, for this reason to be the determining ground and
condition of the maxim. If it were, the maxim could not be
presented as giving universal law. 7
Thus in his discussion of the good, Kant demonstrates that the good provides
the moral will with an object. This object of pure practical reason allows the
will to remain autonomous insofar as it is an object that preserves the moral
will' s decision to choose to be determined exclusively by the form of the law

and not by its material. 8 Hence in his discussion of the good, Kant proceeds
to establish that which will serve as the object of the moral will which has as
its determining ground the law. In so doing, Kant is departing from the
classical ethical ttadition whiclt based its moral principles on the good and did
not derive the good from the law, as Kant does. The consequence of the way
in which Kant establishes the moral object not only validates the way in which
his system values ends for action, but it also stresses that although the will

7

Nun ist freilich unleugbar, daft alles Wollen auch einen Gegenstand, mithin eine
Matnie hdbelt milsse; aber dieu ist dtt111m nicht eben der Bestimmu:ngsgrunll rmd
Bedingung der Maxime; denn ist sie es so la.flt diese sich nicht in allgemein gesetzgebender
Form darstellen, [Ibid., 34 (34)].
8

lt would,be useful here to mention that Kant refers variously to the good as
the concept of an object o( pure practical reason ((;PR, 58 [Beck,59]);as the
sole object of a practical reason (CPR, 58 [Beck, 60]); and as an end that is
also a duty (MM, 386 [Gregor, 190]). This is no surprise considering the
multifarious ways in which the good serves the task which Kant has delineated
for it. This will be treated as the chapter develops, but should be pointed out
here in order to highlight the difficulties of Kant's language.

15

requires an object, it is not necessarily determined by such an object. q

In what follows, I will present Kant's discussion of the good, that which
is the object of the good will. This moral concept gains its viability as it
serves to establish the means by which there is a connection between the call
to morality and its claims on the moral will. Typically concepts gain
acceptance to the will through the will' s being determined by the concepts of
the objects it desires. However, in the case of a moral will, in order to remain
autonomous, the will must be determined by nothing but the law itself. For
in a moral will,

The mere fonn of a law, which limits its material, must be a
condition for adding this material to the will but not presuppose
it as the condition of the will. 10
That is, in the connection between the consequences of the moral law and the
law itself, a means must be established through which·we carry out that which
the law requires while remaining true both to the law and to our autonomy.
This task calls into question the relationship between the principles of
morality and their ability to determine our moral will. That is, if the moral

9For a more detailed discussion of the·way in which Kant is not indifferent
to, ends,
89ff.
10

see Mary Gregor, Laws of Freedom (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963),

Also die blo.fte Form eines Geutzes, welche die Materie einschriinkt, mu.ft zugleich ein
Grund sein, diese Materie zum Willen hinzuzuftlgen,, aber sie nidrt vorauszusttzen.
[CPR, 35 (Beck, 35)].
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law is to determine the will, the will must be free; yet in being free, the ground
of the will should not be determined by anything empirical. Hence in being
moral, "a free will must find its ground of determination in the law, but
independently of the material of the law." 11 Although the will of a moral
agent is determined independently of the sensuous world, the same will resides
in and works to bring things about . in the sensuous world. This occurs as the
will brings ~utobjects or states of affairs in the world. Yet in being free, the

groµ.nd of the detennination of the will should not lie in the objects it seeks to

bring about, ~ the determinatiqn of the autonomous will must only be

sub~ to tl:).e.law inJts ground of d(termination. When the law of the will is
the wiU's grqund. of determination, the will determines itseH and is thus
},·'

'

<

autonw,ious.. In.short, if the object ~f the law is to be added to the will as
part ~ parcel o~ the will, and the will is to remain autonomous, its. object
must be determined by the law and not otherwise. 12
By compari,son, in a sensuously determined or heterol\omous will, the

will. is directly determined by .an o~ject, or the concepts of objects. 13 These

11

so mu.fl ein freier Wille, unabhangig von der Materie des Gesetzes, dennoch einen
· Bestimm'llnpgnuul in dem Gesetze antrrJJen. Es ist aber aujer der Materie des Gesetzes
nichts ... [Ibid., 29 (28)].
12
13

•• •

Ibid., 58 (60).

Kant is. particularly careless about his determination here with regard to
whe~r $( will.is dete~4 by ,concepts of ~bje~ pr objects themselves,

17
objects are sought as a consequence of the will desiring these objects. That is,

the sensuously determined will is determined by the concept of the objects it
desires. In any will, when an object serves as the determining ground of the
will, the object is brought about through principles or maxims which serve as

the conditions of the action insofar as they are the conditions that the agent
fulfills as she works towards bringing about these objects. Consequently, all
principles have ·material insofar as they seek to bring about the material of an
object, insofar as the material is determined by its object. Yet it must'be
differentiated that tin bringing about objects, although all principles ·have
mAtt!rial •. (since al volition's have objects),· all principles are not material

principles.; ·A,principle is ailed a materiat principle only if its material directly
•

I

causes the action bld\lght aboo.t by the principle. That is, when an action is

brought about as a direct ·consequence of dte material· of the object, the will
can be said to have been determined by the ·material of the object; thus the
will wasdetetmined:by a mattrial:prindple. Hence, a will that is determined

by an objtct has a material principle or maxim.
It should, however, be noted that a will can still be subject to bringing
about objects and not have a material maxim. This is the case when the .
material of th.e will has not determined the object, but something other than
/

see footnote number ~n, as ~n as Beck's discussion of the very same; and
an example of the problems Mth this translation, [Ibid., 58 (5 9)].
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the object provides the condition for the principle or maxim which aims at

bringing about the object or state of affairs. 14
Consequently, if the Kantian moral law is to have any efficacy in the
world, in that it is able to allow the will to pursue objects, it must be able to
allow the will to bring about objects or states of affairs independently of the

will being determined externally. That is, the law must be able to capitalize on
the will' s ability to not always be determined by material principles in its

realization of objects. Without this freedom from material determination all
determinations of the law are contingent, empirical, and unable to lead to the
law as a determination of the will, because:
· All practical principles which presuppose an object (material) of
the faculty of desire as the determining ground of the will are
without exception ,empirical and can furnish :no practical laws. 15
Therefore, freedom from hetcronomy is only possible when the decision as to
whether or not to bring about an action (realize an object) is made
independently of a material principle. That is, there is no object presupposed
as the detennimng ground of the will. Thus the will is able to be free from

See Onora O'Neill Constructions of Rc:ason (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989) 83-89 for a discussion of the formulation of maxims
and their universality and subjectivity for objects of desire. See also, CPR, 2021 (Beck, 18·19).
14

15

Alle praktischen Prinzipien, die ein Objekt (Materie) des Begehrungsvermogens als
Bestimmungsgnuul des Willms vurllussetzen, sind insgesamt empirisch u,ul k/Jnnen keine
praktischen Gesetze abgeben. [CPR, 21 (Beck 19)].

19
empirical determination. In these freely determined instances, the maxim or

principle of the will is not determined by the object or end towards which it
aims. So, if the will is not to be sensuously determined, which would be
impossible if the will were to remain autonomous, the source of the
determination of the will must lie elsewhere than in its empirically determined
objects. In stresmng that the will can possibly be free from direct
determination by objects, Kant asserts that the will can be free, and such a free
will has chosen.to be determined "by the law.of reason" alone.·16

Yet if the will is to have any effect, the will must bring about objects.
Kant has always recognized that to be human is to be purposive, seeking to
satisfy the conatus of human existence by bringing about objects and satisfying
desires. Hence, if the law is to be practically effective it must not thwart what
it is to be human, nor must it serve the sensuous aspects of the very same. 17
Consequently, a moral will does bring about objects; yet as was stated above,
in so doing, these objects must not be the ground of the will but rather objects

that come about as a consequence of the will being determined by the law.
Hence, if the will is to be subject to the law, in seeking its objects, these

16

sofern dieser durchs Vernunftgesetz bestimmt wird... [lbid., 60 (62)]. In addition,
see Beck, Commentaxy. l 30ff.
I

l7For a discussion of human action as purposive see Gregor,
Freedom, 79ff.

Laws of

20
objects must be pursued and organized under an object or consist of an object

that will be compatible with practical reason. As such, the object will hold
sway with the will, and will be determined by the principles of the moral law.
That is,. this object will fulfill the demands of our supersensuous self as the
object is a consequence of and not a ground of the law.
The object that Kant proposes as the object of the moral will is the
concept of the moral good; for the good can be the only concept of an object
of the pure practical reason as such. In.being so determined, Kant informs us
that:

By a concept of an object of practical reason I understand the
idea of an object as an effect possible through freedom. 18
The good satisfies the above criterion insofar as it conforms with the
requirements of freedom as reflected in the free will. This is the case since the
good is derived from the practical law and in no way serves as its ground. In
so doing, it allows the will to remain autonomous, freely determined, and
effective insofar as it has an object.

As the object of a practical reason, the good serves as "a necessary

18

Unter einem Begriffe eines Gegmstandes der pralctisdtm V ernunft verstehe ich die
VOT'fldung eines Ob~ a'ls,einer moglichm Wirkung mch Freiheit. [CPR, 58
(Be~S9)].

21
object of the faculty of desire ... according to a principle of reason. " 19 It is a

necessary object insofar as its pursuit is not optional. That is, the good is

an

object of desire as compared to evil, which is an object of aversion. It is to be
desired as a consequence of the setting of a good will. That is, the effects
possible by means of an autonomous will are necessarily good insofar as the
autonomy of the will is ptesetved. Furthermore, its origin and worth lie in
practical reason and the principles. of practical r~n and only as such is the
good allowable as a concept of pure practical reason-an effect possible through
freedom. 20
Throughout this analysis it should be emphasized that Kant has two
different JlleaJ\Uilgf at work for "object". An object. can be something out there
in the world for which we have .a desire and thus we seek to bring about the

particular state of affairs through our action, by which the desire for this
something is satisfied. Hence the object is an object of desire. In addition,

19

••• einm

notwmtligen Gegauta,ul des &g#hrwnplurch... nach einem Prinzip der

Vernunft. [Ibid., (60)].
20

It should be noted here that Kant refers to the good [das Gute] --( as well as
evil [das Bo.re]) vcmously as an object9.(p;r~ou reason~ as an object of
pure practical reason. This variation can be seen in both forms in one page of
Kant's~ (e.g. 58). However, in the title to this section he refers to The
Concept of an Object of Pure Practical Reason [Von dem Begriffe eines
Gegenstandes der reinen pralctischen Vernunft], hence I have followed Kant's lead
in referring to the good as that object of pure practical reason (as has Beck in
his COQUJ\Cfttaty).

22
Kant uses the term object to describe an internal setting of the will insofar as
this setting forms a part:icular disposition of the will. That is, the particular
setting of the will is the will' s object, (or another translation could be the will' s
objective). The setting of the will, as good or evil, is the object of the will as a
consequence of the will having made the adoption of this particular moral
disposition its object or goal. With relation to the moral will and its setting,

the form of the principles of the law have determined what as an object, for
the disposition or setting of the will, is and is not good.

The object of the will, as the object of pure practical -reason, is
determined by the! law and in no way externally determined. This
determh\atiQn of goodness occurs irrespective of whether or not the object is
possible or mrt.ua:l insofar a it takes place in the world This determination of
the will (in adopting the good as its object), presents the moral object-the
good-to the will as its determination, and as the object of its principles for
act.ion. · This notion of act.ion, since it coincides with the inner disposition 6f a

moral will coincides with the latter sense of object as discussed above. 21
Hence the good, as the object of pure practical reason is not an effect of
act.ion insofar as it consists of bringing about a state of affairs in the world..
This object has not material. Instead, the good consists in the act of the will

21

CPR,. 58 (Beck, 59); see also Beck,

Commcnt.aty. 133-36.
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in committing or determining itself. Thus, a good will in having the good as
its object has itself as its object, since in so doing the will provides itself with
its own underlying moral disposition. This can be likened to the way in which
humanity serves as an end in itself, as the categorical imperative takes
humanity as its object. In the case of both the good and humanity, the end as
object does not consist of a state of affairs in the world as much as it refers to
what comes before states of affairs, as a requirement to be included within the
command of the law. Both ends-humanity and the moral good-are
compatible with the command of the law and thereby follow from it as they
bring vision to the law in supplying an object ,for the will.

'This good is compatible as an object, with the moral law, insofar as it
consists of that status of ,the will as it is a will determined by the moral law. It
is an internally required state of affairs, as a setting of the will morally
determined such that "a principle of reason is thought of as already the
determining ground of the will ... (and thus as a determining ground only

through the lawful form of the maxim.)"22 Through the good, it is as if Kant
sets as the object of the moral will "a moral will." Thus the object of a moral
will as the good, is a will of a certain disposition. In this manner, the will has

22

ein Vernunftprinzip wird schon an sich als der &stimmungsgntnd des Willens
gedadtt... (also bloft surch die gesetzliche Form der Ma.rime.) [CPR, 62 (Beck, 64)].

24
itself, and its ovvn perfection as its object. 23

In the moral will.having the good as its object and hence its own
perfection as its object, Kant is demanding that the will be virtuous. In the
Analytic, Kant does not make this point completely evident, but when the
analytic is read in conjunction with what Kant later says about the good in the
dialectic this point becomes obvious. 24 In further describing the good will as a
virtuous will, the demands of the law arc made more clear. That is, through
understanding what Kant means by.virtue and the command to be virtuous,
we learn what is demanded by the law as a consequence of the recognition that
the good is the only possible object of the will For example, with· regard to
virtue, Kant ~
The utmost that finite practical reason can accomplish is to make
sure of the unending progress of its maxims toward this model
(the holy will) and of the constancy of the finite rational being in
making continuous progress. This is virtue, and as a naturally

23

CPR, 58ff (Beck, 60ff ); see also Beck,

Commentazy.

135ff.

24

1n the beginning of Chapter Two of the Dialectic, Kant says:
That virtue (as the worthiness to be happy) is the supreme
condition of whatever appears to.us to be desirable and thus of
iUl qur pursuit of happiness and, co~quently, that it is the
: supreme good hav~ [sic] been proved in the Analytic.
Daft Tugmd (al$ du Wurdigkeitp glucklich zu sein) du oberste Betling,mg alles tlessm,

mis uns nur wunschenswert sclzeilien mag, mithin auch aller unserer &werbung um
Gluckseligkeit, mithin tlas oberste Gut sei, ist in tier Ana{ytik bewiesen worden.
[CPR, 110 (Beck 114)].

25
acquired faculty, it can never be perfect ... 25

Virtue, for Kant, means nothing more than a serious concerted effort towards
successful moral progress. In being human, Kant recognizes that we are not
holy wills, but rather a combination of what is supersensuous and sensuous.
Thus, in calling us to be virtuous, being virtuous is no more than being ·a
"moral disposition in conflict. "26 However, a virtuous will is also no less than
constant striving towards making the human will in conflict approximate a
holy will insofar as it is possible, as determined by the law, and the object of
the moral will, the good.
This good is obviously not a subjective sense of good. Instead, this good
is that moral good to which any rational will would assent, merely because it is
a rational will. Kant stresses that the good is not optional. It is not to be
confused with any sort of hedonistic or pleasure based good. It is the good
that springs from the law and not vice versa. This is the case because:
... the moral law is that which first defines the concept of the
good--so far as it absolutely deserves this name--and makes it

25

ins.

Von -welchem
Unendliche gehenden Progressus seiner Maximm und
Unwandelbarkeit derse"lben ZJtm-bestllndigen Furtschreiten sicher zu sein: d.i. Tugend,
ails Pllchste 1st, was nulltclre praktiscke Vernunft bewtrken kann, die selbst wiederum
wenigstens als natilrlich mvorbenes VennDgen nie vollendet sein kann, [Ibid., 32/33
(33)].
26

I

moralische Gesinnung im Kampfe, [Ibid., 84 (87)].

26
possible. 27

As such, its pursuit is necessary to the will that is subject to the law of reason.

We relate to the good as an inner call to perfection through which our own
will is made to be as moral as possible. The good relates to the moral will and

the. bringing about of states of affairs which are determined by this setting of
the will; that is, the good determines those actions brought about through the
maxims dictated by the good will. This is the case because:
...good (or evil) always indicates a relation to the will so far as it
is determined by the law of reason to make something its object,
for the will is never determined directly by the object and our
conception of it; rather, the will is a faculty which can make an
object real.• Thus good or evil are properly referred to actions and
not the the sensory state of the person. 28

In a good will, or in a will that has adopted the good as its object, actions that
follow from this will are perfectly good, because their possibility as moral is
already secured since the form of the law and "the object, so far as the object

27

sondern umgekehrt das moralische Gesetz allererest den Begriff des Guten, sofern es
diesm Name schluhthm verdlent, bestimme und miJglich mache. [Ibid., 64 ( 66)].
28

Das Gute oder Bise bedaltet .aberjederzeit eine Beziehung auj den Willen, sofern

dieser durchs Vernunftgesetz bestimmt wird, sich etwas zu seinem Objelcte zu machen;
wie er limn lurch daS, Objekt und des,,-n VtJTstellung,n~ Jm11Uttelbar bestimmt
wird, sondern ein VermDgen ist, sich eine Regel der vernunft zur Bewegursache einer
Handlung dadurch em Object witklich werden hinn) zu machen. Das Gute oder Bose
witd also eigintlich au/ Handlungen, nicht au/ den Empfindungszustand der Person
bezogm; [Ibid., 60 (62)].

27
is the moral good, of the maxim coincide. " 29 It is in this manner that the

moral good serves as the criterion by which actions are to be measured. As the
moral will that has the good as its object has a good disposition, all of its
objects are thus conditioned and can thereby be considered good as well.
Thus, actions that follow from the moral good are perfectly good actions that
further the moral •status of the good will.
To summarize, the moral good is the object that the moral law holds
before us as a command to make our will more moral and to perfect our
rational nature iRS()far as it consists of what it is to be a rational will and thus
tatioruilly·will th~t which brings about moral objects. As the object of a pure
practical~ a:nd,deter-mined· as· sueh it has the ability to serve· as the
measuring stick :by which we·can assess our actions .and· hence it· also serves as
that which classifies actions and objects in the world as desirable, relative to·
the law. For a truly moral action would have its source in such a will and
thereby'be good.
With this presentation and analysis of the good in place, we can move
on to its relation to that other part of the highest good, happiness. That is,
the moral good· alone is not enough to account for all of our actions; it
accounts only for those actions that are perfectly good insofar as they follow
/
2

9Beck, Commentazy. 134.
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from the good will. This could be a possible state of affairs for angels, or for

other non~sensuous beings, but it falls terribly short of the human condition.
Hence, as we are both noumenal and phenomenal moral agents, we have
myriad desires, and obviously not every volition will have as its object, or be
able to be conditioned by, some thing that is completely good. Even so, this
does not mean that the resulting object is thus perfectly evil. Kant recognizes
that as humans, we would have desires for other things than those which
would fit under the criterion of the concept of the object of the pure moral

good.. 'fhcse rcsultingdcsires.forw:hich the purely moral will and its object
cannot alone aa:oun~ Kant t.etms happiness.
.Jn what follows, I will present ,a brief discussion of the other component
in Kant's highest good, happiness.· I will do so only briefly since a lengthy
treatment of happiness is not germane to this task. Instead, what is presently
at· stake is: 1 )why does Kant seek to establish happiness as the second
comportcnt of the highest good and 2) what broadly does Kant mean by
happiness in this context? Obviously, both of these are very complex
questions which, in their abundance of controversy, have been treated
elsewhere. 30 I will seek to avoid these controversies through beginning my
30

For an in~epth discussion of the controversy surrounding the role of
happiness in Kant's ethic, and a defense of its importance, see Victoria S.
Wike, Kant on Happiness in Ethics, (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1994 ).

29
discussion of happiness in Kant with the presupposition of the veracity of

Kant's own claim that happiness plays an important role in his ethical project.
Through the moral good, Kant has established what he calls the
supreme good. As such, it is the unconditional condition, that which is not
subordinate to any other condition. 31 The moral good, as a setting of the will,
is that condition under which all other pursuits of the will must be
conditioned. However, other things are desirable to the moral will. As has
been previously established, in order for the moral will to be truly practical, it
must bring things about•in the world. Yet, the good only accounts·for the
objects whidt can· be subsumed under that which is wholly moral ·If Kant's
account ofsthe moral will were to stop here, many desires for other objects
would be left out of the picture.· To completely account for the objects .of .the
moral will, Kant articulates that the moral good is not the only good, that is;
for the most complete good, "happiness is also required. "32 .
Happiness is required as the second component of the highest good
because the moral law would be absurd if those that were worthy of happiness
were to go without it. As strange as this may seem, since everyone is aware of
many cases where seemingly worthy people are terribly unhappy through no

31

CPR, 110 (Beck 114).

32.wird auch Gluckseligkeit dazu erfordert, [Ibid., 110 (114)].

30
fault of their own, Kant holds that to merit happiness through moral worth,

and go without, would demonstrate that the moral law was contradictory. The
law would lead to a contradiction insofar as the law would be creating a
command that would lead to the perversion of the natural end of the moral
species as it seeks to fulfill its own happiness. Kant explains why this is the
case, as he explains that happiness is required to be achieved by those
deserving of it,
not merely .in the partial eyes of a person who makes himself his
end but even in the judgment of an impartial reason, which
impartially regards persons in the world as ends-in-themselves.
For to be in need of happiness and also worthy of it and yet not
to partake of it could not be in accordance with the complete
volition of an omnipotent rational being, if we assume such only
for the sake of the argument. 33
The point of this passage consists in Kant's appeal to the order in the world

that is perpetuated by the moral law and furthered by the idea of an
omnipotent rational being. In such an ordered world, if one were worthy of
happiness, such happiness would be forthcoming. The world must be so
ordered, according to Kant, or else the moral law would be contradictory.

33

Zwar nicht blofl in den parteiischen Augen der Person. die sich silbst zum Zwecla
macht, sondern selbst im Urteil einer unparteiischen V ernunft, die jene uberhaupt in der
Welt· asl Zweck an sich betraehtet. Denn der Gliickse.ligk.eit bedurftig, ihrer auch
wurdig, dennoch aber derselben nicht teilhaftig zu sein, kann mit dem vollkommenen
Wollen.eines vernanftigen Wesens, welches zugleich all Gewalt hiltte, wenn wir uns auch
nur mi soldtl8 zum·.Vmuche denkl,,, garnicht ZJUtlmmen beslllmi. [Ibid, 110
(114/5)].
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Kant has thereby established happiness as that other aspect of the highest

good such that the moral law is not to be in conflict with the natural ends of
human moral agents.
In order for the highest good to live up to its claim of being the bonum

consummatum, or most complete good, it must thereby account for happiness as
a desire of rational beings. That is, in providing a complete object for pure
practical reason, the highest good must actually be the will' s most complete
object. As it is, moral interests alone do not completely account for the
interests of the human moral will. It is the nature of all human will, moral or
otherwise, to desire happiness. Kant says, "To be happy is necessarily the
desire of eve:ry rational but finite being." 34 If the highest good were not to
account for happiness, Kant's highest good would further supplement the
various arguments propounded against Kant which accuse his moral system of
not being a realistic one for rational but finite beings. In addition, in failing to
account for happiness, the highest good would not live up to its claim of being
the most complete object of the moral will.
From the above discussion it is clear that the highest good, in seeking to
be the most complete object of the moral will, does include happiness. Hence,
it is left to consider what Kant means by happiness in this context. In the case

3x;lileklit:h zu sein, ist notwendig das Verumgen jedes vernunftigm, 11ber endli&hm
Wesens [Ibid., 25 (24)].
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of happiness as the second component of the highest good, Kant means by
happiness the non-moral goods that the agent pursues. This sense of
happiness can best be understood as a sensible one. In this sense, happiness is
a "determinant of the faculty of desire" through which we fulfill our non-moral
needs.35 Kant further classifies happiness as:
the condition of.a rational being in the world, in whose whole
existence everything goes according to wish and will. 36
This is a sensible definition of happiness insofar as Kant is careful to express
that it is a condition of happiness for a being "in the world". This condition
is comprised of those objects that are pursued merely for the sensuously
positive effects they may have on us.
Furthermore, once we have adopted the moral good as a determining
principle for the moral will; we are still left with the task of pursuing objects in
the world. In so doing, not all objects will necessarily be determined by the
moral will, some objects that are brought about by the law will not even have
moral import, (e.g. what flavor ice cream to eat on a hot summer day).
Through being human, we are required to pursue some ends that are not
perfectly moral; however, this does not mean that they are immoral either.

35

Bestimmungsgrund seines Begehrungsvermogens [Ibid., 25 (24)].
I

3

I

6Glueks1ligknt ist der Zmand eines vernilnftigen Wesens in .dlr Wilt,. dan es· im
Ganze,, seiner F,xistenz alles nach Wunsch und Willen geht. [Ibid., 124 (129)].
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About this very condition, Lewis White Beck writes that a consequence of our

"devotion to the moral good does not require renunciation of other
goods; ... Some desires are compatible with devotion to the good or can be
made compatible with it. "37 That is, although we are faced with desires that
may compete with the moral good, by their mere presence we are not doomed
to failure before we make a moral action. Other desires that are present in the
will are entirely permissible without running into contradiction with the moral

law. Yet these ends must be subsumed, conditioned and tempered by the

influence of our perfected or sought to be perfected rational nature, which
seeks as its highest end its own perfection. 38

In short; alt.ltough we are to supremely desire the good, it is clear that
other desires can be compatible with this over-arching desire, namely those
desires Kant organizes under the desire for happiness. This is permissible

within the Kantian scheme as long as the desire for happiness is subsumed
\tnder the determination of that will which has the moral good as its object.
As Kant explains:

... virtue (as the worthiness to be happy) is the supreme condition
of whatever appears to us to be desireable and thus of all our

37

Beck,

38

Commentaty. 136.

As Beck explains, ''The only purpose of moral action as such is to secure
the teign of law, and every moral action in part accomplishes this aim." [Ibid.,

136].

34
pursuit of happiness ... 39

Hence, the desire for happiness need not be thrown away, although it must be
tempered by the good, and pursued only on condition that the form of its
pursuit is dictated by the good
Thus, in the same way the moral good, as an object of the moral will,
serves as the rubric under which all perfectly good moral actiQn can be
subsumed, happiness serves as an overarching rubric under which all of our
desires for objects •Of self inteiest ( as non-moral) can be subsumed. With
these treatments of each of the constitutive parts of Kant's highest good in
place, the analysis now moves on to that way in which the highest good is
established as a unifier of the. duality of our human wills. As a part of the
recognition that the highest good is made up of two heteronomous parts, Kant
recognizes that all of the not purely moral objects of desire must still be
t

compatible with and not contradict the desire for the absolutely moral, moral
good. Thus, the will' s desire for the moral good, in desiring that it be a
morally good will is that which is required as the will's over-arching desire.

39

Dafl Tugend (als die Wurdigkeit, gliicklich zu sein) die oberste Bedingung alks
dessen, was uns nur wunschenswert scheinen mag, mithin auch all.er unserer Bewerbung
um Gl;;ekseligke;it, [CPR, 110 (Beck 114)].
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The Highest Good as a Dialectical Ideal of Reason

In the Dialectic section of the second Critique, the highest good appears
against the backdrop of unpacking reason's confusion over what the practically
unconditioned is, a consequence which demonstrates that the highest good
provides for the completeness of human experience and the unification of all
of the human desires under one concept. Through the concept of the highest
good, as it unifies the heterogeneous aspects of ourselves, Kant .gains for the
moral project a theoretical completeness and unity. In what follows I will
concentrate on Kant's demonstration of the highest good as a unifying concept
of reason as it appears in the Dialectic section of the second Critique.
Since it has been previously established that desires for happiness are
compatible with.the supreme moral good, Kant points us towards the pursuit
of something still beyond the supreme moral good through which our pursuit
of the supreme moral good and our pursuit of happiness are able to be united.
That is,· this supreme moral good is not the highest good, it is not the
summum bonum. For it is only through the summum bonum as the unifier of
the two,he~rogeneous aspects of.existence (virtue and happiness) that we are
provided w.itl}. . "the concept of a supreme end which unites all other ends."40 It
is in this sense that I refer to the highest good as a unifier, as that which

40

Beck, Commentary. 242.

36
unites all other ends. That is, the summum bonum is that end, as the object

of a moral agent, through which the two heterogeneous ends of ourselves are
united into one. This unification of ends is not satisfied by the supreme object
of the moral law, the "good", since that is merely the object that is desired by
and rules over the moral will. The moral good alone is unable to provide that
object which umfies the other ends that arise as a consequence of moral agents
being both phenomenal and noumenal. That is, there is a .difference in the

notions of the good as they are presented in the Analytic and the Dialectic. 41
To summarize, in the Analytic, we have the moral good as it has been
propounded in the above sections, while in the Dialectic we arrive at the
highest~ .that to which we will proceed. The highest good involves a
moral system that entails an amalgamation of our phenomenal and noumenal
selves. As such, it must incorporate both moral and non-moral, or even
morally neutral desires. This requires ;a connection between the moral good
and these other goods under a moral system. 42

41

Kant refers to the high~ good variously· as both an end and an object.

This point is rarely addressed directly in the secondary literature, however
mention 9f it is m~ explicitly by John Atwell in his work Ends and Principles
·in Kant's Moral Thought. (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers) 1986,
102ff.,
42

As Beck.ex.plains in his oommerttary: .
While the Analytic, in the doctrine of the moral good, taught
that the moral good is the sole object of pure practical reason, the
Dialectic does not abstract from all the diverse purposes of will

37
This connection of human ends and objects, which Kant accomplishes

through the highest good, is the a priori synthetic combination of the moral
good as bonum supremum and the totality of all other goods, which Kant
sums up as happiness. Kant names this concept the bonum consummatum
or the complete good. This combination accounts for the unity and ability of
the pure practical reason to account for the pursuit of all ends. It is a unifying
concept of the dual aspect of our will as phenomenal and noumenal.. In
addition, this unity is able to account for our human moral purposiveness as it
projects an end for moral action 1hat accounts for all ends of the moral

individual1ay accounting for happiness conditioned by virtue. 43

This unity is expressed by Kant as an a priori unity. 44 As such,·it is not
an empirical unity; but rather, the Jughest good .as a unifier is a theoretical .

concept in that it accounts for the unity of happiness and virtue in the
theoretical realm. That is, virtue and happiness are enacted in the practical
realm, b1.lt.the issue of their w.lification is an issue for theoretical reason, "a

but defines the condition under which they can and must be
synthesized in, a single system.
.· [Beck, Commenwy, 242J;
43

CPR, 110 (Bede, 114)1

44

For as Kant says, "The highest good is a synthesis ofconcepts... " and as
such a synthesis, "this combhlation is know as a priori." ..s""""1, eine Synthesis
der Begriffe sei. Weil aber dine Verbindung Ills a priori, [Ibid., 113 ( 117)].
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practical problem which is assigned solely by pure reason and without any

concurrence of sensuous incentives. "45
As an aside, it is of interest here to note that although in this section
of the second Critique Kant refers to the sumrnum bonum, the highest good as
the bonum consummatum, he refers to this very same concept in varied ways,
if only in this work alone. That is, in the second Critique alone, Kant refers to
the highest good as the summum bonum, bonum consummatum, the Kingdom
of God and the intelligible world. For present purposes, my investigation is
only concerned with the sumrnum bonum as it is expressed as the highest good
which is made up of the bonum supremum and happiness, resulting in the most
perfect good or 1"'num consummatum. 46 Insofar as this is the notion of the
highest good as bonum consummatum, with which this aspect of the analysis
is concerned, this concept has been treated. 47

45

praktischen Aufgabe, welche ohne alien Beitritt sinnlicher Triebfedern blofl durch
reine Vemunft vorgeschrieben wird, [Ibid., 124 (128)).
46

.As bonum consummatum see: CPR, 110 (Beck, 114); as Kingdom of God
see: CPR, 129 and 131 (Beck, 133 and 135); as intelligible word see: CPR,
133 (Beck, 13 7). See also Beck's mention of the very same, in which he notes
the disparity of terms but deems it unnecessary to give them individual
treatment [Beck, Commentacy. 242, (fn 11)].
47

lnsofar as Kant describes the highest good as consisting of the kingdom of
God, that conception of the surtunum bonum will receive treatment in
Chapter Three, while the· conception of the sumntum bonum as an intelligible
-world wm ·receive treatment in Chapter Two.
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Once Kant articulates the summum bonum as bonum consummatum he

moves on to address how it is that this concept is possible. This is the matter
with which the antinomy of practical reason is concerned. This concern must
take place in the antinomy:
... since the possibility of the highest good therefore rests on no
empirical principles, the deduction of this concept must be
transcendental. It is a priori (morally) necessary to bring forth
the highest good through the freedom of the will; the condition
of its possibility, therefore, must rest solely on a priori grounds of
knowledge. 48
In the antinomy, Kant seeks to establish how it is that the highest good as the
unity of two heterogeneous concepts of our will is possible. This possibility,
since it surpasses expression through the categories of space and time, is
established transcendentally. The establishment of the highest good since it is
such a complex object and morally necessary has its origin and establishment
in a priori reason. Thus, the possibility of the highest good is grounded

through pure practical reason's a priori "expression in theoretical reason.
Furthermore, the possibility of the highest good is of central focus
throughout the rest of the Dialectic. With regard to this Dialectic, it is
somewhat unusual that Kant would have a dialectic of pure practical reason
48

Und die Moglichkeit des hikhsten Guts also au/ keinen empirischen Prinzipim
beruht so wird die Deduktion dieses Begriffs transzendental sein miissen. Es ist a priori
(moralisch) notwendig, das hochst( Gut durch Freiheit des Willens hervorzubringen; es
mu.ft also auch die Bedingung der milglichkeit desselben lediglich au/ Erkmntnisgriinden a
priori heruhm. [CPR., 113 (Beck, 117)].

40
since it is not expected that in practice practical reason would over-extend

itself. However, Kant promises us a dialectic that will address an illusion of
practical reason as exposed through its very own judgments. It is important to
appreciate that the Dialectic does not arise as a consequence of pure practical
reason in its practical use. Instead, it arises as pure practical reason seeks to go
beyond its practical use.
In his analysis of this Dialectic, Beck very succinctly presents its implicit
assumptions. The following summarizes his presentation.

l )So far as pure practical reason is practical, it has no dialectic
and creates no illusions because it issues no declarative
statements.
2)So far as pure practical reason is reason, it seeks the
UllCQnditioned condition for its actions and judgments and
decisions.
3 )In seeking the unconditioned, pure practical reason is
theoretical reason employing practical data.
4)The unconditioned condition for pure practical reason is the
summum bonum, that which is at stake in the present antinomy. 49
Through the highest good, Kant establishes the concept through which
practical reason searches for its unconditioned condition. In this notion of the
highest good, .qot only are our heteronomous ends united, but as Beck argues,
we theoretically seek to unite the pursuit of our theoretical and practical

49

Beck, Commentary. 242-246.
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reason as ,vell. '50 This can also be seen as unification of the supersensuous and

E.

sensuous realms. That is, we have our pursuit of the ends of the

~-

-

supersensuous realm--the moral good and the sensuous realrn--happiness.
They are united in the highest good. Furthermore, we have the pursuit of an
unconditioned condition insofar as we are superscnsuously driven by our

reason; this is the unconditioned condition for those conditions subject to our
practical sensuous concerns. As such, the highest good as the unconditioned
condition setves as the sum of all conditions (virtue and happiness) thereby
uniting the duality of our human nature. 51

Tt> summarize, it is very important to appreciate what is being
accomplished as a result of this Dialectic. That is, the highest good is being
consid~red from a theoretical perspective; or at the very least, its practical
aspects are being considered theoretically. As a result of this consideration, we

are left with a concept of the highest good which unifies the two legislations of

~ ' ~ that•this is the

case since in addressing the highest good we are

led to a consideration of the question, "What may I hope?" [Ibid.]
'

51

,,

,,

\

As Beck explains:
Explicitly, there is one illusion arising from the fact that practical reason is
reason and therefore seeks the unconditioned ... .it may seek the unconditioned
as the totality of the object ofpure practical reason in the concept of the
highest good and seek to know it theoretically.
[Ibid., 241].
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our will. This is a unification of ourselves as nournenal and phenomenal and

as supersensuous and sensuous selves. This unification also manifests itself as
we consider not only the way in which our supersenuous and sensuous
concerns of reason are united, but also the way in which our supersensuous
and sensuous ends as moral agents are united. As was discussed earlier in this
chapter, it is through the highest good that our supersensuous end-the moral
good, is united with our sensuous end-happiness. The consequences of this

will be discussed further, once the nature of the antinomy has been

, With this background established, we now tum to the issue of the
antinomy itself. ,Imwhat follows, I will summarize K.apt's antinomy, the
structure of which has been called into question. That is, it has been
questioned whether or not what Kant has expressed as an antinomy of pure
practical reason is actually a legitimate antinomy. 52 For present purposes I will
ignore this contl'Overs.y since it is not germane to the issue at hand, which is
what is at stake in the antinomy for Kant, as Kant presents it.
To be~ Kant denies the following thesis: striving for happiness
produces a ground for a virtuous disposition. This denial is obvious as a

~l.ewis White Beck argues tlmt the antinomy of the Dialectic is not a real
antinomy insofar as it does not contain a real thesis and antithesis, and hence
there is not so much at stake in this antinomy. [Ibid., 247ff].
5

43
consequence of Kant's discussion of the law as that alone which can serve for

L

the ground of a virtuous disposition. If the striving for happiness were to serve
as a ground for a disposition, the disposition would not only be heteronomous,
but far from virtuous. With regard to the antithesis of the antinomy, Kant
asserts that it is not absolutely impossible that a virtuous disposition could

necessarily produce happiness. This is false insofar as a virtuous disposition is
regarded as the form of causality in the world of sense. That is, it is false if
e,dstence is merely understood as that existence which occurs in the sensuously
cobditioned world, as the only mode of e,nstence that is possible for a rational
t,eq.53,

Kant allows that it is possible for a virtuous disposition to necessarily
produce happiness if:

1 )the moral agent· is justified in thinking of her
existence as that of a noumenon in an intelligible
world.
2 )the moral agent has in the moral law a pure
intellectual determining ground of her causality
insofar as it takes place in the sensuous world.
It is not impossible that the morality of intention
should have a necessary relation as cause to
happiness as an effect in the sensuous world. 54

53

Es mu.ft also entweder die Begierde nach Gl-/lckseligkeit die Bewegursache zu
Maximen der Tugend, oder die maxime der Tugend mu.ft die wirkende Ursache der
Gluckseligknt sein. [CPR, 113, (Beck 117/118)].
54

lbid., 113/114 (117/118).
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Hence in typical Kantian style, the apparent antinomy is put to rest. This

quieting is accomplished as we come to the appreciation that we reside in the
noumenal as well as the phenomenal realms. This antinomy arises as the
establishment of the highest good as the combination of morality with
happiness was called into question. The questioning arises Kant says through
the misconception of difficulty in conceiving of bringing about the highest

good. Obviously, if we were limited to the world of sense and its faculties the
highest good would be alarmingly difficult. Yet when the relationship between
appearances is no lon~r perceived as a relationship of these appearances to

things in themselves, the moral law is given vision as it appears through the
actual noumenal realm.
The notion of the highest good so expressed is accomplished by means
of the cause and effect relation of virtue to happiness. This relation is
indirect, since any sort of direct causality would be impossible since it would
somehow require an immediate reward of happiness for virtuous action,
requiring direct control over the causality of nature (imaginable perhaps, but
nonetheless impossible in the Kantian scheme). This indirect relation is
mediated by God which Kant thereby describes as "an intelligible Author of
nature. "55 Hence this combination of virtue and happiness can occur only

55

Eines intelligibelen .Urhebers du Natur [Ibid., 115 (l l 9)J.

45
contingently in a system of nature which is merely the object of the senses

•--.

and, as such, is not sufficient for the highest good.

56

~

It is through this apparent antinomy that the highest good accomplishes

I

a primary aspect of its ultimate role in the Kantian project. 57 This role
•

consists in the ability of the summum bonum to deal with the way in which

pure reason in its practical applicationis able to account for and unify the two
pursuits of a finite rational being. These pursuits consist of the pursuit of the
ends and objects of the supersensuously and sensuously determined moral
agent. The question of how the summum bonum is possible is answered
through the antinomy. That is, the possibility of the highest good is
guaranteed as we recognize (as in the other antinomies) that ~ are not always
limited to seek moral possibilities in the realm of nature. For present purposes
the solution to the antinomy is of little import. What is of consequence is the

role that it provides for the summum bonum. 58 Thus relative to its

5

6The constitutive role which God plays, as the guarantor of the highest
good will ·receive in depth treatment in Chapters Three and Five.
57

1.ewis White Beck has contended that this role as a dialectical ideal of
reason is the only role that the highest good legitimately seives in Kant's
project. The incorrectness and limitedness of this position will be treated in
Chapter Five.
5

%e only other possible·consequence of the summum bonum is its seIVing

as the anchor for the postulattrs that guarantee its possibility. See Beck,
GointPmtu:y, 248ff. In addition, this perspective is given considerable
treatment in the work of Sharon Anderson-Gold. See especially Sharon

46
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presentation in the Dialectic of this Critique, the role of the highest good is

•

limited to that of a unifier insofar as it is a dialectical ideal of reason, the

i=. · .:

consequences of which entail its accomplishing the unification of the dual

•

aspects of ourselves as moral agents in the world.

The Consequences of the Highest Good as Unifier ·
~

In the previous sections of this chapter, the•highest good was

established as that concept which serves as a unifier· of our superscnsuous and
sensuously determined moral selves. This assertion has led us to examine the

highest good as a unifier of the$e two disparate parts of our moral selves. To
summarize, in this chapter I have sought to demonstrate that one of the major
roles that the highest good plays is that of unifier. By unifier, I mean that the
highest good unifies the dual aspects of the human will insofar as it is
supersensuously driven to be grounded in the moral law (and thus to pursue
the moral good as its object) and insofar as it is sensuously driven to fulfill its
empirical desires (and thus pursue its own happiness). This was demonstrated
to be the case as a result of the way in which the highest good is established as

· a relationship between the good, as the object of the moral will and happiness.
Anderson-Gold, "God and Community: An Inquiry into the Religious
Implications of the Highest Good," in Kant's Philosophy of Religion
Reconsidered, edited by Rossi and Wreen (Indiana: Indiana University Press,
1991) 113-31.

47
This is a union vvhose possibility, as a dialectical ideal of reason, was treated in

ii(
-=:'

-·
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the antinomy of pure practical reason. Thus, as a result of this analysis we· are
left with a comprehensive understanding of the highest good as unifier through
which we are inf?rmed as to how it is to serve in the Kantian moral project,
not only as it appears in the second Critique, but also as it appears elsewhere in
the corpus of Kantian commentary. With the highest good established as
unifier, we can next understand the way in which it is presenteed in the second
major role, that of a final end for action, or moral ideal which serves as a guide
for conduct.

CHAPTER2

•

THE AIM OF THE HIGHEST GOOD:
THE SUMMEM BONUM AS MORAL IDEAL

•

•• •

"

In Chapter One, I sought to establish that within the Kantian corpus,
de~,·
especially as evidenced in the second Critique, there is a conception of the
:1 fl i

r·

highest good as unifier. This is the case insofar as the highest good unifies the
;;).:·,

dual aspects of the supersensuously and sensuously determined human will
f.f}kt·

through the highest good's function as a dialectical ideal of reason. In so
,: ·.

doing, the highest good provides the human moral will with an object. In and
of itself, this conception of the highest good leaves Kant's complex object open
,.:

'

,

to the accusation that it does nothing for us in our moral lives. Granted, it is

,~

through this conception of the highest good that the ends of ourselves as both
supersensuous and sensuous beings are united in an object of the moral will;
however, as it thus stands, this object alone contributes nothing towards the
management of our day to day moral concerns. In short, Chapter One
demonstrated that the moral law provides a unified object or end to the moral
will through the highest good, but in the way in which this object ls

established and, so far, in the object it.self, this concept gives no guidelines to
,

48
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our moral life beyond the guide of the command to pursue the moral good. 1

.

Although it has been established that the highest good serves as an

•

object for the human moral will through which its pursuits of various human
goods (the moral good and the natural good) are unified, I will argue that this
is not an exhaustive understanding of the highest good. In this chapter, I will

defend the view that accepting the fact that the highest good serves as a

fl1\ifier of the human will (as established in Chapter One), does not preclude
another role for the highest good. In short, unification is not the complete
10:le of the highest good. In addition to its role as unifier, the highest good
also provides the human moral agent with a moral ideal. It is, my thesis that

~· highest good manifests itself as a moral ideal insofar as it provides a
~ g concept for action. It does this in its function as a final end of moral
lttion.
In arguing for my thesis I will again, as in Chapter One, concentrate

ptimarily on the texts of the second Crltupu. I have chosen to approach my
argument in this manner because, as was stated in Chapter One, the second
~ , chiefly 'in the Dialectic, offers one of the few sustained treatments ·of
1

1ltis is the crux of Beck's criticism of the highest good as a dialectical ideal

ef t'eaSOn~ Beck argues that this understanding of the highest good contributes
ftbthmg to the moral project beyond what the categorical imperative implores
Us·to·do as it commands us td be moral. Yet the highest good as a dialectical
fcteal of reason is not an exhaustive understanding of the highest good, as will
be demonstrated in this chapter.
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the highest good. Furthermore, in going beyond the confines of the Dialectic,

in interpreting Kant's discussion of the highest good in the Analytic and

-·,

ii/i:,Mrw
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•

.............

Methodology sections of this Critique, the highest good appears in a more

--

•

.

organic manner insofar as it becomes integrated into Kant's overall ethical
project. Consequently, interpreting the highest good using all of these parts of

i.;sccond Critique, it could be argued that most of this Critique in some way

dllJmOther addresses the issue of the highest good.2 That the highest good is
the most cmcial issue of .the second Critiqw is not really an issue for my
analysis, Instead, I am concerned with presenting the highest good in a way

1ilat is •most true to Kant. In so doing, I have chosen to concentrate on the
woad Critique since it is one of the first (and only) sustained treatments of
._complex object. My strategy for doing sa follows as a direct Tesult of my
~ - to demonstrate that although the same text is being treated, two rubrics
fer,analysis can be drawn out of the text. That is, in demonstrating that the
highest good supports the two rubrics for analysis I have highlighted irt this
onelWOrk, a mo~ convincing case is made for my overall thesis. This thesis
IISatS that:

there is only one highest good which has been appreciated, more

.. l : 1• ·.;

2This argument has in fact been made by John Silber. Silber has argued

lhtt: Kant's doctrine ofthe highest good offexs a me~s for understandingthe
second Critique insofar as the entire Critique deals with the establishment and
...,_a.nentation of t h i s ~ in one way or another. See John Silber, "The
Importance of the Highest Good in Kant's Ethics," Ethics: An International
louma) of Social, Political and Legal Philosophy, 73 (1962-3), 179-97.

-
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and less accurately, from different perspectives relative to the particular parts

of Kant's discussion of the highest good on which different commentators
have concentrated. The highest good is a complex object able to be
appreciated in myriad ways, and key to this appreciation is realizing that these
ways are complementary, not competing or exclusive. In sum, when these
various interpretations of the highest good are integrated, we are able to see

that not only is the highest good present in its role as an object of the law, but
it also includes a developmental plan fur its consummate realization. With

regaid to the multifarious undetstandings of the highest, good, they come
fl,out even when the analysis of the highest good is centered on only one of its
textual presentations, as Chapters One and Two demonstrate ... Hence, my

analysis results in the two rubrics for categorizing these interpretive analyses
(unifier and moral ideal) for which I argue in Chapters One and Two
respectively.

As a reminder, the thesis of this chapter is that the highest good
manifests itself as a moral ideal insofar as it provides a guiding concept for
~

in its function as a final end of moral action. I will argue for this thesis

.·thlo.ugh: I) establishing that Kant recognizes that the human will requires a

moral ideal as a guide for conduct;. 2) establishing that in the command to
~ e the highest good pomble in the world, the need for a moral ideal is

s
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satisfied; and 3 )addressing the consequences of understanding the highest
good as moral ideal. 3

IE

-

•

Kant's Argument for a Moral Ideal

In understanding the ~ghest good as a unifier of the human moral will,
;we are left with a notion of the highest good that contributes nothing to the

4ay to day workings of the moral will.

Instead, in the abstract, we have an

~.oft.he will that unifies the human wilts pursuit of its moral good
tyirtµe) and its natural good (happiness).•· .In so do~ the highest good

1

,-wWes the unified object of pure practical reason that includes the totality of
objects ptiJISUCd by the duality of the hum.an moral will. Yet in the
consequen.ces of its pursuit so far articulated. this concept of the highest good
leaves the moral will without a substantive end. That is, understood merely as
the all inclusive object of pure practical reason, the highest good only includes
the command to pursue the ends of the will which the moral will would be
r-::r· ~·
\

3

1n short, as in Chapter One, these consequences consist of interpreting the
highest good under the rubric of moral ideal, not only as it appears in the
scco.-.d .Critique, but also as it appears elsewhere in the corpus of Kantian
··~~ntaty.
thi'- ,

-

·,

.

.

:

'i..

'!.

;: (·~.4.J'9hn Silber supports this ~terpretation of the highest good as a u~er of
~ heterogenous aspects of the good. He discusses this issue relative to Kant's
ambiguity in the language of Ahe terms moral good and natural good. ·See
~r's article: "The Moral Good and the Natural Good in Kant's Ethics," Iht
l@vimof Metaphysics, 36 (December, 1982), 397-437.
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pursuing anyway. That is, the highest good merely conditions the pursuit of

the ends that are already in place in the moral will as the highest good merely

~-

consists of the command to pursue the moral good through which the pursuit
of the natural good is conditioned. 5
Yet it is important to realize that not only does the highest good
provide the object through which human moral volition is unified, but it also
satisfies the need of the human will for an end of volitidn.

nm· is obviously a

fine distinction which can be clarified ·as the analysis of the highest good

develops. However, a brief, preJ.mrlmrry tluctdation is appropriate here, and
possible in Kant's own words .
... the highest good (is) the entire.object of pure practical reason,
which pure practical reason must necessarily think as possible
because reason commands us to contnbute everything possible to
its realization. 6
In the prior chapter, the highest good as object of the law, was seen to
determine the form of the action of the human moral agent insofar as the
pursuit of the agent's natural end was conditioned by her pursuit of her moral

5This understanding of the highest good is of course not where this analysis
· will stop. ·it is my purpose in this section of the chapter only to demonstrate
th~ problems with which we are left if the analysis of the highest good were to
stop with this understanding of the highest good.
6

.ist das hiichste Gut das gaiize Objekt der reinen praktischen V ernunft, die es sich
notwendig ab; miiglich vorstellen mu.fl, weil es ein Gebot derselben ist, zu dessen
Hervorbring,mg aT/ts m/Jgliche beirutragen. [CPR, 119 (Beck, 123)). .
••
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end. Through this unification, we arrived at the "entire object" of pure

practical reason. This is the case because it was through this conception of the
highest good that it was possible to account for all of our pursuits. After the
determination of the highest good as the entire object of pure practical reason,
something more must be attended to: we must necessarily think of the highest
good as possible. Kant articulates the possibility of the highest good as
"necessary according to practical principles. "7 The law commands that the
highest good be pursued. Thus, we must think of th.e highest good as possible

since the moral law does not command the impossible. This requirement, to
pursue the highest good, established after the highest good 'is demonstrated as
the all inclusive object of the will, is necessary since we an:· required to
"contribute everything possible to its realization" (from prior quote). This
leaves us with a notion of the highest good as not only that object which is
able to account for all of our desires in the world, but as also a necessarily
possible object which gives us guidance towards how to act in the world in the
ends that we pursue. The highest good gives us a guide for conduct as we
strive to bring about··the highest good. a pursuit which is a requirement, as a
.,consequence of the will being determined·by the law. This definition of the
highest good, as that which gives us a substantive guide for conduct as the
I
7

nach praktischen Prinzipien notweJulig... [Ibid., 120 ( 124)].
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final end of moral action, is that which shall receive treatment in this chapter. 8

In proving that the moral law requires the realization of the highest·
good as the most complete object of pure practical reason, Kant recognizes
that something else is necessary to the operation of human moral agency.
Hence the conception of the highest good as unifier is not and cannot be all
that the highest good provides. That is, with an understanding ofthc· highest
good as metely the complete object of the pure practical reason, Kant realizes
the will would.lack a substantive· end that could guide our moral action. ·Kant
articulatesthis human need as h~ wams:
Without an end of this sort a iwill, eIMsaging to· itself no d£finite
goal for a contemplated act, either objective or subjective (which
it has, or ought to have, in view)~ is indeed informed as1to howJt
ought to act, but not whither, and so can achieve no satisfaction. 9
Thus, the will, if it is to be effective must somehow provide a substantive end
:

~

,

;

\

'· '

for the moral agent. In the previous discussion of the highest good, the
presentation concentrated on that aspect of the highest good through which

9Jb.e highest good as the final end for action, and thus the complete end to
be pursued is· that which guatantees the efficacy of the law in its employment.
For further explication of thispoint see Stephen Engstrom, "The·Concept of
·· the Highest Good in Kant's Moral Theory," Philosophy and Phenomenalo_gj,cal
Researclt. 52: 4 (December, 19'2 )~· 7 4 ?-8 L

olme weldien eine Willldu. llir sich seinm ·wetler objmiv nod, suJ1iectiv bestimmten
Gepnsta,ul (den ·sie hat oder ubm sol"Jte) zur vorluillenden Handlung hiJfZlUlmst, %Wllr
wie sie, aber nicht wohin sie Zit wirten ha.IN, angewinm sieh selbst nieh
thun
k.ann. [REL, 4 (Greene an.d Hudson, 4)].
9

G-.
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the object was that which determined the form of the pursuit of other objects.

Yet Kant himself articulates that the human will requires something more.
Kant explicates a requirement of the human will as that which demands a goal
for its action. That is, the will must have a goal for its acts; it must not see
itself as performing individual isolated acts, but it must be able to conceive of
some sort of whole to which its acts can contribute. The highest good
provides a definite goal for the will. The highest good provides an end which
serves as a final end to individual moral acts, thereby performing a valuable
service to the will, which is now able to envision in what its acts will result.
Without this goal, obviously the will knows how it ought to act-always so that
the law is the ground for its action-but the will is not able to know if it should
act. Kant posits this goal of human action as the means through which the
human will achieves satisfaction; yet in its being brought about, no commands
of the law are transgressed. 10
It should be highlighted that this requirement for an end of action does

10

lt should be noted that there is obviously some difference in the role of
the highest good as a moral ideal and as a final end. Yet this difference is not
. crucial to my argument. For present purposes, I discuss the highest good as a
moral ideal that serves as a final end As an ideal; the highest good is that
concept which determines our final end. The final end is that which is to be
realized, while the. moral ideal is that which is to guide the realization. For a
more detailed discussion of .this differentiation in the roles of the highest good
see John Silber, ~Kant's Conception of the Highest Good as Immanent and
Transcendent," The Philosophical Reyiew. 68 (1959), 469-92.
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not arise as a result of a shortcoming of the law in its ability to determine the

human will. Duty itself requires nothing outside of itself to be obeyed. As
Kant says,
The moral law is the sole determining ground of the pure will...
though the highest good may be the entire object of a pure
practical reason, i.e., of a pure will, it is still not to be taken as
the determining ground of the pure will: the moral law alone
must be seen as the ground for making the highest good and its
realization or promotion the object of the pure will. u
The moral law alone is always to be the determining ground of the will if the

will is to be autonomous. Hence the will that requires some other motive in
order to be determined by duty is thus .a patholO'gi.cally determined will and
thereby hetcronomous. The law consists of the sole auwnomous determining
ground of the will. Yet in so doing, the law not only determines us, but it also
provides us with a goal for our action. This goal is brought about as we make
the "realization or promotion" of the high$.g0Qd the end of the pure will.
This c o ~ to rriake the highest good Ute• object or end of the will is always
understood

~

being conditioned by the law. Needless to say, this provision of

the law, in an object or end of the pure practical reason, satisfies a human

.

11

'

Das moralische Gesetz ist Iler alleinige Bestimmungsgrund des reinen
Willms...Mithin mag dtas ·h4chste Gut. immer tier gana . ~ d einer r,inm
praktischen Vermmft, dJ. eines reinen Willms sein, 3fJ ist es darum doch 'nicht fiir dm .
&stintmunpgnmd desselbm zu ltalter4lund dllS mt11't1lis&hl Geutz1TJu/1,;111Jein 11,ls der
Grund ang,sehen werden. jents untl des.,en Bmirkung Oiler Beftrdmacg,sieh' sum
01,jekle zu maehen. [CPR, 109 (Beck, 113)].

58
need. Angels would have no use for the highest good because their vvills are
entirely holy and pure insofar as they are free .of sensuous determinants. Thus
the highest good is a need satisfied within the limits of the law. 12 In having a
goal for our action, we are in no way subverting the law as the ground of our

action. Kant explains how this is possible in an oft qooted passage of the
second Critique where Kant even. goes so far as to say that it is possible for the

highest good, that which also serves hs an ~nd, to determine the·will. This is
the case because:
... it is self-evident not merely that..jf the moral law is included as
the supreme condition in the concept of the highest good, the
· highest good·is then tne object but: also that the c.o~pt ofit and
the idea of its existence as possible through our practical reason
are ·likewise the determining ground of the pure will. 13

12

As John Silber writes:
The moral law does not have its foundation in some object, nor is
it incomplete as the law of morality if it fails to determine an
object. The concern· for the determination of an object stems·
from a human need. It is the need of the human will for an
object in the act of volition that forces Kant to this consideration
of ends and the extension of the law beyond its own limits alone
to the condition of
See Silber, "The Importance ... ," 192-93.

man:

13

Es versteht sich aber von selbst, daft, wenn im begriffe des hiJchsten Guts das
.. moraliS&he Gesetz als o#Jerstl Bedingimg sdwn mit eingesd,lossm ~ alsdann das hoehste
Gut nicht blofl Objekt, sondern auch sein Begrijf und die Vorstellung der durch unsere
praktische Vemunft m6glkhm Existenz desselben rug'/eid, der Besthnm,mgsgrund des
reinen Willens sei; [CPR, 1 10 (Beck, 114)]. In addition, Kant explains how it is
th.at the highest gQOCl can senre as a goal for our action• w Religion Within the
Limits of Reason Alone. Kant's explanation of this will receive treatment in
Chapter Three.
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Thus the highest good can be seen, within the very careful qualifications Kant

delineates, as a determining ground of the pure will. This is possible only so
far as the bonum supremum, the supreme aspect of the highest good is seen as
the primary ground of the highest good. That is, in the will' s consideration of
all other objects and ends, these are possible in their pursuit only as they are

conditioned by the moral law. The bonum supremum or the moral law itself is
always the ultimate ground of the will. This is true for the will when it is
considered in isolation as well as when it is considered through its object, the
highest good. In sum, although the requirement for a:n end is a merely human
requirement, the will's requirement ofa.n end is allowable within the
constraints of the law.
Kant argues that not only is it allowable for the will to have an end that
serves as a goal, but the will must also envision a goal for itseH. Throughout
his discussion of the highest good, in its confusing vacillations between end,
object, and their entailments, Kant is careful to highlight that we are humans
and the will is determined by this glory and frailty. Thus, if the moral law is
to inform us not only how to act but also enjoin us to actually act, it must
··provide an end of this sort, an end that answers the demand of a goal for our
action. That is, the law must not only provide the means through which we
are allowed to harmoniously combine both aspects of ourselves as
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supersensuous and sensuous beings (in providing the highest good as a
dialectical ideal of reason), but the law must also provide a guide for our
action such that we are able to determine: "What is to result from this right

conduct if ours?" 14 In arriving at and being guided by a result of the law, the
law is given vision, and we are further able to ascertain its demands.
That Kant considers what OUI' good action will result in is really of no
surprise. Throughout his work, Kant was ,consistently critical of a rationalistic,
to him vacuous, notion of the law and the· good.. This;is evidenced in his
criticisms of the rationalistic ethics o£Wolff and Baamgarten. Kant thought
these rationalistic ethics· had little prad.iaalsignificance; henm he
characterized ·such an ethic as follows: ·

·... a medical man told a patient suffering from constipation that
he ought to loosen his bowels and to perspire freely and digest his
food well. .This, is iust telling him t.Q·do what he·wants to know.
how to do. Such propositions are tautological rules of decision. 15
Hence, for the good to be practically efficacious, it must include something
further than the command merely to do this good. Kant realizes this and
realizes the law must somehow inform us as to how to do what it is we have to

1

4was dann aus diesem

U'IJSerm

Rechthandeln herauskomme, [REL, 5 (Greene

and Hudson, 4)].
1

5This point is made, and this passage is cited by Silbel". See Silber,
"Importance," 186-187; in which he cites Kant's Lectures on Ethics. trans.
Louis Infield (New York: Harper & Row, 1963) 25/6.
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do. In so doing, Kant points to a need of the human will. This is a further
need of the will, further in the sense that not only does the will require an ·
object insofar as all volitions have objects, but also that the will has a need for
a goal. It is through the specter of the projection of a goal that the
individual's objects of volition are to be considered.
It would be helpful at this point to consider Kant's language. As was
previously discussed, there is an ambiguity in Kant's language. That is, Kant
refers to the highest good as well as the mow good as both an object, end, and
as an object that serves to guide our action (as a moral ideal). In and of
themselves, these constitute no great difference, but in realizing how each of
these are made manifest, the role of the highest good becomes more clear.
The highest good, as well as the moral good, are the objects of the will. In this
sense, these objects are required to be adopted by the will, as determined by

the law. This is an adoption of a non•material object, and much more aligned
with the discussion of the highest good as presented in Chapter One. Yet the
highest good also serves to guide our action, it serves as a moral ideal. That is,
in its conception as an object, sometimes referred to as a concept of an object,

.. the highest good serves as a mow measuring stick. For example, when other
objects are being determined as to whether or not to be brought about in the
practical realm, these objects .( as states of affairs or actions) can be compared
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to this moral ideal and thereby assessed as to how effective they are in
furthering the highest good. This assessment serves as a criterion for
determining whether or not the action should be brought about. In both
instances the highest good is an object, or end, as the coincidence of virtue and
happiness, but it is also a guide for action insofar as it determines the objects
that will bring about its actualization. Kant thus says of the highest good that
its possibility

belongs wholly to the supersensuous relations of things and
cannot be given under the laws of the world of sense, even
.though the practical consequence of tais,id~ i.e.;., ·U\e actiQns
which are devoted to realizing the highest good, do belong to this
.. world. 16 ·
It is in this manner, as stated above, that the highest good serves as a guide for
action under which our objects as ends of action are able to be subsumed. As
a moral ideal the highest good does belong "wholly to the supersensuous
relations of things." This is the case insofar as the highest good follows from
the law, which relates to the supcrsensuous aspects of ourselves. Yet, the
practical consequences of this aspect of the highest· good take place in the
world as we strive to bring about the highest good. These practical
consequences consist of~ objects we ,seek to bring about as the ends of our
16

.gimzlieh ZJUn abersinnlichen Verhilltn~ derDi1tge gehiJrt untl nach Gesetzen
Iler SinnenrMlt gar nicht gegeben :,,erden h11m, obzwar die prllktische Folge
ldee,
niimlich die Handlungen, die t1Ar111lf•bdeltm. ·das ltoehsl;e. Gut ·wirklieh zu machen, zur
Sinnmw,lt gehiiren: [CPR, 120, (Beck, 124)].
•.•

"ieser
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action--as the objects of the highest good. These specific actions work to bring

about the highest good, but they are able to be subsumed under the organon
of the concept of the highest good as object since the concept of the object of
the highest good contributes to their being accomplished. This contribution
consists of the highest good' s role as moral ideal and guide for conduct. 17
As a consequence of thewill's need to perceive of an end for action, the

will then requires a mechanism through which we can perceive a guide for our

actions and somehow maintain a vision of what will come about as their result.

h is my position that the highest,good as a moral ideal provides just that as it
demonstrates exactly what will JeSUlt.from this right· conduct of ours. For it is

through the highest good as a moral ideal, that end which the law determines,
that we ascertain

17

Once again, Kant seemingly collapses the terms end and object, and
object and concept of an object, in reference to the highest good. In the
passage qu~ted .in footnote thirteen Kant uses the tean Obj1Jcte and Gegmst111Ui
to refer to the highest good. Yet, a few paragraphs later [CPR, 111
(Bed(l 15)],· when ,the highest good is referred to as SQmething to be concretely
brought about in the world Kant refers to it as: Objekte, Gegenstand and Zweck.
As vy.as discus$ed in Chapter One, object has more. than one meaning fol'. Kant,
in this instance it should be understood as both a setting for the will and as a
.stat~ of affairs to be brought about (objective), the latter which conforms more
closely to Kant's depiction of Zweck. In short, there seems to be no consistent
use of the terms Objekte, Gegenstand and Zweck in reference to the highest good.
To avoid confusion, I will refer to the highest good primarily as an end for this
chapter and as an object for Chapter .One in orocr to highlight the different
roles at stake for the highest good, thereby imposing some sort of .system
where none seems to exist.
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... towards what, as an end--even granted it may not be wholly
subject to our control--we might direct our actions and
abstentions so as at least to be in harmony with that end... 18
In directing our action towards harmony with an end, the will fulfills its
ambition to bring about the effects of the law in the world. This need for
direction, result and guide is that which Kant has enumerated for the human
will and is that to which the next section turns as I will outline how it is that

the highest good satisfies this need.

The Highest Good as Moral Ideal
Although Chapter One treats one of the integral roles of the highest
good, it is not an exhaustive portrayal of the highest good In what follows I
will work out Kant's presentation of the highest good insofar as it consists of a

moral ideal and guide for action. In so doing, the highest good will be
demonstrated to be a substantive guide for moral conduct through which we
are able to actualize the requirements of the moral law. In understanding the
highest good as a moral ideal, it becomes something far from an empty object
or end of the law; instead, it will be shown to fulfill the demands of the human
· will as they were articulated in the previous section. It is Kant's position, as

18

Und worauf wir, gesetzt aM,h, wir hAtten kieses ntd,t villlig in unserer Gewalt,
doch als auf einen Zweck unter Thun und Lassen richten kiJnnten, um damit wenigstens
zusammen zu stimmen. [REL, 5 (Greene and Hudson, 4)].

65
was argued in the previous section, that this moral ideal is required if the

human moral agent is not only to know what should be done, but to actually
do it. Through this conception of the highest good as a moral ideal, we bear
witness to the world that is determined as a consequence of a commitment to
the moral law.

As it has been presented thus far, with the highest good understood
merely as a dialectical ideal ,of reason, the moral law leaves. us without the

tools for its .application. That is, the law must provide some way ,of guiding
the tramlation of the law at its noumenal· levcl into,an •actuality for our

phenomenal lives. Kant accomplishes this through the highest good as it
includes a command to be.brought •about in the world. I will demonstrate how
this is the case through presenting the highest good as: I )including a

command to pursue ·happiness in proportion to desertl' 2)including ·a command

to bring about a state of affairs in the world that complies with happiness in
proportion to virtue and 3~ is discussed as dlc ectypal world in the Analytic
of the second Critique through whim the law·automatically sccks,to·become
manifest in the sensuous world.

The highest good consists of a moral ideal insofar as we are given

guidmu:e into what morality requires as Kant's moral law commands us to
pursue this highest good. In so doing, we are called to make actual, as far as
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possible within human limitations, the highest good in the world. The content
of the highest good which we are called to actualize is the very same as that of
the dialectical ideal: happiness in accord with virtue. Hence, what was
perceived as a mere theoretical possibility becomes a.practical actuality as
Kant includes within its consequences not only a determination of the will,
but also a command to pursue the state of affairs this determination includes-happiness in accord with virtue. Thus what was, in its establishment,
demonstrated to include the unity of goods human moral agents pursue, in its
consequences can be demonstrated to include the pursuit of these goods in
accord with the aforementioned unity.
In discussing the highest good in this manner, the form of the command
of the law is given content. This is possible insofar as the highest good
includes the command to bring about this highest good in the world. In
discussing the highest good as the "entire object of pure practical reason,"
Kant goes on to say that "reason commands us to contribute everything
possible to its realization. " 19 Furthermore, in giving the form of the command
some content in commanding us to pursue the highest good, there is no issue
.of heteronomy. That is, the highest good and its pursuit is allowable, as was
previously discussed, because it is an end that was deduced from the law and

ganze Objekt der remen praktischen Vernunft, ... weil es ein Gebot derselben ist, zu
dessen Hervorbrmpng lllles miigliehe beizutr11gen. [CPR 119 (Beck 123)].
19
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not an end that determines the law. Thus, the command to pursue the highest
good is a concrete command in that it includes an actual program for action.
This program consists of the way in which we are called to the realization of
the highest good. The command includes a call to bring about a state of
affairs within ourselves as well as in the world, a state of affairs where

happiness accords with the worthiness to receive it. As Kant directs our
pursuit of the highest good individually and socially, he describes these ends as
follows:
Inasmuch as virtue and happiness together constitute the
possession of the highest good for one person, and happiness in
exact proportion to morality ( as the worth of a person and his
worthiness to be happy) constitutes that of a possible world ... 20

From the above, it is evident that Kant differentiates the task of the highest
good in its individual and social pursuit. Not only are we to bring about a
highest good for ourselves insofar as we strive to make equitable our possession
of happiness in proportion to virtue, but we must also seek to make this a
global condition in the world. The consequences of this distinction
demonstrate that the highest good does include a pursuit that takes place in
the world, and not merely within the will of an individual. That is, the

20

Sofern nun Tugend und Glackselighit zusammen den Besitz des hochsten Guts in
einer Person, hierbei aber auch Gluckseligkeit. ganz genau in Proportion der Sittlichkeit
(ab Wert tier Penon und demi Wiirdigkeit. glileklidi ~ sein) ausgeteilt, das h«hste
Gut emer mliglidlm Welt allSlnlld,m. ,[Ibid.;, H. l.1:15)1. : , ,

!'
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individual is to work to make her own happiness commensurate with her

virtue as a condition of worthiness. In addition, the moral agent is to seek"to
bring about a state of affairs in the world where this condition persists.
According to the above, it is not enough to be as worthy of happiness as
possible. The moral agent must also strive to actually make her happiness
commensurate with her worthiness to receive it. That is, individual moral
agents cannot become moral· matt.yrs, working to ·make their own wills ·as

virtuous as possible with no reganl for the commensunbleness of their·
happiness. In and of itself, this condition is highly difficult te imagine without
its <kt:ermination being conditioned by pathological motives and thereby
condemning ·the moral agent te a state of hetcronomy. FurthemtOl'C, this
condition would not be• natural, insofar as human moral agents are not pure
will, but within them abides a sensuous nature as well.. This nature is worthy

of respect and must not be ignored. Hence, in bringing about the highest
good, the moral agent must act so as to be virtuous in order to be deserving of
happiness. In addition, when opportunities for hapJ)itte$s arise, the moral
agent must seek to appreciate these opportunities, recognizing that her
. appreciation of said happiness is always conditioned by her worthiness to
receive it. 21
21

With regard to the connection between happiness and virtue, Kant
explains that if a virtuous individual receives happiness and is not deserving of
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Beyond the command to make the highest good an actuality for oneself,

Kant articulates a command to pursue the highest good in the world, for all
humanity. That is, the task of the highest good does not stop with the
commensurableness of one's own happiness and virtue. We must work to
bring about the highest good in the world, creating a state of affairs such that
virtue is commensurable with happiness for everyone. This notion of the
highest good as including a social component, in bringing about a possible
world, will receive detailed treatment in Cll.apter Three. I mention it here only
to demonstrate that even in his early treatments ·of the highest good,• Kant
recognizes that it is a task to be made·. manifest·.individually· and socially.
With the command to bring, about a state of affairs -Of happiness in
proportion to virtue, it is pos.gble to look at other passages in Kant's work in
order to gain still more insight into the role of the highest good as a moral
ideal. That is, in looking at what Kant has said about happiness in the

it, she is unable to enjoy that happiness. As Kant explains:
... the upright man cannot be happy if he is not already conscious
of his righteousnes.5, since with such a character the moral self~
condemnation to which his own way of thinking would force him
in case of any transgression would rob him of all enjoyment of
the pleasantness which his condition might otherwise entail.
Und in tier Tat 'ktmn tier Rlchtsduij.fene sich nicht glikklich fi,uJ.m, wmn er sich nicht
zuvor seiner Rechtschaffmhrit bmltflt ist; weil bei jener Gesinnung die Verweise, die er
bei (Jbertretungen sich selbst zu "lf'llchen durdi seine eigene Dmlcungsart ge,wtigt sein
wirde, und die moralische Selbstvmu,11J11Jung ihn al'les Gmusses tier Annehmlichkeit, die
S01ISt sein Zustand enthalten mag, berauben wurden. [Ibid., 116 ( 120 ).
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Analytic of the second Critique, we may glean valuable information on the

pursuit of happiness. In the above I argued that we are to make our happiness
commensurable with our virtue; yet how is this to be accomplished? Kant
gives some concrete guidelines for the pursuit of happiness, and it is to these
which we shall now tum.

Happiness is to be pursued insofar as we are worthy of it; yet even once
we are worthy of happiness, its pursuit is. ®nditioned by very special caveats:

The mere form of a law,.whkh limits.its material1c must be a.
condition for adding this material to the will but not presuppose
it as the condition of tbe,will. Let th¢·. tJW.Crial cpqtent be, for
example, my own happiness .. .it can become an objective practical
law only if I include within k U\¢• ha.ppine$$ of ~thers, 22

For Kant the pursuit of happiness. is conditioned· by the form of the law. This
means that the pursuit of happiness is conditioned by universality as the form
of the law. Hen<;e. the pursuit o(happiness is P9~Qle only insofar as we
pursue the happn,.es& of other$.
· . This. artiC\,llation of the conclitions. (<)r tbe pu.Quit of ba,ppiness adds .
content to the law insofar as it leaves 1JS wit)l some co~te ~ ,for our
own pursuit of happiness. First and foremost, we are to pursue our individual

22

Also die blofa Form etnes Gesetze$, welche die materie eimchrilnkt, m"!fl zugleich

ein Grund sein,. diese. Materie zum Willen hi~zuzujagen, aber sie nicht vorauszusetzen.
Die M.aterie sei z]J. meine eigCM Glw:kseligkeit... kann nur alsdann ein objektives
praktisches Gesetz werden, wenn ich anderer ihre in dieselbe mit einschliefle. [Ibid., 35
(35)].
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happiness only as we are worthy of said happiness. Yet this is not all of the

information we are given in regulating our pursuit of happiness. Kant further
informs us that in our individual pursuit of happiness, this pursuit is to be
conditioned by the form of the law--as universal. We are only able to pursue
our own happiness, then, insofar as we pursue the happiness of others.
Beyond the above, there is also the function of the highest good as a
moral ideal in its most obvious guise. That is, in fulfilling the command to
pursue the highest good possible in the world, we are able to immediately
appeal to the command to apportion happiness with virtue in our daily moral

dealings. 23 That is, in instances where it is possible, we should distribute
happiness to those who are worthy. As trite as this may sound, there is -some
guidance available in this simple command As John Silber has explained:
..in rearing children, serving on juries, and grading papers one
tries to do and actually can do something "about apportioning
happiness in accordance with desert. "24
It is possible to apportion happiness with desert, if only in this very mundane
manner. The command of the law is nothing more than that which can be

23

1n his later works, Kant articulates the highest good concretely as the
ethical.commonwealth. In so doing, he explicates stages to be achieved in its
being brought about, thereby giving an even more detailed and concrete
program for enacting the highest good in the world. These issues will be
treated in Chapters Three, Four and Five.
24

Silber, "The Importance... " 183.
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expressed in so banal a way. Kant never articulates the pursuit of the highest

good as that which is to be a super human endeavor. Instead, the command to
pursue the highest good is merely to be understood as the command which
follows from the very human adoption of this object·as an end for action,
insofar as it is demanded of the law. 25

Kant gives another clue as to the way in which the highest good
becomes manifest in the world as a moral ideal in the Analytic section of the
second Critique. In the Analytic sectio~ Kant articulates how it is that the

highest good, as a consequence of the will making the moral good its object, is
brought about. As a reminder, as was previously ~ d in Chapter One,
the human moral will is• a will of desilc. This is-ttue for us as phenomenal

beings in that we have desires for sensuous objects, and as moral ;(noumenal)
beings·as well. In giving an object for the merely moral will, Kant.accounts for
the way in which a will determined by law takes. the moral good as. its object. . ,
This is required in order to demonstrate that.even though a will is moral,. it is

still able to have objects and ends. Yet with this merely moral end, Kant

recognizes that if he does not then again· relate the. determination of the

25

Jeffrie Murphy ~ s that it is impossible to,~ppo(tion happilless with
desert since we are in no way able to determine what human beings deserve.
Obviously; it is my position tbat this is simply.wrong, a discussion I will save.
for Chapter Five. See Murphy, "The Highest Good as Content of Kant's
Ethical Formalism," Kant-Studien 56 (1965) 102-110.
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supersensuous aspect of the 'Nill to this other aspect of the will, that which

determines our other objects, moral and otherwise we are left with an empty
moral object. With the moral object remaining abstract in this state of affairs,
the law remains a supersenuous concept lacking any sort of connection to the
world. Thus, Kant needs to provide the moral will with soJM sort of tool
through which it will be able to tr:rnsccnd the disparate realms of the
supersensuous and sensuous. In so doing, the will is provided with a guide for
conduct, an ideal, insofar as the form of the supersensuous will is to determine
the matter of the sensuous will.
In the Analytic section of the second Critique, Kant points to a means
through which we are able to conceive of what will become of our action as
determined by the law. That is, Kant points to a bridge between the
supersensuous and sensuous realms through which we are provided an end for
action. This moral ideal is possible as a consequence of the adoption of a good

will, a will determined by the law as its end or object. This end comes about
as a consequence of recognizing the moral good as the object of the pure moral

will. As a consequence of the will' s adoption of this end, Kant argues that the
·will is transferred into a supersensuous realm insofar as the will is free. In
being so located in the supersensuous realm, the moral law immediately drives
us to bring about the state of1affairs dictated by the law-the highest good. As
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the Jaw determines our supersensuous self, it then determines our sensuous

self, and the world wherein this sensuous self abides. If this were not to be. the
case, the law would not be effective in the world, but merely in the noumenal
realm as that which determines our will.
For, in fact, the moral law ideally transfers us into a nature in
which reason would bring forth the highest good were it
accompanied by sufficient physical capacities; and it determines
our will to impart to the sensuous world the form of a system of
rational beings. The least attention to ourseH shows that this .
idea really stands as a model for the determination of our will. 26
Here Kant demonstrates that merely by adopting the moral law as the ground
for our will, reason is driven to bring about the highest good as an end in the
world. In so doing, the will is determined to "impart to the sensuous world
the form of a system of rational beings." Hence, it is through the moral law
that the command to pursue the highest good in the world appears. Included
in this command to bring about the highest good is the role of the highest
good as a model for the determination of the will.
In what follows I will unpack the sources and consequences of the way
in which the law, in determining the will, and in the human moral agent
accepting that determination, results in an ideal for our action. This ideal
26

Denn in der Tat versetzt uns da$ .moralische Gesetz der ldee nach in eine Natur.
in welcher reine V ernunft, wenn sie mit dem ihr angemessenen physischen V ermogen
begleitet wilre. das hiJchste Gut htrvorbringen wurde, und bestimmt unseren Willen. die
Ft1m1-tler Sinnenwelt,·als einem Ganzen vemunftiger Wesen. zu erteflm. [CPR, 44
(Bcck45)].
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consists of the way, as articulated above, in which we are required to transfer

Kant's archetypal world into the sensuous realm, resulting in the ectypal
world. 27
It is important to remember that this discussion takes place in the
Analytic section of the second Critique. This is important insofar as we should
keep in mind that Kant's task in that section is the deduction of the idea of a
concept for the pure practical reason. In so doing, Kant is careful to stress
that the object or end of the law is determined afttt tac law, and in no way
prior. Hence, he is anchoring the law in the a priori realm, whereby it is in no
way contingent or empirical. In this way; Kant i:cmoves the possibility of
compromising the universality and necessity of the law. In being universal and
necessary and completely free of sensuous matter, the law is able to result in
the autonomous determination of the will. As Kant says:
The law of this autonomy is the moral law, and it, therefore is the
fundamental law of supersensuous nature and of a pure world of
the understanding, .. 28

27

This transference from the archetypal world to the ectypal world resulting
in a moral ideal is the main focus of the work of Thomas Auxter. Auxter then
goes on to·use this interpretation to exclude any other from seNing as a moral
ideal. See especially: Thomas Auxter, "The Unimportance of Kant's Highest
Good," Jou,maI of the Histocy of Philosophy. 17:2 (1979) 121-34.
28

Das Gesetz dieser Autonomic aber ist das moralische Gesetz; welches also das
Gnmdgaetz.m,er ilbersinnlidten Nature 1l1lll eiMT reinm V ~ l t ist, [CPR, 43
(Beck, 44)).
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The moral law and the will which is determined by it reside in a "pure world".

This world is named by Kant the archetypal world. The archetypal world ·
only contains the conditions of the moral law; it contains no guide for its
implementation, and as such it can serve as no guide for our action. In
addition, the "archetypal world (natura archetypa)" can be known "only by
reason. "29 Hence, as was previously articulated, the demands of the moral law
require more than the archetypal world alone can provide. Insofar as the
archetypal world is where the law resides; Kant must articulate a means to
overcome the limitations of this realm and thereby allow the law to become
active in the sensuous realm. Without this further articulation, the
supersensuous, pure realm is where the law would remain. That is, alone and
without an object or end, the law relates merely to our will, but it is not
merely a moral will that we are; we are creatures in and of this world. When
the law is unable to connect us to our world, it is only a vacuous concept
without import for our practical lives.
Yet as was seen in the prior quote, once the will is determined by the
law, we are immediately transferred "into a nature in which reason would
bring forth .the highest good... ". This transference is accomplished through the
determination of our will to "impart to the sensuous world the form of a
29

Man kilnnte jene die urbildliche (1111tura lll'dletypt,)~ die wir bwft in der Vernunft
erkennen, [Ibid., 43 (44)}.
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system of rational beings. "30 Thus, through the moral law, in its adoption of

the end of the law-the highest good-the will is connected to the sensuous
realm as a consequence of its being grounded in the supersensuous realm.
Kant, then, provides a means through which the archetypal world immediately
transfers us into the sensuous realm-- by means of the concept of the highest
good. In so doing, the moral law and its object or end, insofar as it resides in

the archetypal world, must create:
a counterpart (which) must edst in the world of sense without
interfering with the laws of the latter. 31
This counterpart is made manifest through bringing about the highest good in
the world. What has served as a unifying object for the will now is able to
serve as an end (object as a desired state of affairs) of the will insofar as we are
commanded to strive towards bringing about this state of affairs. Kant names
the counterpart to the archetypal world "the ectypal world (natura ecrypa),
because it contains the possible effect of the idea of the former (the archetypal
world) as the determining ground of the will. " 32
Through the ectypal world Kant allows us to fashion the sensuous world

30

lbid., 44 (45), as quoted in footnote twenty-seven.

deren Gegenbild in der Simrenwelt. 1tber doch 'zugleim ohne Abbrueh ur Gesetze
derselben existieren soil. [Ibid., 43 (45)].
31

32

•••

well sie die mogliche Wirkung der Idee der ersteren als Bestimmungsgrundes des
Willens enthillt. tlte nachgrbt/Jete (1Udllm ectypa) nennen. [Ibid., 43 (45)].
•••
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of which we are members into a reflection of our moral selves. As Thomas

Auxter, the main advocate of this role of the ectypal world explains, it is
through the determination to work to bring about the ectypal world that we
are provided with "an ideal we can use in our moral efforts to fashion the
world we are given. "33 This ectypal world is that which the highest good
determines in its role as a moral ideal. 'This is the highest good, insofar as·
Kant origmally said, as it consists of what wov.ld ·be brought, about through the
transference of the form of the supersensuous world (the archetypal world)
into the ~nsuous 'WOl'ld (the cctypal world). In• short, it is through the highest

good ·as end of the moral la-w, an• end which the moral law requires and
commands us to bring about, that we apply the law to the world; thus the
supersenuous meets the sensuous; and• are given a guide for action.;
In sum, the above has argued for an understanding of the highest good
as moral ideal. This role for the highest good gains credence through its basis
on Kant's own articulation that the will requires such a guide for conduct.
Furthermore, the highest good is· shown to fulfill this requirement of the will
as reason commands that this aH inclusive object as the totality of our ends be
brought about in the world. Included in the command to bring about the
highest good in the world is the command to make one's own happiness

33

Auxter, "Unimportance" 126.
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commensurate vvith one's own virtue and then to make this a state of affairs in

the world. In addition, this command is further fleshed out through the
caveats Kant gives with regard to the pursuit of happiness. This command
also gains content through an examination of the way in which we can reward
virtue with happiness in our daily existence. One final means by which the
highest good serves as a moral ideal is through the way in which the law, in
determining the will, automatically seeks to become manifest in' the sensuous
world.
In analyzing the issue of the highest good as a moral ideal, it would be
wise to consider two related· points of controversy. First; there has been some
controversy concerning where the highest good is· located. Second, there has
been some controversy concerning ~ther or not it is possible·to achieve the
highest good. It is my view that both of these controversies collapse into the
same issue and that an extended discussion of either of them consists primarily
of energy ill spent. Yet, for the sake of the present analysis, I will demonstrate
why it is not purposeful to give these concerns extended consideration.
The primary question at issue in the above controversy is typically

articulated as whether or not the highest good is possible. l will treat this
question first, because if the highest good is not possible, it makes no sense to
discuss "where" the highest good is not possible. In response to the question,
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there can be no doubt that the highest good consists of a real possibility for

the Kantian ethical system. This is the case, because Kant's ethics requires
that the highest good be at the very least possible because its pursuit is
required as a demand of reason. It is my view that there is something behind
these points of controversy. That is, the issue as stake is not really whether or
not the highest good is possible in Kant's system, this point is clearly made by

Kant throughout his work. Rather than the issue of the possibility ofthe.
highest good, these commentaries seek to establish whether or not the highest
good is justified or necessary to Kant's system. 34, For •my purpose, such

considerations are not germane. .It·is my task .to be as tJue as-possible to..
Kant's texts. I am not attemptmg to correct Kant, or develop a new ethic.
Instead, my analysis merely seeks to present a means through which the ·
Kantian ethic, in its object the highest good, is best understood. 35

The second aspect of this controversy, is'.wl\ere is the ,highest good to be

n--alized; That is,• if the· highest good is a teal possibility in the Kantian system
is it to be actualized in this world orthe ncxtJ,This ~ is.more complicatil

34

1n addition to the questions of justification and necessity, concerns with
.the possibility of the highest good often consist of a desire to eliminate God
from Kant's system. See A,uxter. Kant's Moral Teleology. (Macon: Mercer
University Press, 1982) especially Oiapters Five.and Six.
35

At the conclusion of the antinomy of practical reason Kant states his
conclusion very clearly. The highest good "is practically possible", as this
antinomy has proven. ..•ist prdtisch mlglidz, [CPR, 115 (Btck 119)]. ·
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than the former. The complication lies in the ambiguity of Kant's texts. Kant

has articulated a concrete program for action through which the highest good
is to be made manifest here on earth. In addition, he has demanded that
humanity be immortal, to account for the moral progress that the highest good
requires. The highest good could possibly take place in this world. However,
Kant has often expressed doubts as to the actuality of such a program being
brought to fruition in the time in which humanity is to reside on the earth. 36
Kant's support of the view that the highest•good takes place in the next world
is necessarily limited since his discussion.of such a possibility is obviously
limited by the way in which the categories could conceive of such a possibility.
In short, there is evidence for either view and· nothing·to be gained by
attempting to exclude one or the other under the pretext of having found the
correct view. Thus in answering the question where the highest good is to be
realized, Kant would perhaps answer that concern with such a question is
dangerous insofar as it could possibly lead to .heteronomy insofar as humanity
could possible seek the realization of the highest good as an incentive towards
moral conduct. Rather, we should strive with all our power and possibility to
make the highest good a reality with little concern for its location, and thus
without concerns for the location of the possible rewards in which such

36

See the presentations of the highest good in: TIP, REL and PP.
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striving might result.

The Consequences of the Highest Good as Moral Ideal

To conclude,. this chapter has articulated an analysis of the highest good
as moral ideal. Obviously this analysis has depended to a great extent on
those points established in the previous chapter. A lesson· to be learned from
this is that the various manifestations of the highest good, whether they be
categorized under the rubric of unifier or moral ideal, are to a great extent
symbiotic. They are symbiotic insofar as there is not a clear distinction
between where the role of unifier and moral ideal begins and ends. This is no
great surprise in a Kantian concept. Kant's project is veiy complex and the
way in which he deals with the highest good varies relative not only to his
philosophical acumen but also to the difficulty of the tasks to which he turns
his attention. Kant presents the highest good differently as he approaches it
from different perspectives relative to which aspect of the highest good each of
his discussions highlights.
This lack of a clear distinction is not a disadvantage or weak point to
this analysis. Instead, it provides further evidence for my position, which
holds that there is a consistent concept of the highest good. The highest good
appears inconsistently and in a contradictoiy manner only when its various

83
interpretations are treated in isolation, as competitive and not complementary.

It is with this in mind that we tum to Chapter Three and the presentation of
the highest good as it is contained in Religion Within the Limits of Reason
Alone. In this presentation of the highest good, Kant specifically articulates
the highest good as an object of the law that is both a unifier and a moral
ideal. In addition, ,this concept contains an ~dded social component through
•
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which :the moral law is given further vision as Kant stresses that the ethical
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CHAPTER3
THE SOCIAL HIGHEST GOOD:
KANT'S ETHICAL COMMONWEALTH
In the previous chapters, I sought to establish that within the Kantian
~orpus, ~~ially 'as evidenc~ in the second Critique, there is a conception of
the h~ghest good as a unifier and a conception of the highest good as a moral
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Two determined this was not an exhaustive notion of Kant's complex object.
Likewls'e, Chapter Three will esublish that these noti~~s of the high~st good,

as expres~d iii'lli~· p:..Cvious chapters, do not consist ~fan exhaustive
understanding of the, highest good. There is an additional conception of the
highest'good, established thro~gh the presentation of the highest g()()(} as it.is
contained in one of

l<ant'smo~t ac~essible works. Religion Within the Limits

of Reason Atone. In this work, Kant sets as his goal to make apparent the
r~lation of religion to human nature, or in his own words, he sets out to
explain h~~ "morality leads inevitably to religion." 1 In so doing, he presents

1

die Moralftihrt unausbleiblich zur Religion. [REL, 8fn (Greene and Hudson,
7fn)].
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one of the most well rounded articulations of the highest good, including the

addition of a substantive social aspect.
In what follows I will demonstrate that the conception of the highest
good in Kant's Religion adds a new dimension to the object of pure practical
reason. This new dimension primarily consists of a social component that has
not been present in the previous articulations of the highest good. In
addition, it is ,through this·articulation of the highest good ·that the·•·
representations discussed in the ptior. chaptCI'S arc brought together-. , I will
approach the explication of this mw dimension ,t:.hroagh addressing ·the
following two questions. First, what .is the nomn of the highest good at work
in Kant's idigi<m Within the Hmm of ReasQn Alone? Next, how is this

notion of the highest good fulfilled? Through answering each .of these
questions., we arc given a complete explication of Kant's complex object afoot
in this work. Furthermore, it is my position that this understanding of the

highest good, which will become apparent through answering the above
questions, is the consummate articulation of the highest good. 2
First, what is the notion of the highest good at work in Kant's Religion?
. It is my thesis that this conception of the highest good consists of its role as a
unifier and moral ideal which serves to anchor God in the role of moral
. /

·

2

This claim will receive ext.¢J1.sive treatment in Chapters Four and Five.
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guarantor. In this discussion of the highest good, God is required because, as

has been previously discussed, the highest good must be possible if the moral
law is not to be meaningless. In being required as a condition of the moral end,
therefore, God is necessary and thereby anchored. Although God has played
this role previously for the highest good, it is in this discussion of God (in the
Religion), as moral guarantor, that the consequences of God's role become .more

apparent. Kant's moral argument for God is not without controversy. 3
However, it will be.deemed as suchfor this analysis, since,the specific
relationship between, God and mor.wty is mt presently at stake. Rather,• what
is at· stake is the consequence of the ·above pairing, resulting in a notion of the
highest good through which the Kantian notion of God is anchored.

In the Religiona Kant portrays a markedly different notion of the highest
good. l will argue that this new aspect of the highest good becomes apparent
in the discussion of how the highest good is fulfilled. That is, in establishing

how the notion of the highest good-as unifier and moral ideal, and an end
which requires God-is to be fulfilled, its new aspect as a social end of human

life becomes evident. This will be demonstrated through answering the second
3

1 do not directly address the controversy surrounding the moral argument
for God.in the Kantian corpus. ..In short, I do not support the position that in
his later work, Kant repudiated his moral argument for the existence of God.
For a detailed discussion of these issues see: G. A Schrader, "Kant's Presumed
Repudiation of the .. Mor.al Argument' in the Opus Postumum: an Examination
of Adickes' Interpretation," Philosophy. (July, 1951 ).
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question, as it is expressed above.

In addressing this second question, "How is this notion of the highest
good, as it is expressed through question one, fulfilled?" it is my thesis that
this notion of the highest good is fulfilled through Kant's notion of the ethical
commonwealth. Kant provides us with an answer to the question, "How is the
highest good to be fulfilled?" as he articulates a very specific program for the
manifestation of this formulation of the highest good. This concept of the
highest good, as ethical commonwealth, although hinted at elsewhere in Kant's
works, is arguably one its most attractive formulations. For here, in calling us
to overoome our propensity to evil, the origin· of which"lies in our social
nature, Kant urges us to transform our social interactions (by leaving the
ethical state of nature) into moral interactions~ In so doing, we would be
working -to bring about an ethical commonwealth which would consist of
moral interactions'.with others as that nexus ~in which and through whose
unity alone the highest moral good can come to pass. 114 .
In what follows I will discuss what the highest good is· and how it is to

be made manifest as presented in the Religion. I will do so by: I )explicating
the notion of the highest good as unifier and moral iddl; an end that requires
God; 2 )addressing how this conception of the highest good becomes manifest

4in wilchem und durch dessen Einheit es allein zu Stande kommen kann, [REL, 98
(Greene and Hudson, 89)].
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through the ethical commonwealth, explicating its source as the required

consequence of the social origin of evil that we must overcome as we are called
to leave the ethical state of nature and work to bring about the ethical
commonwealth; and finally 3) broadly describing the ethical commonwealth,
leaving ·the task of a more detailed description to Chapters Four and Five. By
taking Kant seriously in his presentation; of the ethical commonwealth, we are
able to address yet another manifestation of the highest good· as it appears in
the corpus.

The Conception of the Highest GOQd in .the Relipin
As was asserted previously, the conception·of,the·highest·good in the

Religion consists of three aspects. The highest good serves as the unifying end
of our purposiveness as sensuous and supersensuous agents, it serves as a moral
ideal and guide for our conduct, and the highest good serves to anchor the
Kantian conception of God as moral guarantor. In looking at the presentation
of the highest good in· the early sections of ReJ:igjon Within the limits of

Reason Alone. these three aspects of the task of the highest good will become
evident as they take their respective places in the moral venue.
The roles of the highest good as unifier and moral ideal were discussed
individually in Chapters One and Two respectively. However, in the Religion,
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these two aspects of the highest good are not considered in isolation. That is,

the highest good of the Religion includes both aspects of the highest good as
previously articulated. In the Religion, the highest good serves as a unifier
which guides our action. Now, in the Religion, just as in the second Critique,
we are talking about the same highest good, yet the task of this highest good,

insofar as it consists of the union of the two tasks in the same concept, is even
more apparent. In what follows, I will demonstrate that Kant's conception of
the highest good in the Religion, insofar as it serves as a unifier which guides
our action· se:rves as an anchor for the Kantian conception of God. In short,
the conception of the highest good in the Religion· combines both aspects of the
highest good as previously presented ,(unfier and,moral ideal) while ·
contributing a new social dimension to the highest good.
In the preface to the first edition of.the Religion Kant begins by asserting
that the moral law in and of itself is enough. It is eoough to determine our
will, and it is enough objectively insofar as when we have other needs, they are

subjective needs, and not required or conditioned by the law. Instead, these
needs arise as a result of our being human. After making these assertions,
Kant continues to examine this status of the law as it relates to our being
human. That is, although the law has no need for any supplements, perhaps it
provides us with something of ,that nature. Throughout this discussion Kant
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remains faithful to his conception of the moral law as not requiring anything

at all for it to become manifest. In its manifestation, morality becomes related
to an end not in such a way that the end is the ground of moral action but
rather the end comes about as a result of the sum of the consequences of the

law. With these caveats, Kant clears a path for the appearance of the highest
good as a unifying and guiding moral end to which we shall now turn.

Kant has presented-the command, to .bring.about the highest good
possible in our sensuous world as a command that goes beyond the moral law.
This is so -since the law requires, that we give no amsidea.tion to consequences

in considering .our duty. The moral ,law-commands without qualification,
making duty an object of respect "without proposing to us an end (or a final
end)" through whim we are helped to determine what duty reC,Ommends -to us

or through which we are given an incentive to pursue our duty. 5 •This is the

case because in waiving any concern with the consequences of duty, we
thereby ~ duty an object of the highest respect without -regard to any
other end that could perhaps wrongly serve as an incentive to the fulfillment
of our duty.

However, Kant continues in his explanation of our relation to the law,
realizing that the above relation of respect is not a complete account of human

5

lbid., 6fn (6fn).
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experience. Although the Jaw alone should be enough to determine our

morality, "it is one of the inescapable limitations of man and of his faculty of
practical reason... to have regard, in every action, to the consequences thereof''. 6
Often, the law alone is not enough to determine our actions; as. humans we
constantly seek to go beyond the mere moral determination of our will and
consider how the end of the· action that is brought about will serve us. Kant
claims that although consequences come about last in actual practice, it is
often the case that they actually are considered first in the representations and
intentions of our call ui> moral ·action. This $tate of affairs can be understood
as a direct result of the structure of our volition.
As human beings, we strive to bring about states of affairs-in the world

(and in our wills) through action. These actions are not brought about merely

because we are supcrsensuous, but because we are sensuous empirical beings as
well. The things or states of affairs we desire to bring about are the objects of
our inclination. Thus, ·in acting,.we 3tteJnpt to actualize our desires for the
fulfillment of our ends as objects of inclination. 7 As hum-, rational; and end
desiring beings, Kant describes oUT having oUT own happiness as a subjective

6

lbid., 6fn (6fn).

7

This does not preclude our recognizing that there are ends or objew of
our will that are self existing, 9bjective ends. Rather, this discussion merely
stresses that often these conditions are brought about as a consequence of the
conditions, as states of affairs in the world, being objects of inclination.
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end. Thus, in being human we seek to bring about what we understand as

pleasing states of affairs in the world which, as a consequence of taking place
in the world, can only bring about synthetic (empirical) propositions.
Likewise, any call to fulfill this end can only be a subjective, empirically
determined call just as anything resulting from it is of the same nature.
However, as rational moral beings we are not merely empirical and our
actions are not only determined by our empirical synthetic ends. There is of
course another determining ground within us, other than that of our own
happiness, a determining ground that we ought to have and· one that is
proposed to us by reason alone -- the law. 8 The law, since we are called to

fulfill it not through the "craving for possession of a thing through one's
action, n9 has ends which are not objects of inclination. Instead, the law is an
object of respect, and the ends that the law commands "are those proposed to

8

By our nature as beings dependent upon circumstances of sensibility, we
crave happiness [Gluckseligkeit] first and unconditionally. Yet by this same
nature of ours... as beings endowed with reason and freedom, this happiness is
far from being first, nor indeed is it unconditionally an object of our maxims;
rather this object is worthiness to be happy, i.e., the agreement of all our maxims
with the moral law [Wurdigkeit glucklich zu sein, d. i. die Ubereinstimmung aller
· unserer Maximem mit dem moralischen Gesetze.]. That this is objectively the
condition whereby alone the wish for happiness can square with legislative
reason-therein consists the whole precept of morality; and the moral cast of
mind consists in the dtsposition to harbor no wish except on these terms.
[REL~ 46fn (Greene and Hudson, 41-42fn)].
·

9

lbid., 6fn (6fn).
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us as such by reason alone." 10 As humans, then, we are pulled by our tvvo

different ends. The one end, characterized as subjective and empirical is
determined by happiness; the other, characterized as objective and practical is
determined by the law through reason alone.
It is a fact of our being human that we have two aspects of ourselves
expressed through our determinations as moral. beings and as worldly beings.
We desire the fulfillment of our ends, and we are called to fulfill the commands
of the law. These aspects of ourselves Kant describes as empirical and rational
respectively. However, with' regard to both of these disparate ends and aspects
of ourselves, there is a possibility that ,these ends can be "directly presented to
him (the moral agent) by reason alone,'', through which tht moral agent is able
to seek "something that he can love." In this final end, the aspects of ourselves

as rationally and empirically determined are united. In addition, through this
unification, this very same end guides the pursuit of the empirical en~ that we
are naturally drawn to pUI$ue. Hence the law provides us with aJt end as
unifier which guides our conduc;t. 11

10

lbid., 6fn (6fn).

lt should be noted that the·present discussion of the hlghest good
integrates the two approaches articulated in Chapters One and Two. The
relationship of the highest good as. a unifier and as a moral ide.l is not an
exclusive one. Rather, the twQ tasks are combined in the same object or end
of the will. The discussion of each of the previous chapters isolated these
aspects of the highest good in order to highlight the way in which
11
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The highest good serves as a unifier which guides our conduct in its role

as a final end. Kant recognizes (as was discussed previously), that to be
human and to seek to bring about an effect of our will, the will must be aimed
towards some object. The object Kant postulates as the highest moral object is
the highest good. 12 The justification for such an end is given in terms that are
not usually classified as Kantian, for it is through such an end that the agent
gains satisfaction. This satisfaction is of course, in typical Kantian
terminology, not to be the ground of the agent's action but rather a result of
the agent's action being grounded in the law. The satisfaction of the moral
agent lies in her being able to have a definite goal for her acts and thereby see
"towards what, as an end...we might direct our actions and abstentions ... "13
This end is the end that arises out of morality as was discussed in the earlier

contemporary scholarship on the highest good has isolated the tasks of the
highest good without integrating'therri.. , In short, the highest good ls· always a
unifier, and always a moral ideal. Yet like Kant's presentation, this one has
concentrated on one aspect or another in order to highlight the roles of the
highest good. In what follows, the two previous presented roles will be
demonstrated to be included in the understanding of the highest good as the
ethical commonwealth.
12

"For in the absence of all reference to an end no determination of the will
can take place in man, since such determination cannot be followed by no
effect whatever; and the representation of the effect must be capable of being
accepted ... as an end conceived of as the result ensuing from the will's
determination through the law.n [REL, 4 (Greene and Hudson, 4)].
13

lbid., 4 (4).
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section of this chapter. As such, the highest good, in the form

of an object which takes the formal condition of all such ends as
we ought to have (duty) and combines it with whatever is
conditioned, and in harmony with duty, in all the ends which we
do have (happiness proportioned to obedience to duty) 14
serves as a unifier which guides our moral life. It unifies our ends as those
which we ought to have (supersensuously determined) and those which we do
have (sensuously determined). Through this unification, we are given a guide
for all of the ends that we pursue, ffll end that is in harmony with duty. Thus,
it is through the highest good that we are able to have an unifying and guiding
end for our moral actions. 'This end serves our human need for the unification
of the disparate aspects of ourselves and: for the envisioning of an end that
allows for the determination of the will through which we can act in a way
that wiH better serve the demands of the law.
In sum, it is through this notion of the highest good as a unifying moral
guide for conduct that we are pushed to recognize action as characterized not
by what it achieves, but rather by the grounds according to which it was
determined. In so doing, the highest good, in being an end beyond the law, is
still in accord with the law. That is, .in the highest good~s role as a unifier and
moral ideal, the highest good relates to action merely insofar as it is a

I
14

lbid., 4 (4).
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consequence of the law. 15 This end, in being provided by reason alone, is

provided through the law insofar as
the law, which merely arouses his (the moral agent's) respect, even
though it does not acknowledge this object of love as a necessity
does yet extend itself on its behalf by including the moral goal of
reason among its (reason's) determining grounds. 16
That is, the moral law can provide us with an end that allows us to integrate
the demands that are a part of our experience as human beings. Through such
an end we are left with an object which we can love as well as respect.
By means of all of this explanation of ourselves as drawn to be
empirically determined and thereby limited in our moral capacities, and drawn
to be rationally determined and thus unlimited in our moral responsibilities,
Kant is progressing to explain how the moral law leaves us with the following
proposition: "Make the highest good possible in the world your own final

1

5With regard to the aspect of the highest good· as both a unifier :.tnd as a
final end Kant says, as a final end, the highest good:
... provides them (the moral agents) with a special.point of focus
for the unification of all ends)[der Vereinigungaller Zwecke
vmchajft]'; for only thereby can objective, practical reality be
given to the union of the purposiveness arising.from freedom
with the purposiveness of nature Zwedcmiiftigkeit aus Freiheit mit der
Zweckmilftigkeit der Natur]
[Ibid., 5 (5)].
16

das Gesetz also was ihm bloft Achtung einftuszt, ob es zwar jenes als Bedii,fn,i.ft
nicht anerkennt, erweitert sich doch zum behuf desselben zu ausnehmung des moralischen
Endzwecks der vernunft unter seine Bestimmungsgrunde [Ibid., 7fn (6/7fn)].
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end!" 17 Kant asserts that this command of the law is a synthetic proposition a

priori, introduced by the moral law itself through which practical reason
extends itself beyond the law. This extension is accomplished and allowed as a
result of the moral law being a law for human beings. That is, for all of our
actions, we are required to apply the supersensuous law to sensuous
circumstances. Thus, since we undertake our actions in the empirical world in
order to bring about states of affairs in the world, it is typical for humans to
conceive of an end over and above the supersensuous law. For example, when
l would seek to treat others as ends in themselves, this formal law could
become manifest through an act the end of which could be feeding the hungry.
Hence, in treating others as ends in themselves, I would be going beyond the
law in seeking to bring about a state of affairs wherein I would be providing
food to those who lack it. Kant allows for this extension beyond the law only
because, in so doing, we have ends (such as the highest good) that embrace the
a priori principle of the determining ground of a free

will. That is, through this

extension of the law, we are giving witness to the effects of morality since in its
ends we provide a demonstration of the objective though merely practical
.. reality of the concept of morality as being causal in the world. 18

17

mache das hiihste in der Welt mogliche Gut zu deinem Endzweclc! [Ibid., 7fn
(7fn)].
18

1bid., 6/7fn (6/7fn).
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In seeking to bring about this final end, the highest good possible in the

world, we are subject to the strictest obedience to the moral law which is to be
considered the cause which ushers in the highest good as end. In so doing, we
are brought face to face with our human limitations since human beings, in
our limited capacity, are not able to completely and exhaustively bring about
happiness in the world proportionate .to worthiness to ·be happy. 19 Thj.s leads.
Kant to his postulation of God as ''an omnipotent moral Being... as ruler of the
world, under whose care the [balance] occuts~ 1120 God is now a logical
condition fur the adoption of tM highest good serving the role ofan,
omnipotent guarantor of our final end

In ,establishing how it is that God enters the scene, Kant seeks to
establish bow it is that morality is able to "extend itself to the idea of a
powerful moral Lawgiver, outside of Mankind," .without becoming u,ntrue to its
original project~ 21 In a lengthy footnote, a place where Kant often conceals a
wealth of information, he indicates the solution to this quandary. Here, Kant
traces the justification for God through the idea of a highest good in the

1

9There are some ways in which we can bring about happiness in
proportion to virtue, this is discussed by both John Silber and Philip Rossi.
20

ein 1lllvmn6gmdes moralisthes Wesen als Welthemcher angenmnmm werfm, unter
dessen Vorfarge dieses geschieht [REL, '8fn (Greene and Hudson, 7fn)].
·

21

wodurch ,s;e sich zur ldee eines machthabenden muralischen ~bers auszer
dem Menschen erweitert [Ibid., 6 (5/6)].

99
world,
for whose possibility we must postulate a higher, moral, most
holy, and omnipotent Being which alone can unite the two
elements of this highest good. 22
It is because of this that morality for Kant leads inevitably to religion. For
morality leads to the highest good, and the highest good requires God for its
possible completion; hence, because it is the organization around God, religion
comes about. Thus, ip unpacking the requirement to pursue the highest good

as a synthetic, a priori proposition, Kant delirteates the connection between
God and the highest good. In what follows, I will unpack this explanation
which serves to anchor Kant's presentation of the role of God· as 'moral
guarantor of the highest good..

God is required as guarantor because the highest good is a teqtiired end
of the pure practical reason. As a command of reason, the highest good must
be possible. If the highest good is to be possible, its possibility requires
"bringing about happiness in the world propt>rtiohate to worthiness to be
happy." 23 Human capacities are insufficient to exhaustively bring about this
end; hence, the highest good requires the existence of God to deal with the

22

das ist, die /dee eines hochstm Guts in der Welt, zu dessen MIJglichkeit wir ein
hiJheres, moralisches, heiligrtes und allvermiigendes Wesen annehmen milssen, das allein
beide Elemente desselben vereinigen kann; [Ibid., 5 (4-5)].
die Gluckseligkeit in der Welt emstimmig mit der Wurdigkeit glucklich zu sein zu
bewirken [Ibid., 8fn (7fn)].
23
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aspects of the ,vorld that we are unable to overcome. Thus, it is through the

highest good that Kant anchors his conception of God as the logical condition
for the possibility of our final moral end, the highest good. And so it is that
"morality leads inevitably to religion. 1124

As the above demonstrate, God is required for the highest good to be
brought about in the world. An idea of divinity is necessary in this context for
Kant 11as the cause supplementing our incapacity with respect to the final
moral end. 1125 Our own powers, nb matter,how moral and perfected they might
be would still leave us short of any coherent malization. of the highest good.

This is the case since it is through the Mghest good that Wit cori.front the
1

sensuousness and this-worlcffiness:ofour"being human: 'Fhat is; we are unable
to effect, consistently through our own endeavors all that would be, required
for the world to bring about, for ourselves and ethers, happiness to the degree
that they are deserving.

As human beings, we are unable to be certain of our effect on anything
but our own moral dispositions. 26

This, in and of itself, is more than enough

24

die Moralfahrt unausbleiblich Religion [Ibid., 8fn (7fn)].

25

als ergiinzende Ursache unseres Unvermogens in Ansehung des moralischen
Endzwecks vorstellen [Ibid., 183, (171)].
26

Although in effecting OUT own moral dispositions, we may consequentially
effect other things, e.g. the happiness of others. This is not a primary effect,
since if it were the goal of our pursuit, it would have to be a heteronomous

IOI
to ready ourselves for the aid of "a gracious Providence." However, we are

unable to effect, with any sort of consistency, that way in which our desires for
states of affairs in the world are brought about or fall short. 27 The world in
which we live is not under our control. We are unable to have the states of

affairs in the world consistently conform to our desires for happiness.
Included in this idea of a falling short is the way in which our own
moral status cannot guarantee our happiness. As evidence of this incapacity
Kant appeals to the wodd around us as symptomatic·ofour inability to have
happiness rewarded in proportion to virtue. Rarely is the righteous man or
woman the one with the greatest worldly reward. ·The nexus of this resolution
is the highest good which seives to resolve the incommensurableness of the
world with our moral desert. For it1is through the highest good that not only
our purposiveness as happiness seekers and moral beings are united, but also
that the ends of the world as enacted in the natural realm are unified as nature
facilitates the satisfaction of the empirical aspect of our desires which our

pursuit insofar as its ground would be pleasing others, and not in the law.
Even when we seek to make others happy, thereby universalizing happiness as
a pursuit, this is a pursuit primarily conditioned by our moral disposition
·insofar as the disposition is the source of the effect.
27

An expression for everything wished for, or worthy of being wished for

which we can neither foresee nor bring about through our own endeavors
according to the laws of experience; for which, therefore, if we wish to name
its source we can offer none other than a gracious Providence [gtittge Vorseh,mg]
[(REL, l07fn (Greene and Hudson, 98fn)].

102
demand for happiness necessitates. 28

The presentation of the highest good as that which unifies the natural
purposiveness of the world as the vehicle for happiness with the moral
purposiveness of humanity as the condition for our deserving said happiness is
important in the Religion, but for different reasons than in Kant's other works.
Here the deficiencies of humanity to affect the natural world are pointed to as
a causal explanation of the need for God in the moral project. In Kant's other
works, this union of purposiveness in and of itself was of the greater import
insofar as it points to a useful and constitutive aspect of the concept of the
highest good. 29 Although not the key issue of this presentation of the ·highest
good, here Kant still remains faithful to the concept of the highest good as

unifier. This unification accomplished in the moral object integrates the
demands of the moral call which requires its manifestation and its enactment
through the moral agent's utilization of her agency in both the supersensuous
and sensuous realms.
In the preceding explanation, an aspect of the highest good that

28

Moral purposiveness and natural purposiveness are united for the same
reasons that are cited in Chapter One. Without this cooperative unification,
all desires to bring about the highest good in the world end in frustration.
29

For a more detailed discussion of this notion of the highest good, as a
dialectical ideal of reason through which the duality of purposiveness is united,
see Chapter One.
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received prior treatment has surfaced again. In the Religion Kant presents the

highest good as unifying the different sorts of purposiveness afoot in the
world. However, this aspect of the highest good is part and parcel of the
notion of the highest good as requiring God as moral guarantor. That is, the
unification of purposiveness is a symptom of the illness of our general human
inadequacy to bring about the highest .good in the world. The solution to this
shortcoming comes through God· as the- champion of the concept of the
highest good. Without the postulation of the existence of God the moral call
to pursue the highest good would necessarily -lead to confli~ or frustration
from our sheer inadequacy. Thus, .it is through the highest good that the
demands of all realms are met and satisfied.
In sum, with this more· descriptive idea of the highest good, we are given
a substantive,. filled-out notion of the highest good which has as its task the
unification of our ends as a guide for action. Throughout this discussion of
the highest good Kant continues to stress that although the highest good is
that which we are required to pursue, its pursuit would be impossible were it
not for God who guarantees its completion. 30 With this articulation of the

3

°Kant uses variously illustrative descriptions· for the highest good
throughout the Preface to the First Edition of the Religion.
"some sort of final end11, "the concept of a final end of all things", "union
of the purposiveness arising from freedom with the purposiveness of nature", "a
final end for his duties, as their consequence".
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notion of the highest good present in the Religion, there remains only the task

to determine the form through which this understanding of the highest good is
to be made manifest. That is, what does the highest good which serves as
unifier, moral ideal and anchor for God look like?

The Fulfillment of the Highest Good
I have articulated above what will be accomplished through the highest
good (moral guidance and unification of purposiveness), and. what, beyond our
worthiness, is required for its manifestation (God as moral guarantor). What
remains is to consider the form of this highest good and why it is that the
highest good takes this form. In what follows, I will demonstrate how it is
that here, in the Religion, Kant introduces a conception of the highest good as
the ethical commonwealth. This conception of the highest good differs from
the traditional understandings of the highest good as they were considered in
the other chapters. This notion of the highest good.is unique in that it
includes a social dimension. As such, the responsibility and duty to be moral
is no longer that of the individual in her moral isolation. The moral agent is

. no longer able to
apply himself exclusively to his own private moral affairs and
relinquish to a higher wisdom all the affairs of the human race (as
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regards its moral destiny). "~ 1

The ethical commonwealth goes beyond an understanding of virtue as a
primarily individual task articulated through individual acts. Hence, the
requirement to pursue the highest good no longer lies solely with the moral
individual in her isolation; for now it is placed on the species as a moral unity.

As Kant describes:
Now here we have a duty which is sui generis, not of men
toward men, but of the human race toward itself. For the species
of rational beings is objectively, in the idea ofreasen, des,t!incd for
a social goal, namely the promotion of the highest as a social

good.32
To bring· about the highest good is· the tkstiny of :the human species, as a,
species, and as such it is a ~ goQ<l. We:are thus required to pUfflle the
highest social goal, which follows from our primary duty to pursue and make
perfect our own virtue. The highest good takes this social form as a

consequence of Kant's full scale treatment of human evil. In presenting Kant's
ethical commonwealth, I will present Kant's doctrine of evil in order to

31

als ob ein jeder nur seiner moralischen Privatangekgenheit nachgehen, das Ganze
der Ungelegenheit des menschlichen Geschkchts aber (seiner moralischm Bestimmung
nach) einer hohen Weisheit uburlajfen dtnfe [REL, 100 (Greene and Hudson,
92)].
32

Hier hilben wir nun eine Pftcht von ihrer eignim Art nicht der menschen gegen
Menschen, so,ulern des menschlichen Geschkchts gegen ,sich selbst. Jede Gattung
vernunftigtr Wesen ist nitmlich oJ;;ectiv, in der ldee der V ernunft, zu einem
gemeinschajtlichen Zwecke, nilmlich der Beforderung des hiichsten als eines
gemeinschaftlichen Guts, bestbnmt. [Ibid., 97 (89)].
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demonstrate that the ethical commonwealth is required in order to overcome

the inherent evil of human nature. This is the case because as humans we are
radically evil and this state, at the most basic level, is that which thwarts our
efforts to seek to perfect our state of virtue. As radically evil, we are thereby
left in an ethical state of nature which we are also required to depart from and
overcome through our moral relations in ethical community (represented as·.
the highest good). As a function of the drive to seek our own moral
perfection, we must strive to bring about this social highest good as a means to
facilitate and preseive our own virtue, thereby fulfilling the command of the
law. For present purposes I will articulate the primary characteristics of this
conception of the highest good concentrating on its social aspects and how it is
a manifestation of what morality requires. In what follows I will present this
social highest good relative to its underlying basis in Kant's interpretation of
radical evil. 33
In Kant's doctrine of radical evil he goes far towards describing why we

3

3This chapter will not include an exhaustive account of Kant's ethical
commonwealth. Instead, I will present the basic aspects of the ethical
.commonwealth in terms of its origin as the means through which the
sovereignty of the good principle is to come to pass. The other issues relative
to this understanding of the highest good, such as how the ethical
commonwealth is connected to the other understandings of the highest good
will be addressed in Chapter Four. Furthermore, the means for the formation
of the ethical conunonwealth, as well as a critical assessment• of this
consummate notion of Kant's highest good will be addressed in Chapter Five.
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act and do what we do and, most relevantly, why it is that we transgress the

law. Kant's explanation of evil arises as a result of his need to hold us morally
culpable for our actions that go against the law. Prior to this work Kant had
said very little about how it is that we could go against our moral vocation and
still remain free, for free action is moral action and thus autonomous. Yet
when we look out, at the world~ we are not surprised to see that moral agents
everywhere appear to be going against the law, and to be doing so freely, that
is without coercion. Hence, for persons to be held culpable for their actions

Kant must give an account of how they come about while preserving human
freedom. 34

Kant demonstrates that the moral status of our actions as good or evil is
chosen and that, as such, we are responsible for this choice as it is a function
of our freedom. To establish this, Kant examines the source of morally good
and morally evil actions. In so doing, it becomes apparent that the origin of
our moral actions, whether they be good or evil, if they are to be free, cannot
be a result of the sensuous inclinations of moral agency. If this were the case,

an individual moral agent would not be responsible for her actions because

34

John Silber, in the introduction to this work explains the problem as
follows: ... "Kant had to show how necessity can be combined with freedom in a
single relationship." John Silber, 'The Ethical Significance of Kant's Religion,"
introduction to Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone translated by
Greene and Hudson, (New York: Harper Torchbooks)l 960, lxxxi.
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they would be understood as a consequence of something over which she had

no control, her natural state. That is, evil as a part of the sensuous nature of
moral agents would not originate in free choice; it would in some way be hardwired into the natural being of agents. 35 Thus, in order for action not to be
sensibly determined, its origin must lie elsewhere than in the sensuous drives
of the moral agent, and, as such, the origin of action must be freely chosen. In
order to fulfill these aitcria.;Kant concludes that as acting moral agents, our
actions are:determined by maximStwhich we freely choose. These maxims that
we choose and •those which .• goycm our acts arc those parts of us that are

dctemtined. by "mittttt" ·wile:rc natme is understood in a non-sensible manner.
Kant describes this non.sensible nature as follows:

...let it be noted :that by "nature of man" we here intend only the
subjective ground of the exercise (under objective moral laws) of
man's freedom in.general; this ground--whatcvcr is its character is
the necessary antecedent of every act apparent to the senses. 36
Nature, then, is not that which is the opposite of freedom, since that would
contradict the possibility of our being culpable for our action. Here, nature is
that means through which we are anchored in "human nature" as we make a

35

Man himse!f must make or have made himself into whatever, in a moral
sense, whether good or evil he is or is to become. Either condition must be an
effect of his free choice; for otherwise he·could not be held responsible for it
and could therefore be moral!, neither good nor evil. REL, 44, (Greene and
Hudson, 40).
36

lbid., 21 (16).
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commitment to a subjective disposition for action. This over-arching

disposition serves as the ground for all other actions for morally culpable
beings. As such, this subjective ground is and must always be an expression of
freedom. If this were not the case, the use or abuse of the agent's power of
choice "in respect of the moral law could not be imputed to him nor could the

good or bad in him be called moral. "37

In establishing the charac;ter of what Kant calls the over-arching
subjective predisposition of our nature, he discusses the pulls that are at work
in us as moral beings. We previously established that the moral agent is.pulled

toward, fulfiHing the demands of her moral self-foHowing the law; the moral
agent also is pulled towat:d fulfilling the demands of her sensuous selfpursuing her own happiness. These are the two incentives, termed
propensities, that govern us and are most relevant for the determination of our
overall maJim.
These mcentives are specifically good or evil insofar as tMy serve as the
means·through which the underlying moral propensity of human agency is
actualized.· That is, through the determination of our underlying moral
.maxim; as sf,ecifically either gci>od 9r evil, the subjective determination of the

human moral agent is realized. For Kant, the propensity is that which inheres
37
i11 Ansehung des

sittlichen Gesetzes ihm nicht zug,reehnet werden und das Gute
oder Bose in ihm nicht moralisch heiszen [Ibid., 21 ( I 7)].
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in the moral agent and thereby determines the subjective disposition at the

root of all subsequent acting. As he says:
...by the concept of a propensity we understand a subjective
determining ground of the will which precedes all acts and which,
therefore is itself not an act. 38
As a result of this account of moral action, the term "act" has two meanings,,
both of which are reconcilable with the concept of freedom. An "act" in the
first and more primary sense applies to the general adoption of the basic
propensity (towards good or evil) which becomes the basis for all other
actions. These other actions are "~" m the second sense and their status as

good or as evil is determined in accordance with their determination through
the original act. The pull toward morality or toward evil-is actualized at the
most primary level, in the first sense of "act". For the true moral or evil status
of an individual is not determined by "act" in the second sense, but only in
that most primary adoption of the basic moral predisposition. The point of
this differentiation in the two senses of act for Kant lies in safeguarding the

freedom that underlies our action. We freely choose the underlying ground of
our maxims as a propensity towards good or evil. After this choice, our actions

.regardless of whether or not they specifically follow from that original maxim,

38

versttht, man unt.er dem /3egriffe eines Hanges einen subjectiven Bestimmungsgrund
der Willkilr, der vor jeder That vorherg,ht. mithin selbst noch ni&ht That ist [Ibid., 31
, •i

(26)}.,
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are determined as such. Thus, our goodness or evil is determined at the most

basic of volitional levels. 39

As a consequence of this explanation of our maxims, evil is possible only
as a determination of a free will. This is the case since the will can be
appraised as good or evil only by means of its most primary underlying maxim.
Thus the propensity to evil consists in the underlying ground of the maxims.
This underlying maxim is subjective insofar.as it is freely chosen and could be
otherwise. In short, whatever the determination of the moral agent's
underlying· m.axim--as good or evil-it has a subjective status. This is the case,

propensity towards good or evil,, and•since the propensity was chosen fntely, it
could always be otherwise.

As a result of this, good and evil are not disel!mcd from perfonned
actions. That is'" moral agents are not evil or good by virtue of their
performance of evil actions (actions contrary to law), or good actions (actions

springing from the law); instead, they are.good or evil because there is present
3

91<.ant says of the more basic and fundamental sense of act, it:
.. .is intelligible action, cognizable by means of pure reason alone,
apart from every temporal condition;
of the second sense of act, as individual actions he says, it:
...is sensible action, empirical, given in time (factum phomomenon).
Ibid., 32/33 (26/27).
. /
In addition, this dual understanding of act can be seen in light of the
comparable notion of object in Chapter one.
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in the acting agent an underlying maxim which is either evil or good. v\Thether

or not the determination of the underlying maxim consists of a commitment
to good or evil is inaccessible to human cognition. This is the case since the
subjective determination of the underlying moral maxim is a determination
that takes place as a part of our noumenal selves. The true status of the
underlying maxim is only apparent to an all knowing being. Hence to
determine someone's moral status requires the a priori inference of an
underlying .good or an underlying evil maxim. 40
In short, the above has argued that Kant provides a program through
which .m.Qral culpability is retained, while at the same time freedom is

preserved. This system demonstrates its goal· of moral culpability insofar as we
are able to say of a moral agent that she is by nature good or evil. To be by
nature good or evil means only that there is in us an ultimate ground
(inscrutable to us) of the adoption of good maxims or of evil maxims (i.e.,
those contrary to law). In addition, this primary predisposition towards good
or evil forms the basis for the adoption of all of the subsequent maxims,
through which actions are brought about. This organization comprises what

40

More on the status of our inner disposition will be explained relative to
the ethical commonwealth as establishing the good over the evil principle in
our maxims. For now, it is enough to realize that "the ultimate ground of the
adoption of our maxims, ...cannot be a fact revealed in experience," [Ibid., 22
(17)].
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according to Kant, it is to be human; it is our "nature".

As a result of the above system of moral culpability, it makes no sense
to speak of good or evil as that which determines the will. Freedom is
preserved and, consequently, we determine the goodness or the evilness of our
will as we freely adopt the maxims that result in such a good or evil

determination. The determination of the will itself can only lie in maxims,
that which consists of those rules made by the will for the use of its freedom.
Human meral agents are then demonstrated to be the originators of the good
or evil that is a part of our-characters. This is· the case, sinde. the ultimate
grounding of our maxims is posited freely as the ground antecedent to every
use of freedom in experience. With the introduction of the above conception
of adopting a maxim, Kant preserves moral culpability and freedom,
something that has not been completely clear in his previous works. 41
Agents are never indifferent with respect to the moral law; they are
never neither good nor evil. This is the case as a result of our adoption of our
ultimate moral disposition. 42 This disposition is the ultimate subjective

41

We freely choose a subjective maxim, determined by our will (as willldir).
Our subsequent acts, as good or evil, are then a result of the expression of our
freedom and as such they can be moral or immoral. Ibid., 44ff (44ff).
42

••• if it were merely a question as to whether the law or the sensuous
impulse were to furnish the incentive, man would be at once good and evil;
this, however, .. .is a contradiction. Ibid., 44 (40).
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ground of the adoption of maxims, it is singular and applies universally to the

whole use of freedom. That is, whatever the dominant disposition within a
moral agent, that disposition serves as the determining factor in the agent's
moral status, as good or evil. As was established previously, human agents
possess a drive to morality and the very same toward happiness or self-love.
Relative to these drives, the moral agent is good or evil contingent upon which
drive is subordinated to the other.

... Henee the distinction between a good man and one who is
evil ... must depend upon suburdination (the form of the maxim),
i.e.• whidi•tfthe.e-, lncenthwhe makes the etmdltion of the other. 43

It f0Dow&, Wn, that the agent who has subordinated her moral drive to her
1

drive·to fulfill the need for self-love has a morally evil predisposition and is
thus an evil individual, Likewise, that agent who has subordinated her need
for self-love to her drive to fulfill the moral l:lw has a morally good disposition
and is a morally good individual.

As a result of the above, the determination of moral evil and goodness
can be·understood as based upon the hierarchical relation of the ground of all
maxims. From this, Kant concludes that the human species is evil by nature.
·This claims cn(:ompasses the entire moral status of the species. Generally, it

Ako nrujl.Jn U1fUrsthid, ob iler Mensch gut Oller 1JiJre ·sei, nicht in dem
Untersehiede der Triebfedern, die ,er in seine Maxime ausnimmt (nicht in dieser ihrer
materie)) smulern ih dn Unterordnung (der Form derselben) liege,,: welche vo,, beiden er
zur Bedmgulfg "4r 11ndern 11Uldtt. [Ibid., 36 (3 I)].
43
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can be concluded that humanity has perverted the appropriate hierarchy of the

subordination of maxims. Humanity has subsumed the principle towards good
under the principle of self-love.
Kant's explanation of humanity's propensity towards evil is
contradicto:ry. That is, he is claiming to have knowledge of what he previously
asserted was cognitively inacces.,iblc. Kant attempts to make his claim that
humanity is evil through demonstrating that both the moral principles and the
principle of self-love are enough to determine our will. Furthermore, it is only
natural for us in being human that there is some mixture of these incentives in
the determmin.g of our actions. However, humans have demonstrated time
and again that they are morally evil. From this empirical and historical point,

Kant concludes that.our species is morally evil insofar as we have perpetually
subsumed the wge to morality under the principle of happiness and self-love. 44
The evil of humanity is a radical evil. It is radical insofar as its source
lies at·the root of all of our maxims and as their ground, corrupts all of them.
It is, as a natural propensity, inextiYpable by human powers. This is the case

44

For more on this see: REL, 36-7 (Greene and Hudson, 31-2); 28/9 (27):
... from what we know of man through experience we cannot
judge otherwise of him (that he is evil), ...we may presuppose evil
to be subjectively necessa:ry to eve:ry man, even to the best
Ibid., 27 (26)
It is not really clear how Kant can go from an analysis of human volition to a
statement about the status of said volition.
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because any sort of moral revolution, a revolution which would reverse the

immoral hierarchical relation of principles, would have to occur through the
adherence of good maxims in the moral predisposition. This would be an
impossible state of affairs, since the ground of all maxims is a corrupt ground.
Thus good maxims could not take hold in the corrupt ultimate subjective
ground of all maxims. In establishing evil as radical, there is a danger. That is,

if humanity is to be free (as well as culpable), evil must be possible to
overcome. 45 If evil is an inescapable condition, humanity is no longer free, but
determined by its evil nature. It is no surprise that Kant provides a means
through which the under.lying evil of humanity is overcome. In what follows, I

will demonstrate that the means for this overcoming of radical evil consists of
the emergeJ\Cc·of the highest good as ·ethical comlh<>nwealth.

The conception of the highest good as ethical commonwealth is a social
understanding of the highest good through which that which is good in us is
able to regain its soveteignty over that which is evil in us. As we have seen,
human beings are radically evil in that within their original and most basic
disposition lies a propensity to evil. As a result of this underlying propensity
.towards evil, humanity has a dual motivation to pursue the highest good.
That is, not only is the highest good a duty in that it is the object of the moral

45

1bid., 37 (32).
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law, but it is also a duty in a more fundamental sense. 46 In working to bring

about the ethical commonwealth we are not only working to bring about the
highest good, that object which the moral law requires, but we are also
working to re-establish the sovereignty of the good principle within our
internal subjective moral hierarchy of dispositions, thereby fulfilling the
command of the moral law in our duty to improve our virtue.
The society of the ethical commonwealth which Kant has claimed as the
highest good, is required insofar as it is Kant's conception of the highest good.

Furthermore, it is required to overcome our propensity towards evil. That is,
no matter how much an individual .lw managed to have the good principle
overcome the evil principle in their maxims, this correct ordering of things is
constantly coming under attack from others who have.not done such a good
ordering. 47 Thus, it can seem impossible for one to overcome their
predisposition to evil since no matter how far the moral individual manages to

46

About our duty to pursue the ethical commonwealth, Kant writes:
The idea of such a state (the ethical commonwealth) possesses a
thoroughly well-grounded objective reality in human reason (in
man's duty to join such a state), even through, subjectively, we
can never hope that man's good will will lead mankind to decide
to work with unanimity towards this goal
die ]dee in der menschlichen Vernunft ihre ganz wohlgegrundete objective Realitllt hat
(als Pjlicht sich zu einem solchen Staate zu einigen ), wenn es gleich subjeciv von dem
guten Willen der Menschen nie geh'!lft werden kitnnte, daft sie zu diesem Zwecke mit
Eintracht hinzuwirk.en sich entscliirJJen wurden [Ibid., 95 (86).
47

Ibid., 93 (85).
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change her own predisposition, her own progress becomes threatened when

she comes into contact with others. Furthermore, moral agents can
misunderstand this social threat to their individual morality and thereby
become convinced that the evil of their maxim is not their fault, but rather
that "of mankind to whom he (the moral agent) is related and bound."48 This
is obviously ,a misguided understanding of the overcoming of evil which as a

result of the exe:rcise of our freedom, it can be,. and must be, possible to
overcome. It must :be possible to overcome our evil because we have no
OOJIUlland.$'\O do il\at. which

is impossible. Furthennott it ;is out ~sponsibility

to strive with all of our power to overcome the sovereignty of the evil principle
over the ,good principle within us. 49
The fact that we are responsible for our own evil does nothing to

diminish the effects, through our social contact, with others. .For it is through
social interaction with those who are ~ as well as with others just because

they are human, that we are led to the inevitable corruption of our
predispositions. This is the case no matter how gteat our effort •has been to
keep our moral dispositions pure. As a result of this condition of the social
corruptibility of our dispositions we are called to:

48

lbid., 93 (85).

49

1bid., 44 (40 ).

·

1
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the forming of an alliance uniquely designed as a protection
against this evil and for the furtherance of goodness in man--of a
society, enduring, ever extending itself, aiming solely at the
maintenance of morality, and counteraction of evil with united
forces ... 50

This union is the ethical commonwealth. It is Kant's highest good insofar as it
consists of the highest possibility of morality in society, through which our
pursuit of happiness is to be conditioned. Without such a union, we are
fore~r doomed to moral failure insofar as all of our individual moral progress
will rount for naught since it will be lost as soon as we meet with others. Thus

it is through the fortnation of the alliance at the root of the ethical
commonwealth that we ate able to keep safe and illerea$C our moral progttss.
That is, through the establishment of an ethical society we are able to
safeguard the moral progress that we have already made. In addition, it is only
through the ct.hkal commonwealth that we are able to combat our radical evil
and work·towards the establishment of the sovereignty of the good principle
within our subjective predisposition.
... the sovereignty of the good principle is attainable, so far as men
can work toward it, only through the establishment and spread of
a society in accordance with, and for the sake of, the laws of

50

eine ganz eigmtlich af die Verhii.tung dieses Bosen und zu Beforderung des Guten
im Mensdren abzwecknule Vermiigung als eine bestehnule und sich tmmera1tSbreitmde,
blt!ft aus die Erhlllt,mg der Mumlit4t angelegte Gesellschaft zu mic:htm, welehe mit
t1ereinigten Kriftm dem BIJsen entgegenwi-rfte [Ibid., 94 (85-86)].

120
virtue ... 51

This social union is the highest good insofar as it serves to safeguard and
nurture that which is moral within humanity. In so doing, the highest good
would promulgate the establishment of the good principle's sovereignty over
the evil principle. In this way, the burden of virtue is shared by an entire
society rather than by each individual in her isolated moral combat with the
evil principle. From this conception of the highest good, as an ethical
commonwealth understood as following from a duty to overcome our
propensity to evil and to seek to bring about this state in others, the face of
the highest good changes insofar as it is no longer that union for individual

virtue and happiness. Instead, the highest good requires.
a union of such individuals into a whole toward the same goalinto a system of well-disposed men, in which and through whose
unity alone the highest moral good. can· come to pass... 52

As required to be brought about, the highest good represents the moral life as
a social· and collective undertaking given the general way in which evil and its

51

Die Herrschaft des guten Princips, so fern Menschen dazu hinwirken kiJnnen, ist
also, so viel wir einsehm, nicht flnders erreichbar, als durch Errichtng und Ausbreitung
einer Gesellschaft nach Tugendgesetzen und sum Behuf derselben [Ibid., 94 (86)].
52

sondern eine Vereinigung derselben in ein Ganus zu eben demselben Zwech zu
einem Systme 'WOhlgesinnter Mmsehn, erfortlm, in we/chem u,ul durdt dessen Einheit es
atlein zu Stand kmnmen kann [Ibid., 97/8 (89)].
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requirements to be overcome are ascribed to the whole species. 53 Just as the

promulgation of evil is socially rooted, so is the means through which it is to
be conquered. It is not enough to do everything within your power to change
your inner self, the moral agent must also strive to create such a society that

has as its basis "a system of well-disposed men."
The form of this commonwealth is to be realized as a result of the moral
progression of the citizens that are already in a political commonwealth.
These citizens would voluntarily leave their ethical state of nature. This
ethical state of natUtt is likened to the political state of nature, which is a state
"of war of every man against every other. "54 The ethical state of nature is
similar to·political state of nature because it too is a state of war.
1 • ·.

the ethical state of nature (is~, one of ope,, e0nflicf between
principles of virtue and a state of inner immorality which the
natural- man ought to bestir himself to leave as soon as possible. 55

As such, the ethical state of nature is a bellicose atmosphere made up of the

53

See Sharon Anderson-Gold, "God and Community: An Inquiry into the

Religious Implications of the Highest Good," as it appears in Kant's Philosophy
ofReligion Reconsidered, edited by Rossi and Wreen, (Indiana: Indiana
University Press) 1991, especially pages l 23ff.
~ . 97 (Greene andHudson, 88).
55

so ist der ethische Naturzustand eine iffentliche wechselseitige Befehdung der
Tugendprinci[lien und ein Zustantl der innern Sittenlosigkeit, tlUS. we/chem der
natiirliehe Mensch so bald wie mDglicl, lrerauszulwmmm sich ~igen soil [Ibid., 97
(89)1.,
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conflicts between our own inner dispositions of good and evil and those same

in all others. In being required to leave the ethical state of nature the moral
agent is being required to pursue a new sort of duty. This is a duty of the
society as a whole. Of this whole, Kant explains:
... the idea of such a whole, as a universal republic based on laws
of virtue, is an idea completely distinguished from all moral

laws...56
In being so distinguished, this duty requires our working towards something
that is not in our power. This is the means by which Kant introduces God into
the idea of the ethical commonwealth as the moral guarantor of this social
understanding of the highest good.
With the ethical commonwealth·not totally under the auspices of
human domain, the conditions for the bringing about of the ethical
commonwealth rely strongly on the role of God as moral governor and
guarantor. We work to bring about a union of moral agents united for the
furtherance of virtue, but we have very little guidance towards how, through
our humanity alone, this will occur. Kant hints that its establishment will
arise out of its basis in the republican constitution. 57 Likewise, the main

56

lbid., 97 (89).

57

This is part of the developmental notion of the highest good that will
meet with in depth treatment in Chapter Four, see also REL, 94-5 (Greene
and Hudson, 86-7).

123
guidelines Kant gives for the establishment of the ethical commonwealth share

their origins with his political theory in that they are subject to the
requirements of public legislation. This public legislation must be made up of
laws which must ''be capable of being regarded as commands of a common law-

giver."ss
With! the above, a picture of tbe,ethicalcommonwealth takes form. For
itis,within the uniy~rsal ethical commonwealth where the laws~ internal,

that-we ~ t o Q>d 35 the common law-giver.
Hence an ethical commonwealth can be thought of only as a
people under divine commands, i.e., as a people tf God, and indeed
unw lllws if virtue. 59 .
.With God·~ the mor,al governor of the :ethical COIM\Qnwcalth, the moral· law
is now recognized as the. divine command of this lawgiver.. With God taking
Ol\, this role in the ethical commonwalth.; the

people within the

CQmmonwealth come together under the auapices of this moral ruler united; as
a "peo~ of God. 1160

As a result, the. members of the ethical commonwealth understand

58

lbid., ·98 (90).

ABD ist em etlrischts gemeines•Wdln mirwls ein Volk unter glttlithe Gebotm, d.i.
als ein VolkGottes, und ZWtlr nad, Tuge,ulgesetzen, nt denken milglich. [Ibid:, 99
59

(91)].
60

lbid., 99/100 (91).

/
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themselves as a people of God, a consequence of which consists in their

formation of a universal church of God. That is, Kant dictates that the
people of God come together in no other form than that of a church, which
will serve as the formal organon and archetype to be actualized on earth in

order for the ethical commonwealth to be brought about. When the
archetypal "invisible church" is actualized in its ectypal form of the ''visible
chureh" we know we are on the right path towards the achievement of the
ethical commonwealth. 61
With the role of God demonstrated as moral guarantor through the
fornt of the· church, the highest good as· ethical commonwealth shares some of
the same characteristics of the more traditional, individwillstic notions of the
highest good. Within the ethical commonwealth, we arc acting such that we
make our moral selves worthy to dese~ God's assistance as we seek to make
actual the invisible church on earth. God's assistance is required in order that
we are able to make commensutate the ends of morality with the world as well

as ·we are able to h\ake our own moral ends commensurate with our subjective

61

"The true (visible) church is that which exhibits the (moral) kingdom of
God on earth so far as •it' can be bJOUght to pass ey men"
Die Wtlhre (sichlbare)Kirdte ist kiejmige, welehe Jas (morausdu) .Reich Gottes ,nu
Erden. so Fieles durch Moudtm gesdlehen kllnn, tlarsteUt... [Ibid.• 101 (92)].
This discussion of the invisible and visible church is like the discussion
of the bringing about of the archetypal and ectypal worlds in the Analytic of
the second Critique. See Chapter Two for a discussion of this connection.
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desires for happiness.

Mankind (rational earthly existence in general) in its complete moral
perfection is that which alone can render a world the object of a
divine decree and the end of creation. With such perfection as
the prime condition, happiness is the direct consequence,
according to the will of the Supreme Being. 62
Only as moral agents work to make themselves worthy of divine aid, in being
"morally perfect," through working to bring about the invisible church on
earth, will divine aid be forthcoming. However, in working toward this
ethical commonwealth, we are not to use it as that way in which to determine
our actions (heteronomously). That is, we are not to seek to bring about the
ethical commonwealth for the sake of happiness .in the world nor are we to
zealously look to God for assistance. We have no knowledge of the

connection or timetable God uses to determine his role in the manifestation of
the ethical commonwealth. Even though a concern with the divine timetables
is anxiety provoking, Kant implores us to have no concerns. It is only

"essential to know what man himself must do in order to become worthy of this
(God's) assistance. "63 This is assistance that will bring about the ethical

62

Das, was allein eine Welt zum Gegenstaml des g/Jttlichen Rahschluffes und zum
Zwec"ke der Schiipfung mach k(inn, istdie Menschheit (das vernunftige Weltwesen
ilberhaupt) u-,, ihrer moralischen, ga11UR Volllannmenheit, wwon ab oerster &dingung
die Gluckselig"keit die unmittelbare Folge in dem Willen des hiJchsten wesens ist. [Ibid.,
60 (54)].
63

lbid., 52 (47).
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commonwealth as well as our own moral conversion as it stresses the role of

God as guarantor of the concept of the highest good.
To sum up, in this chapter I have argued that the highest good in

Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone is similar and different from
Kant's other presentations of the highest good. This notion of the highest
good is similar insofar as it serves: as a unifying moral ideal and requires God
in order for it to be made manifest. Consequently, the notions of the highest

good as presented in Chapters One and Two are demonstrated to be
complementary and not competitive or exclusive. Hence, through the ethical
commonwealth, the two notions of the highest good as expressed in the second

Critique are united and made manifest. Thus to fulfill the command to pursue
the ethical commonwealth is to fulfill the command to pursue the highest
good as articulated in the second Critique. In addition, this notion of the
highest good in the Religion differs from the previous notions. This notion of
the highest good is a social conception of the highest good in the form of
Kant's ethical commonwealth. Central to the social aspect of the ethical
commonwealth is the way in which it fosters a notion of collective virtue that
includes an orientation towards others in creating a more perfect social union
as a church on earth. Hence with this third chapter, the similarities and
differences between Kant's conceptions of the highest good are brought to
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light. From the establishment of this integrated interpetation of the highest

good, Chapter Four will consider the possibility of a developmental plan
through which we are able to actualize this integrated interpretation of the
highest good. This will be done as Chapter Four demonstrates the way in
which the Kantian corpus contains a developmental program for achieving the
ultimate articulation of the highest good .as the ethical commonwealth based
on perpetual peace, that object which morality requires.

CHAPTER4
KANT'S DEVELOPMENTAL PLAN:
THE CONSUMMATION OF THE HIGHEST GOOD

In the prior chapters l have, argued for the three predominate themes of
the highest good, in order to explicate ·and distinguish the various

manifestations of Kant's complex object. To sum up, the highe6t good appears

in primarily tJuee guises: first,•as that dialectical·ideal for the unification of
our purposiveness, as demonstrated. in Caapter One; ·sCCK.md as that moral

ideal which senves as a 'gllkle· for our action,, as demonstrated in Chapter Two.

Third and finally; the aigltest good appears-as the ethical commonwealth. In
this manifestation of theffl.ghest.good, the two prior appearances of the

highest good are .combined as ,the highest good is made manifest as. a unifying
moral ideal with a required social component as the means through which

radical evil is to be overcome. This.third conception of the highest good
consists of the ethical commonwealth. It is this third manifestation of the

highest good, that which received treatment in Chapter Ihree, that Kant
articulates as the supreme manifestation of the high.est good. Hence in what
follows, instead of in.teq>reting the highest good through these various
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instances, I ,vill present my main thesis, that duty determines just one object,

the highest good, the consummate articulation of which is made manifest
through a developmental plan culminating in the ethical commonwealth based
on perpetual peace.
Implicit in my thesis is the following: to grasp the highat,good in its
complete relation to the moral law and moral agents is to appreciate the moral
object. as it is manifested: in its entirety, that is, within what is falsely, albeit

commonly, delineated as. Kant's separate realms. These faux separations are.
oft~n,articulated as those of the individual as·comparcd to society; the .realms
of the .political as compared to the ethical, .and that. of right contrasted to

virtue,,just to name a few. Yet in its entirety,.·the most complek
conswnmationof the· highest good comes about as a consequence .of the
integration of .the5e realms by way of a developmental plan. The blueprint for

this plan is contained within Kant's rorpus, but is by.no means obvious.
What I have done: is to piece together the integral parts of this plan through a

careful, analysis .of several of Kants developmental texts. This analysis leaves
an .understanding of the highest good that not only serves as a means through
which these disparate, perspectival, and exclusive statements of the highest
good are integratc<i, but it also requires cooperation among them. In addition,
analysis of this developmental plan results in the removal of the false
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polarizations within the Kantian project which serve as a barrier for

comprehending the Kantian vision of what morality requires.
As has been discussed in the previous chapters, duty determines just one

object. That is not to say that many objects are not compatible with the law.
However, there is only one object which we are given a command to pursue.

Many actions are required and we have many duties as a result of the
command to obey the law, yet the law itself commands that we work to bring
about only one object, the highest good as·bappi.ncn urharmony with moral
worthintss. . in what ·follows I wiU further•demonsttatc. how it is· that .tluty ·
determines just one· object, the highest ~ irrespective .of,whether or not
this is done relative to a "moral'', "political", "individual" or "social" ,project. I
will. accomplish this through addressirtg the connections, and removing the

roadblocks rhetwttn the above multifarious notions of the place from which
one seeks to pursue and achieve the highest good. Included in this will be an
analysis of the object of ·pure practical rea.,on insofar as it ihcludes a
developmental-plan for its consummate articulation. In short; I will
demonstrate that there is just one conception of the highest good - that object
that·duty requires in its practitt. Howtver, the specific requirements in
content of this object vaty and are to be understood perspectivally as relative,
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that is, contingent on one's place in the moral venue. 1

In order to establish my thesis, that duty determines just one object, the
highest good; the consummate articulation of which is made manifest through
a developmental plan culminating in the ethical commonwealth based on
perpetual peace, I will: 1 )demonstrate that the practice of duty consists of the
highest good. This is the case insofar as through the practice of duty there is a
developmental plan which culminates in the ethical commonwealth. Thus
after establishing, step one, I will: 2 )presertt the developmental plan that

culminates in the ethical commonwealth based on perpetual peace. This plan
consists of tluec moments, the moments of:, a)a person, b )a state, and
c )humanity. This becomes apparent, through ,presenting the stages of the
highest good insofar as they are actualized in these realms. Finally, after the
above discussion I will: 3) present the consequence of this highest articulation
of Kant's complex object. In short, these consequences will mnsist of the
expression of the highest good as the ethical commonwealth based on
perpetual peace which comes about as. a iesult of the developmental

1

Part of my argument includes the claim that it is nonsensical to speak of a
"moral" highest good and a "political" highest good. The highest good is that
object which combines the greatest possible happiness in accord with the
greatest possible enactment of duty (virtue) relative to that particular context,
e.g. between individuals, among citizens, amidst republics, etc. This argument
is substantiated in what follows, however it is useful for the explanation to give
this short elucidation here.
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ascendence of the prior notions.

The Practice of Duty is the Highest Good
Throughout the previous three chapters I have dealt with various
definitions of the highest good. In each of these conceptions of the highest
good some aspects have remained common while others have varied.

Attention to· these •Similarities and differences enables us·to regard the highest
good'front ,a more unified point of view. Within eacl\ presentation of the

highest good three 'factors have mmained constant; ,Aiways,and in cwry case,
the high~st good is that otr,.jca. that is detcmniritd by the Jaw,,insofar as it is

the,ohject of pure practical reason. Second, as determined by the law, this
object is fflfUired to ,be pursued insofar as the law includes a command to
pursue the highest good. Third and finally, the abstract notion of the highest
good ·contalns a general program· as its.~ This task is the creating of an

environment,stich that it becomes possible to achieve happiness in proportion
to our wotthincss to receive ru-

With regard to the conception of the highest

good m: Chapter Ohe, as.a dialectical ideal of rcason,cthe environment of
.happinas in proportion to virtue is brought about within the moral will.
With regard to the conception of the highest good in Chapter Two, as a moral
ideal, the environment of happiness in proportion to virtue is brought about
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within the world. With regard to the conception of the highest good in
Chapter Three,· the ethical commonwealth, the environment of happiness in
proportion to virtue is brought about both internally and externally. This is
the case insofar as we are required to bring about a commonwealth and
overcome our internal propensity to evil. In brief, the highest good is the
object of the law, required to be pursued, and that which brings about the
coincidence of happiness and virtue. However, as we have ·se~n in the earlier
chapters, for ·each of these three .factors, there are as many incidental
differences.· .It is my thesis that these incidences of difference are expressed as
a consequence of the perspective from which the highest good is being made

manifest.
In short, there is one highest good, the program for which is determined
differently in its specifks relative to the perspective in the moral venue from
which the highest good is being pursued. That is, each notion of the highest
good shms ·at least the above three characteristics. What differs about the

various manifestations of the highest good is the perspective relative to duty

from which each ofthese objects of pure practical reason is pursued. The

three perspectives from.which to pursue the highest good manifest themselves

'I
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relative to the principles of morality, right, and moral right 2. Thus it is

through these •various perspectives from which to perceive duty that the
theoretical form of the highest good is required to be practiced as an object.of
the law.
Furthermore, the three principles upon which the individual
manifestations of the highest good are based (morality, ·right, and moral right)
are each pe:rspectival manifestations of duty. As a manifestation of duty, the
object of each is the highest good as that practice which 1 )the law determines,
2 )duty requires and 3 )happiness is present in proportion to virtue. Hence in
what follows I will examine and prove the claim that the practice of duty,
)

perspectivally relative, is the highest good. The essay in which Kant devoted
extended treatment to this relation between duty and its practice, "On the
Proverb: That may Be True in Theory But is of No Practical Use," is an
obvious choice as that place from which to begin. 3

2

With regard to the conception of the highest good as a dialectical ideal,
the environment to be created, where happy moral right, I am describing the
formulation of Kant's theory of duty that provides the basis for the ethical
cormnonwealth. Here, what was once merely internal laws are now legislated
ext.ernaJly. More simply, moral right is that pJace where morality agrees with
· politics determined ·by what Kant refers to as the Tugendgesetzm ·.... laws t.f virtue
[REL :94, ..(G~me and. Hudson,• 86)] .
.

A b~f oote to clarify terms. The.object of duty (tJ\eory) is the highest

3

gqQ4 (practice). Duty can be.approached from three perspectives: I )a person
(individual), 2)the state (political), 3)humanity (people or world). The
principle underlying the approach of the perspectives is: l )morality, 2 )right,
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Kant begins this essay and its treatment of the relationship of theory to

practice by clarifying his terms and thereby setting the stage for his
presentation of the highest good as it entails the practice of the theory that is
duty. He defines a theory as an aggregation of rules; even of practical rules, in

which
these rules are thought -of as principles possessing a certain
generality and, consequently as being abstracted from a multitude
of conditions that· nonetheless necessarily influence their
application. 4
Kant then elaborates that the theory with which he is exclusively concerned is
none other than a theory based on the concept of duty. Since this theory is
. '

'

based on a concept of duty, its practice must be possible. This follows from
the definition of duty, which would be empty if it were not possible to be
pursued, for how could there be optional or occasional duties. Theory based
on duty is that place from which we draw the law that determines our matters
'

'.

of morality, including both moral and legal duties, (what Kant refers to as

3 )moral right. All of this results in the following ina.nifestations of the highest
·good: l Jmmmum bonum~ 2 )the state, which has multiple stages {a,)civil
commonwealth,. b )fedeiation of iStates, c)perpetual peace]~ 3)ethical.
commonwe.ith, based on perpetual peact., :The above is what the chapter will
seek to establish, but it is helpful to have a preliminary explanation of terms in
place.
/

+rrP, 275 (Humphrey 61).
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Tugend- oder Rechtsp.flicht). 5 These matters of morality are decided through the

mediation of an act of judgment in the determining of our action, which can
be thought of as a practice when it is ''brought about in consequence of certain
generally conceived principles of procedure, 11 accomplished as a certain effect
of our will. 6
Throughout his prefatory remarks, Kant continues emphasizing that the
practice of duty is not useless and it is an affront to philosophy to think of it
as such. In addition, its pursuiVis worthwhile as-it is based "entirely on its

appropriateness to its underlying theory,11 and there is no more appropriate
theory than duty. 7 Through emphasis and hyperbole Kant presents as
ludicrous the. possibility that the moral ·law has no relevance for the real world.
His is no impotent theory with a vacuous notion,of pncticalconsequences,

rather it is a theory with carefully constructed practices which follow from it.
Being mindful of Kant's inttoduction to this essay, how is it that we can
interpret the practices that he goes on to discuss, the practices of duty, as

5

At this point in Theory to Practice Kant is very clear that both moral and
legal duties, those things which fall under' th'e' doctrine of virtue an:d right
respectively, are both considered moral matters. This comes as no surprise
when perpetual ~ e is recognized as that place which allows· for the
agreement of morality and politics, an agreement that is also a moral matter.
Sec 1TP, 277 (Humphrey 62) and PP, 370-373 (Humphrey 127-129).

61TP, 275 (Humphrey 61).
7

lbid., 277 (62}.
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made manifest through the highest good? The evidence is presented by Kant

himself, through his depictions of the object of duty, pursued as the practice of
duty and therefore articulated in each of the latter sections of Kant's essay.
There can be no doubt that throughout the three sections of Theory to Practice
Kant is comemcd with the practice of duty since he explicitly states his task as

such. Truly, duty can be practiced in a multiplicity of ways. However, Kant

maintains throughout his writings that the consummate object of the moral
law :catt be none other than the highest good. That is, ,many objects are in

ac(X)rd with duty_ b~,duty. itselfdetctm,unes only .one object. .This is the case
because it is through the hlgllcst. good that~ combine our supreme good -

The object of the theory of duty, that theory which gives us the law, is

under oonsidemtion,tluoughout this AtSSay. In each of the sections of the

essay, Kant articulates the object that he considers as theory's practice, doing

approached as
'

weff as criticized.

The standpoints are each perspectives from

',

whiclM;o evaluat-e the object of duty, to understand it as it develops the

doct.rint :thtt,ugh' whidl -. approach the achievement of the highest good, and
to present ·Kant's· relation of theory to practice. It is 'with this in mind that
•

>

"'

i

•

; '.t-,.

;

/
8

For more analysis and substantiation of this point, see Chapter One.
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Kant sets forth to meet his critics in three realms wielding the practicality of

his theory as it is variously manifested in its development toward the highest
good.

9

The Development of Duty's Object

Keeping this in mind, we will begin our approach through continuing
to concentrate on the essay Theory to Practice, in order to articulate the object
of theory's practice. This essay is particularly suited to this enumeration since
it is here that Kant gives the most complete articulation of that object ( the
practice), which duty (the theory) determines and the manifest ways in which

duty determines it. In addition, through the format of this essay Kant
addttsses his critics directly, thereby demonstrating the consistency of the
possibility of the highest good as it specifies the practical consequences of his
moral theory.
As has been mentioned earlier, Kant's presentation of the three

9With regard to the perspectives through which to evaluate the relationship
between theory and practice. l<ant says:
I divide this essay in accordance with the three different
standpoints from which a gentleman who boldly criticizes
theories and systems usually judges his objects, thus from three
attitudes: (l) the private person who is yet a man of affairs;[als
.Privat-, aber doch Geschiljtsmllnn] (2 )the statesman; [al.s ·Staatsman.n]
,(3)themanof the·wurld fals Weltmann (oder Weltburg,r aberhaupt)}
, (or citizen of the world in general).
SeeTfP, 277/278 (Humphrey 62).
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standpoints from which to perceive the relationship between theory and

practice is of great import. He addresses this issue near the end of the
introduction to Theury to Practice. For our purposes, this relates to the
perspectives from which the practice of theory (its object) is presented and
pursued. From the standpoint· of each of the three different p e ~ Kant
enumerates the way in ,which the three aforementioned general points about
the highest good are to be concretized. 10 He• does this by first articulating the

natu.:,,:of the contept pf the highest good in.the most abstract of terms and

practice :.of duty enaded in three realms, those of: l )the,pcrsoit; 2,)the· state;
and 3)humanity., Kant himseH refers to these· three momenu, in the

development of duty's object as he outlines' the contents of the rest of Theory

. , Thus, -we shall present the rdati.on,hip of theory to practice
in three sections: first, in morality in general (in relation to the
weJM>eingofach man); second, in politics (in relation to the·
well-being of nations); third, in cosmopolitan perspective (in
relation to,the wellpbeing of·~ humanrace as·a whole and
insofar as its well-being is conceived as progressing through a
sequence of,devclopmcnts during all future times). 11

10
11

See footnote 8.

Kant articulates the perspectives as: morality [Moral], politics [Politik],
andjn ~Osm()J)Olitan perspective [kosmopolitischer Betrachtung]. He then goes on
to express how these "express the relationship of theory to practice in morality
[Moral}, political right {Staatsrecht] and mternational right {Viilkerrecht]"
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And thus shall I proceed to present the relation of theory to practice from

these standpoints.
In treating these perspectives, I will enrich this analysis through
appealing to Kant's other writings. That is, the perspective of the individual
has already met with some treatment in Chapters One and Two. FurthennoIC,
the perspectives relative to right, where Kant discusses the practice ·of duty
relative to the state and the human race are given further treatment in lllc

Metapeysigs Qf Morals.,• lt:is then ·through appeal to the ·essay Perpetrtal Jwce
and

Religion Witbin, the.IJmm, of,Rtason, Alone 1:lm. we arc able to further

com~°'° the ramifications of these perspectives..' ,For in ~the hwnan race as

a whole,..,· Kant proposes that the highest good.,as theory's practice is
characterized by progressive, developmental moments that culminate in the
.K"t.ualization of 'the;mghest good throughout the world, in its final form, none
other than an ethical commonwealth based ·on perpetual peace.
H these-manifestations of the highest good as they appear through.out

these works are isolated and thereby viewed individually" th.at. is, in not "seeing
the parts in their reciprocal interrelations," 12 the controversy about the highest

··good can be sustained in perpetuity. However, the debate over the highest

[Ibid., 278 (63')].
12

.

.I

See footnote number one, in the introduction.
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good can be silenced, or at least quieted a good bit, through recognizing that

the highest good consists of a tripartite development, consisting of the three
perspectives articulated above, culminating in the ethical commonwealth
based on perpetual peace. In short, the confusion over the highest good is a
consequence of not recognizing its unity and thereby putting forth competing
notions of it. The best presentations of these notions that end up in
competition·with one another are found in Kant himseH, when they are taken
in isolation and not as diverse manifestations of the object of the moral law

(diverse insofar as they are pursued from·various petspcctivcs). Hence it is
through appreciating ,these~diverse, ,apparently competing moments as Kant
articulates them that we take his view most seriously.

Moments: A Person

In Themy to Practice, the first perspective which Kant addresses is that of
the moral person, through his response to the criticisms of Garve relative to

his presentation of the demands of the. law on moral individuals. This

perspective is one that is very prevalent throughout Kant's work. It is the
· perspective from which we initially meet the law and fulfill. our -purpose as
moral beings.
Here Kant points to and describes the end required by duty, as dictated
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by morality in general. It seems redundant at this point to argue that the

theory with which Kant is here concerned is duty. It is not a controversial
claim to assert that morality is the duty of the individual. The interesting

aspects of this claim, the means through which Kant expresses the claims of
the moral law on us and the determination of the object that the individual is
required to pursue, are addressed in the previous chapters. Suffice it to say

that morality is· based on the theory of duty as it relates to duty and the

demands of the law on the moral individual. As such, the moral individual is
required to pursue certain ends and is :subject to this requirement as she is
required to preserve a will not in conflict with duty. 13

,·

Kant also tkscnbes the end of the individual moral a~nt as an action.

This is the-case in that it expresses.an end the agent should actMdy seek to

pursue, Kant describes the pursuit of the highest good as a consequence of a
determination of fhe·wilL Once the will has accepted its. determination "the
basis of which is that if we stand jn .certain moral relations to things in the
world, we must everywhere obey the moral law;" the will is obliged to pursue a
further duty. This duty is the practice of the theory of morality, and thus a
consiequence ofth.e ~moral" perspective from which to pursue our duty. This

perspective coosi,sts of the
. ,·,

3TrP; ·218 (Humphrey .63').

1
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further duty to strive vvith all one's abilities to ensure that such a
relationship (a world conforming to the highest moral ends)
exists.14

Hence the highest good is demonstrated as that end that follows from the law.
The highest good, as the end of the agent who has made a commitment to the
moral law is required to be pursued. For the highest good, as determined by

the theory that 'COmes from duty is the agent's moral end. Kant describes this
end ofa,will determined by moral duty in a manner that is familiar. This end
is

... the highest good possible in the world (the. purest morality
throughout the world combined with such universal happiness as
,accords with it). 15
This cndi as the highest good, includes a conccm for: the relationship of
morality to the individual's well being where that well :being is understood as a
will not in conflict with duty. This is the end of-the moral agent whether she

is an acting agent in the state, as a member of the human race, or a singular
agent. The end itself never changes; it is always happiness in proportion to
our worthiness of it.

1

4eine Welt, den sittlichen hiichsten Zweckm angemessen. Elsewhere in the
footnote, Kant,refers to the highest good as: [eine Welt als das hiJchste auch durch
unsere MitwurhlngmiigUtJhe Gilt] and [das hikhste Gut],·all wordings consist of
that object which foJlows,from.the law and is required to be pursued,H die beim
Menschen Pflieht ist. {ibid., 280 fn (64fn) ];
15

das hiJchste in Iler Welt moglichf Gut [Ibid., 279 (64)].
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In bringing about a rnora11y good world, from the various perspectives

Kant describes, the specific distractions and pitfalls that are present vary.
However in this section Kant merely describes the moral agent individually as
she interacts with the world. Here she is her own nemesis as she battles to
keep happiness and selfishness away from the ground of her action. That is,

Kan.t rehearses ,the arguments that are present elsewhere regarding the
difficuhies of the pursuit of the highest good and the impurity of the will. 16 •,
Kant stresses in this section that regardless of the skq,ticism of his
critics and the evidence in the world, pure motives •

in,prlnciplc possible.

They are states for which we should,strive ap.d that which ~ty,should

encourage. 17 Consequently, Kant is concerned not so much with establishing
the highest good and its viability, as he is with the establishment of its
possibility relative to the perspective from which the theory of duty is

1

%ese difficulties are the familiar ones of:
·,-The highest, good is not a need of morality, but a consequence of the will' s
needing an object to act.
-The hi~st !gbod iS ·not a ground for action, the principle of morality is the
only determinant of a moral will.

' See TIP, 279-81, (Hutnphrey 64~5).
Flbid., 288 (71 ).
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articulated in its practice. 18 This practice itself is my main concern since it is

the highest good. However, the issue of perspectivalism is likewise of concern
since it grounds the various notions of the highest good that are present in the
corpus as the practice of duty appreciated from the various points of view. 19

Moments: A State
Once Kant establishes. the practice of duty with regard to the principle
o:f'morality1and the perspective of the moral individual,he goes on to discuss
the practice of duty with regard th the' pth1df>l~ of tight and, the perspective of
the state. :Here'.I<ant ardcmates!political •light as that :principle which is a
reflectibn of the thet>ry;that is duty as it relates to its practice in the formation

1

8With regard to the overarching issue, the establishment of the highest

good relative to the perspective from which the theory of duty is articulated in
its practice, Kant aplains:
As will become apparent in what follows, the crucial issue at stake
, here concerns the principle of morality not at Ml, but only the
universal moral point of view.
Ibid., 281, (65).
19

lt ·sh1>uld be noted here that the coaceptiol\ of the highest good as .An end
or object for. moral uv:nviduals corresponds with the concepti® of.the highest
go«l as discussed in Chapters One and Two. Both of the discussions of the
previous chapters related to the highest good from the perspective of a moral
individukl.
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of the state. 20

.Toe understanding of right as a reflection of the theory that is duty,· is
somewhat controversial. Although controversial, this interpretation is easily
sustained. The basis of this interpretation lies in the status of right consisting
of the understanding that freedom must be able to be expressed in the world if
the moral law is to have any veracity. Through right, Kant is providing a
system that allows for coctcion and force in order to protect the minimum
rights of individuals, within the context of his moral system.
The concept pf an external right in· general derives cnmcly from
the concept offreedom in the external relations among men...Right
, ,is the limitation of each. person's freedom so that.it is compatible
with the freedom of everyone, insofar as this is possible in accord
-...1. .a wuTI:I:,aa law... 21
wiu,

.

---!..----1

Hence ,right supplies us with systemamed moral principles in the format of
laws which allow the guarantee of an environment in which we can pursue our
duty, based on freedom. These laws themselves are based on right as the
external formulation of duty.

As moral agents we are free, and this freedom, and its pursuit must be
protected. The protection of these "rights" is accomplished through political

,zoAll translators cite the difficulty of the term Recht. in English. However,
with that stated, I will follow normal procedure, using the term right for the

Germ.an R«ht.
21

TIP 290, (Humphrey 72).
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organization, based on a system of duty. It is a system of duty, because it is

derived from a first principle and remains on the level of principles that can be
known a priori to be binding. For as Kant says, "Right is therefore the sum. of
the conditions under which the choice of one can be united with the choice of
another in accordance with a universal law of freedom. "22 This law of freedom
dictates our duty and as such. right is not some separate realm for Kant, it is a

further fotmulation of a context based on the theory .ef duty. 23

What then-is the object of duty with regard· to th.e realm of the

political? Very simply stated. Kant aclvocates that moral ·individwds come
togethei' ,to form

a nation• order to protect their freedom, because

however well disposed and law-abiding ,men might: be, .it still lies
a priori in the rational Idea of such a condition (one that is not
rightful) that befont: a public lawful condition is establishcdp
individual men, peoples, and states can never be secure against
violence from one another, since each has its owrt•right·todo
what seems right and good to it... 24
That is, moral agents are required to leave the state of nature and enter into
the civil commonwealth. This is required since the rights that are nevertheless

2MM 230, '(Gregor 56): .

2

23

See the ·"'Introductio'n to the Metiiphysics of ·Morals".',• specifically section
one, and the "Introduction to the Doctrine of Right" in The Metaphysics of
Morals. for a detailed discussion of rignt as a reflection of freedom and &cc
choice. KgS, VI, 211-214 (Gregor, 40-43) and Mary Gregor, "Kant's Theory
of Property,,. Revie\v of Metaphysics, 41 (June 1988) 7 65ff.
24

MM, 312 (Gregor, 124).
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present in a natural state have no means for protection. That is, when conflict

arises, there is no· arbiter present to settle disputes. Hence when disputes
arise, there is no means through which we are able to guarantee that the rights
based on freedom will be respected and upheld. Thus as human moral agents,
we "ought above all else to enter a civil condition. "25 This required formation

of a nation is brought about as the practice of duty. In this instance, the
practice of duty is determined by its form as determined by the principles of
civil right manifested in a civil constitution. The bringing about of a nation is
required, and moral agents can be brought out of their state of nature by force,
if they are not willing to fulfill the requirement of the law.
Kant's argument stresses that a civil state is the only form that a nation
may take, if it is to be grounded in the moral law. This civil state is arguably
the highest good since it is that end, as practice, which follows from the theory
that is duty. As the practice of duty, the civil state is an end that is required
by the civil realm of moral life. This embodiment of the highest good consists
of a unique type of contract that establishes the civil state, based on the law
based on theory, that follows from duty, our civil right.
The civil contract has some of the properties of common contracts,
"Uniting many for some (common) end (that they all have)," but it is unique

25

lbid., 312 (124).
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since it also acts

as an end in itself (that each of them ought to have) and,
consequently as an end that is an unconditioned and primary
duty with respect to every external relation in general among
men. 26
Thus the pursuit of this contract is required for the establishment of duty's
object relative to right in the form of the civil state. Like the non-contentious,
traditional understanding of the highest good, where the individual as a sole
moral agent must not act to pursue her happiness alone, but act out of duty,
the society must act from duty as well. This duty takes the form of an ought
based on the civil law. This object of the law, the civil state, is the
manifestation of the theory that gives us civil right. The means for the
satisfaction of the contract establishing the civil state consists in the pursuit of
a Republican Constitution embodying: 1)the freedom, of human beings, 2 )the
role of the subjects as equal, while being dependent on legislators, and 3 )the
concept of a citizen, as wholly independent and equal. 27
With regard to the practice of duty (as the highest good) consisting of

happiness in profX)ttion to virtue, this formulation serves that end. The civil
commonwealth guarantees happiness insofar as ,tt allows for the equal pursuit
of happiness (and virtue) .. However, it does not establish the pursuit of

2

6TTP, 289 (71}

2

I

•

lTTP, 290 (Humpluey; 72) and PP, 350fn (Humphrey, 112).
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happiness as a ground for the establishment of the commonwealth. Instead,

what is stressed is the basis of the commonwealth on the rights of freedom;
rights that are secured for everyone through the establishment of the
commonwealth by law. 28 As such, civil right ensures the equal pursuit of
happiness insofar as an environment based on the law is created. ·Hence civil
right leaves us with a necessary concern not only for our own well being, but

also fur the relation of morality to the well being,of people in interactions~ In
establishing a civil COll\JllOnwealth, we recognize that we ue pursuing the end
determined by duty.s demand. This dcmandJor~tof duty is
und.erstood1through, QUr appreciating that as we

a1e

given rights that follow

fmm f'nredom,;they are grounded in freedom and allow for our happiness only
insofar as we base the society' on the duty ,thatfollows from this freedom. 29
Thus the high.est good when based on duty, reflccted in this context as

2

2

8TrP, 290 (Humphrey, 72).

9With ~ard to the formation of the state as guaranteeing happiness in
proportion to worthiness to be happy, Kant explains:
The pr~tion salus p-.blica suprrma civitatis lex est remains
undiminished in value and esteem; but the [aspect of the]
public's well-being to receive.first consideration is precisely.that
legal contract securing everyone's freedom through laws, that
contract whereby each person remains at liberty to seek his
happiness in any way he thinks best so long as he does not violate
that universal freedom;Undcr law and, consequently, the rights of
other fellow subjects.•
Ibid., 298 (78). [De l"'hlic well-bmng is the highest law if the people].
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right, consists of a commonwealth that secures the pursuit of happiness in

accord with conformity with right enacted through a civil constitution. 30 As
such, Kant has defended the practice of duty, relative to the perspective of
politics, from deteriorating into a Hobbesian "might makes right" civil state.
His would be an empty moral theory if that was the world to which it would
lead. Kant's practice based on duty in the form of the highest good
emphasizes that a society united for the satisfaction of the desires of select
individuals is not our goal. Such a society would not satisfy his theory, since
its end would not be determined by dut.y~ 1he theory of duty, in the form of

right, determines its practice in the form of the pursuit of a civil
commonwealth.' This commonwealth, as determined by right is required to be
pursued insofar as its establishment guarantees, as much as possible, freedom.

In its fcmnation, based on a civil constitution, this object of duty has as its
goal the greatest possible (pursuit of) happiness in conformity with right.
At this point, it would be helpful to summarize our progress thus far.
In the previous section I have argued that as a consequence of the practice of
duty, moral agents are required to pursue the highest good, expressed relative
. to a specific perspective, two of which have been addressed. From the first

3°The civil commonwealth is the highest good manifested within this
context. It is important to remember that any singular manifestation of the
highest good taken in isolation is not the complete highest good, but rather a
moment in the development towards the complete highest good
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perspective, that of the individua1, moral agents are required to pursue what

has been commonly known as the summum bonum. 31 From the second

·

perspective, that of the state, moral individuals are required to come together
to-form civil commonwealths. Now that the possibility of a moral nation is
establishecL I will discuss the next developmental move in the realization of
the ,ethical commonwealth, this step is the consideration of the ,highest good

from that ,of a moral people. In what follows; l will argue that this final step is
comprised of the evolutionaiy developMcmts that arise from the unity of
various nations. After which. I will present that way in which an drgani%ation
of· nations works towards the agreement of morality and politics in an-ethical

commomwalth based on perpetual peace. 32

Moments: A People

At this point, ·the discussion becomes ·somewhat more ·complex since it

is oo longer present in one unified treatment or Kantian text. In this section,

31

See Chapters One and Two for a discussion of the traditional notion of
the highest good as smmnum bonum (the combination of happiness in
proportion to worthiness to be happy); that object the individual is
· commanded by the law to pursue.
2
,,~

dt. should be pointed out here that Otap~r Three :represents Kant's social
depiction of the highest good--as the ethical commonwealth. As the
consummate articulation of the highest good, the ethical commonwealth is
brought about "tluolilgh the previous section (a State )j but actually cor.reSf>onds
to the section that follows (a people).
,
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using various Kantian texts, I will argue, that the progression from theory

(duty-the moral law) to its practice (the highest good) that left us with the
formation of the moral state, requires our pursuit of still another object. This
is the case because those rights which were safeguarded through the

establishment of a civil commonwealth are "up for grabs" in relations among
nations. In order to safeguard that which has been secured by means of right
in a nation, among nations and for the human race in general, inoral agents are

required to fulfill their duty to pursue the establishment of an ethical
commonwealth based.on perpetual peace. Thus, in what follows I will follow

the progression of the moral state through to its fulfillment in relations of
perpetual peace. ·Once perpetual peace has been established, lwlll argue that

moral agents art required to pursue yet another object of duty. That. is, they
are required to leave their ethical state of nature and pursue that object which
the law requires ·in the fo:rm of an ethical commonwealth. This. object is
presented as a "universal republic based on laws of virtue". 33

& a universal, virtuous republic, the ethical commonwealth is a
complex commonwealth. It includes a large debt to morality insofar as it is
.· based on virtue, but it also· includes a large debt to politics insofar as it is a
commonwealth. "An ethical commonwealth must rest on public laws and
33

als einer allgemetnmRepllblik 1UICh Tugendgesetzen [REL, 98(Greene and

Hudson 89)].
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possess a constitution based ·on these Jaws", 34 hence the ethical commonwealth

would not be such as it is without proper attention given to politics. That 1s,
the ethical commonwealth _is the most complete manifestation of the highest
good but its establishment is contingent upon the manifestation of the object
of the theory of right, relative to the perspectives of intemational and
cosmopolitan right. As will be shown in what follows, the ethical
commonwealth has its politkal basis .in perpetual peace as the -highest
manifestation of the object of theory appreciated from the perspective of right.
For it is through perpetual peace that we am givm the po$Sibility of a, state of
affairs where •moiality agrees with politics. Hence the task at hand is-to

articulate the ethical commonwealth as the highest good (the object of ,duty)

through, which this final ~point, ·the consummation of virtue and
happiness, is made complete.

·I will present the. ethical commonwealth as the consummate articulation
of the highest good by, of course, lmlding on the previous analysis. By

building on the aforementioned, I will fil'st address the perspective of object of
duty as :it is dnennined relative to the principles .of international and
· cosmopolitan right. Kant treats these conceptions of right in both of the

34

Nar so fem ein ltlrischis gemeines Wesen doch auf iJffentlichm Gesetun beruhen
u1Ul .·eb# ""1'4#/ $idi ~ Be,fassung enthalten mu.fl [Ibid., 96 (88)].
1
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essays Theory to Practice and Perpetual Peace. 35 From there, with the formation

of perpetual peace, we can move onto the plan Kant dictates in section three
of Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone in order to establish the
bringing about of the ethical commonwealth. Finally, through the results of
this analysis, begun in Theory to Practice, continued in Perpetual Peace and
concluded in the R.eligum, the consummate articulation of the highest good in
the formation of an ethical commonwealth based on perpetual peace will be
made evident.
With this in mind, we move on to the next development of the object
of duty which Kant deals with in Theory to Practice. Here, in the section
!

1

..

1

entitled On the Relationship of Theory to Practice in International Right, Considered

from a Universal!, Philanthropic, i.e. Cosmopolitan Point of View, Kant addresses
the object that is determined by duty relative to international right. That is,
once moral individuals have come together out of their state of nature to form
nations to have their conflicts adjudicated under the principle of right, Kant
advocates that nations come together and unify under the concept of
international right in order that their conflicts can be adjudicated as well.
In this problem the only difference between the state of nature of
individual men and of families (in relation to one another) and
that of nations is that in the Right of Nations we have to take
3

5They also receive helpful treatment relative to this task in Kant's work

The Metaphysics of Morals.
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into consideration not only the relation of one state toward

another as a whole, but also the relation of individual persons of
one state toward the individuals of another, as well as toward
another state as a whole. 36
By working towards a League of Nations we are able to address the problems
that arise between individual nations which have established themselves under
constitutional right, and those others that surround them. It is through the
establishment of this object of duty as dictated from the perspective of
international right that we further fulfill our obligations. For it is only
through an association based on the concept of International Right (the right
of nations) that we are able to preserve the relations of right that have already
;

l

been forged. This object dictated by international right Kant names as the
"sole remedy" for the conflicts that arise between nations and which can
eventually lead to war between nations. 37
This object, dictated by duty from the perspective of international right

consists in the formation of what Kant calls variously a "League of Nations", a
"League of Peace", and a "World Republic". Thus the league of nations is
dictated by duty as the object of international right. As dictated, its pursuit is
required. Relative to the relations between nations, (and no longer among
individuals directed at the formation of nations), the moral end is no longer

36

MM, 344 (Gregor, 150).

3

7TIP, 313 (Humphrey, 89).
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dictated by constitutional right but by international right. As such, this end is

dictated as an object of the law. As that object dictated by duty in the
relations among nations, states are required to come together to work towards
bringing about a league of nations, as "a rightful state of federation that

conforms to commonly accepted [principle ofJ intermrtional right.
· Hence· the highest good articulated as the object of duty in this context

follows from right as we are morally required to pursue a· peaceful union
among nations adjudicated by international right. ; Kant justifies the
:requirement for the pursuit of peace amung·.nations as it allows for moral,

progress. He purports, reasonably enc,up, that in a peaceful: nation, moral,
agents are ootkr able to pursue moral progression and their personal

betterment. Hence in a peaceful state, "succeeding generations...will be able

even m· a moral· sense to make ever more progress towards bettering
themselves. "38 As such, this object is that organon providing the greatest
Jbssible happiness ftiative to an organization of nations.. This is the case
because in ·a league. of nations those· rights· achieved in the formation of

nations are presclVed and not subject to acts ·of ·aggression.
· ln·what. follows, I will demonstrate that in the essay PerpetualPeaa,

Kant picks up on the themes he describes in Theory to Practice. That is, this

38Jbid., 311'(88).
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essay articulates a further development of the concrete program for bringing

about the highest manifestation of the object of duty relative to right. Kant
appropriates the model given in Theory to Practice and demonstrates that the
republican constitution as it was developed in Theory to Practice is here
understood as the only ground for perpetual peace. Without necessarily
passing through this stage there would be no perpetual peace. That is,
although the previous practices of duty are the consummate articulation of the
highest good within their context, they are mere conditions for actual
consummate articulation of the highest good context independent. As such,

they are required as a developmental stage leading to tlw,highest good. This
status as condition is clear in the establishment of the republican constitution,
because
Not only is a Republican Constitution pure in origin, whose
source is the pure concept of right, it provides the only
foundations of perpetual peace. 39.
As we have seen,. after grounding his approach dictated by ·theory as ·it· is
manifested in.constitutional right, Kant further characterizes the development
of the enlightened people as ending up in a unity of states. This is the same
. progressive Jl\Ovement that was discussed as a requirement of international
right.
/
3

91>P, 351 (Humphrey, 113).
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Through the league of nations we are brought close to the actual

culmination of the moral human race as it brings about perpetual peace. The
pursuit of perpetual peace is only possible through the formation of the league
of peace. 40 As such, its pursuit of ends required by duty as it is manifested
from the point of view of the global realm of moral life can also be assessed
from the perspective of cosmopolitan right. Through cosmopolitan right, .the
perspective becomes that of the moral individual as a citizen of the world,
thus combining the best aspects of all. three of the previously articulated
political realms.

Just as duty gave us the moral law as it was manifested from,the
standpoint of the individual and then gave us constitutional right as it was
manifested from the· standpoint of the state, we are now given cosmopolitan
right as we are able to appreciate the ultimate $tandpoint of humanity.
Through the recognition of cosmopolitan right, we are further impelled
towards the formation of states based on a republican constitutipn interacting

within a league of nations .(based on intemationalright), as .a precondition for
perpetual peace as the highest end of the Kantian political system. For it is

40

"0nly in a.universal association.of stlltes (analogous to that by which a
people becomes a stat~) can.rights come to hold conclusivery and a true condition
ojpeace a;>me about." Thus Kant presents "perpetual peace" [as], "the ultimate
goal of the whole Right of Nations."
See MM, 350 (Gregor, 156).
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through perpetual peace that we are allowed to look for the appearance and

genesis of the ethical commonwealth, where morality agrees with politics.
However, with cosmopolitan right, this is taken further. 41 Reason can provide
the way for related nations not to be at war or lawless through nations giving

up their savage lawless freedom, just as individual persons do, and by
accon)D'lodating 1thcmselves to the constraints of common law; establishing a

nation <f pet,pl4s that will finally include all the,people of the earth. 42 This is the
same notion of right that is tied to the formation of relations among nations

relative td this: prlitciple of right. This same·~ t>f right is what drives
the moral individual out ofhersolitude, into the· formation <:>f nations,
towards 'What is ,tnbrally required, perpetual peace. However through

a

cosmopolitan right, it evolves iir such manner that it allows for the
possibility of morality to enter the scene by way of an establishment of
perpetual peace;
Perpetual peace· is· not merely the condition of the possible ciessation of

wars through the· republican constitution, for the·republican constitution can

41

With regard to Cosmopolitan Right, Kant says:
;This right, since it has to do with the possible union of all nations
with a view to certain universal laws for their possible commerce,
can be called et>STnOpolitan Right (ius cosmopoliticum).
Ibid., 350 (156).
42

Ibid., 357 ( l l 7J.
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be brought about by a nation of devils held in check by their desires for trade

and fear of punishment. 43 Perpetual peace as our "moral objective" goes ·
beyond the realms of politics and morality, arises as a consequence of its
foundation in duty, and allows for the highest agreement of happiness in
accord with virtue in this world in a law governed commonwealth: determined
by right. As Kant says:
...establishing universal and lasting peace constitutes not merely a
part of the doctrine of Right but rather the entire final end of the
doctrine •of Right within the limits of 1'¢ason alone... 44

This is the case among individual nations via a>nstitutional right., between
nations in international right,. and· allowing·fm . perpctua) peace via

cosmopolitan right. 45
In going beyond the realms of the merely political and the merely moral
and encompassing them both, perpetual peace includes another kind of
commitment. This further commitment, required for the complete
manifestation of perpetual peace is described by Kant in his work Religion

Within the Limits of Reason Alone. Here, in describing the "founding of a
kingdom of God on earth," Kant is describing in a more concrete way the

43

lbid., 366, (124).

44

Ibid., 355, (161). :

45

With regard to perpetual peace as a moral objective, see PP, 365 and 379
(Humphrey, 123 and 133).
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ethical aspect of the ethico-civil commonwealth made manifest through

perpetual peace. As was previously mentioned, a peaceful state of affairs could
be brought about by devils. However, true perpetual peace is the precondition and reciprocal condition for the ethical commonwealth as a kingdom
of god on earth. 46 Perpetual peace is then the possibility we are left with as
the consummate culmination of the developments that have arisen out of each
of the manifestations of the highest good relative .to right.

As was previously mentioned, once perpeuul f>'8CC has been
established, Kant explains that we are to pursue yet artOdler object, :relative to

pMSCnCC of duty relative to the laws of virtue. This command of duty takes
the following, form:

Man ought to leave his Ethical State of Nature in order to
become a Member of an Ethical Commonwealth. 47
That is, just as the state of nature prior to the establishment of the civil state,
and the establishment of the league of nations is one of war, so too is the

4&fhe relationship of perpetual peace to the ethical commonwealth is
·explicitly expressed as the former serving as a precondition of the latter. But,
as will be discussed in Chapter Five, the establishment of the ethical
commonwealth guarantees perpetual peace. In short, like so many other
things, the connection between these two aspects is not simple.
47

Der Mensch soil aus dem ethischen Naturzustande berausgehen, um ein Glied eines
ethischen gemeinen Wesens zu werden. [REL, 96 (Greene and Hudson, 88)].
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ethical state of nature. Here, as was discussed in Chapter Three, the good
principle, which resides in all individuals, is continually attacked by the evil
which is found in him and also in everyone else. Thus it is through the
establishment of an ethical commonwealth that we are able to create an
environment where the rights and morality that are not protected prior to this
association are guaranteed.

As was argued·•in Chapter Three, the ethical commonwealth was
demonstrated to consist of Kant's social understanding of the highest good.
Thus it is not nec.essary at this time to repeat those arguments. To summarize
the conclusions of that chapter, the ethical c o ~ is the object of the
law determinec1'by the laws of virtue (moral right), its pursuit is required, and
it is the best means possihle' for the guarantee of happiness in proportion to

virtue. Unlike the aforementioned objects of the law detennined·by duty
relative.to· the·pnnciples of right, the ethical commonwealth does not ·require a
justificatory explanation of its status as the highest good. This is the case

since Kant explicitly states that the ethical oonunonwealth is the object of
duty. as ~ highest. good. . In short~ as Kant himself says, "The species of
.rational beings is objectively, in

w

idea of reason, destined for a social goal,
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namely, the promotion of the highest as a social good. " 48

lnstead,of demonstrating that the ethical commonwealth is a
manifestation of duty's object relative to moral right, I will demonstrate how it
is the consummation of the highest good in this developmental plan. That is,

we have ·shown how individuals must come together to form states, and states
must come together to form a league of peace, and this league of peace must
work towards ·petpetual peace. Thus it is only left to consider how the league
of peace, based on international and cosmopolitan• right must serve as•the basis
for the ethicalcommonwalth. Once this point is .established; the ,mbnination
of the developmental plan will be! complct:e, and the various understandings of

via the ethical common\\lCalth. 49

It is ·the wk of the ethical commonwealth ~rationally to impress these
laws (of virtue) in all t.neir'scope upon the entire human race. "50 This is a duty

/ede Gattung-verntlnftigtt Wesen ist nrlmlich objecttv; in der Idet der Vernujt, zu
einem gemeinschaftlichen Zwecke, nilmlich der Be,forderung des hochsten als eines
gemeinschaftlichiii Guts, bemmmt.· [Ibid., 97 .(89)].
·
48

4

91be actual form of the ethical commonwealth relative to Kant's
understanding of the one true church will be explicated in Chapter Five. That
is, once the ethical commonwealth is established as the consummate
articulation of virtue and happiness, we will go on to discuss the details of its
construction.
~L, 94 (Greene and Hudson, 86).
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and is accomplished insofar as the ethical commonwealth consists of moral

individuals coming together under moral right, for the formation of society.
"And so far as these laws are public, an ethico-civil (in contrast to a juridico-civil)
society or an ethical commo11:wealth" is formed. 51 In its formation, the ethical
commonwealth builds on the aforementioned conceptions of the highest good.
This is the case insofar as the ethical commonwealth has its basis in the
political commonwealth; ccindeed, unless it is based upon mch a
commonwealth it can never be brought into existence by man. " 52 The ethical
state, must have asits·basis t.Mesubtishment! bylaw, of the minimum
criterion of freedom as it is dictated by right. ' Through'the civil state (the

1

object of right➔ ,·we havecmated\S1JCh:a·situation.ofindiviGlua:ls•united under
laws, based on:.their status as citizens of the· state. This status as citizen must
be·prcserved in the establishment of the ethical commonwealth:· That is, the
constitution and form·of the ethical commonwealth
shall contain nothing which. contradicts the duty of its members
as citizens of the state--although when the ethical pledge is of the
genuine sort the political limitation need cause no anxiety. 53
Thus the ethical ·commonwealth must be based on·the prior development of

51

lbid.

52

lbid.

53

lbid., 95 (88).
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the object of duty, as it was determined from the perspective of right, by

means of perpetual peace. And, as was previously shown, the association of
individuals organized into a civil commonwealth is a precondition for
perpetual peace. This precondition is made manifest as a requirement of the
law, in bringing about the highest good (as the civil commonwealth) from the
perspective ofthe state or politics. Consequently, all of the prior stages
contribute to the development of the manifestation of the ethical
commonwealth.
The final form of an ethical ooD\mOnwealth is an ethical whole. That is,

what we.VI/CM ldt with in perpetual peace is.the league of nations where each
society rehttive Oite'to another, and amengst its m.ethhers can be represented as
in the ethical scite -of natute. That is, when

aleague of nations is formed

under the doctrine·of iri.ternational right, pe~ is established, but not based
on laws of virtue. It is as if we have peace by force rather than peace by
conversion through the sovereignty of the good principle preseIVed via the
ethical commonwealth. Even with the addition of cosmopolitan right, we are
still dealing with right and that means for its presetVation in external coercion
.. and not internal legislation. This is the situation with separate political states
which have united through a public international law, but not through the
laws of virtue. However, when a people comes together under the laws of
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virtue we have the ethical commonwealth, which is not merely based on

perpetual peace, but guarantees perpetual peace, not externally, but by virtue
of its establishment through the law of virtue.
Such, therefore, is the activity of the good principle, unnoted by
human eyes but ever continuing--erecting for itself in the human
race, regarded as a commonwealth under laws of virtue, a power
and kingdom which sustains the victory over evil and, under its
own dominion, assures the world of an eternal peace. 54

The ethical commonwealth thus goes beyond the understanding of perpetual
peace as its precondition, and bec<>mes its guarantor. 1lu1s" ~ough the
analyses begun in Th«,ry to Prt.U:tiee and Perpenu,l Peace, then completed in

Religion Within the Limits ofJeefiOO JJ.onc;, W¢, are able to see tbe
concretiz•tion of~. culmination of the. high~st good through the ethical
common~alth based on perpetual peace. This \.lQ.derstanding of the highest
good takes us beyond the facile understanding of Kant's ethics as merely
deontological toward a rich understanding of the deontological ethic with an
eye for teleology requiring social and political philosophy for its completion.
It leaves us with the ethical commonwealth based on perpetual peace and a
perpetual peace based on the ethical commonwealth.

54

Das ist also die menschlichen Augen unbemerste, aber bestilndigfortgehende
Bearbeitung des guten Princips, sich im menschlichen Geschlechtals einem gemeinen
Wesen nach Tugendgesetzen eine,Macht und ein eich zu errichten, welches den Sieg uber
das Bose behauptet und unter seiner herrschaft der Welt einen ewigen Frieden zusichert.
[Ibid., 122 (114)].

.
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To conclude, the above ana1ysis has demonstrated that there is a

tripartite developmental plan that culminates in the supreme articulation of
the highest good, the ethical commonwealth. In so doing, the ethical
commonwealth integrates many of the understandings of the highest good.
This occurs as a consequence of the various perspectives through which the
highest good must be made manifest in order for the ethical commonwealth to
be achieved. In short, this leaves us with an understanding of the highest good

that consists of complementary, rather than competing interpretations insofar
as these interpretations have been shown to contribute to the realization of
the consummate articulation of the highest good-the ethical commonwealth
based on perpetual peace. The next chapter addresses the way in which this
consummate articulation of the highest good is made manifest.

I

CHAPTER5
KANT'S KINGDOM OF GOD ON EARTH:
THE ETHICAL COMMONWEALTII AND
ITS CONSEQUENCES
Having previously determined that the highest good has a different face
contingent upon the perspective from which it is being approached, it is time
to approach its best face. This consists of the consummate articulation of the
)

'.

,'

'}

highest good, the ethical commonwealth, based on the concept of perpetual
peace. As was determined in Chapter Three, the ethical commonwealth is
Kant's social highest good. As was determined in Chapter Four, the ethical
commonwealth is the most complete articulation of the highest good. In what
,,•.;(.,

follows, I will consider how it is that this consummation of the moral law in
the world is to be brought about, concretely. That is, it has been established,
relative to the aforementioned developmental plan, that it is a duty of the
human race sui generis to pursue the ethical commonwealth based on perpetual
peace, but how is it that once this stage of development has been attained, the
·1

•

ethical commonwealth is actually to be made manifest. 1 In this chapter, I will

, , ~See REL 95/96 (~ne ari.d Hudson, 88/89).
~

'\

\
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articulate: what the ethical commonwealth is like, how we bring it about, and

whether the ethical commonwealth is to be hoped for or expected. It is my
position that Kant answers these questions primarily in his work Religion

Within the IJmits pf Reason Alone, and secondarily in his work The Conflict

of the Faculties. From a careful analysis of these works, I will argue: I) the
ethical commonwealth is demonstrated to be a people of God under laws of

virtue,. 2 )the ethical commonwealth is pursued by means of humanity's
organization in a church, and 3)the ethical commonwealth is to be hoped for
or, opectted insofar .as we make ourselves morally worthy of God's assistance in

the formation of His (Kant's pronoun) kingdom. 2 •.These are•tht concerns I
will take up in what.follows~

After further describmg•and examining the ethical commonwealth by
dealing with the above, the only aspect of the project left to be pursued· is the
relationship of this undcrst2nding of the highest good to the contemporary

literature on the highest good. Throughout this study, p:re9ent in the
background, has been a dissatisfaction with contemporary interpretations of
~

highest, good. These approaches are inadequate in that they are

problematic. I consider these approaches problematic insofar as they do not

For instan~ ~£ ~f,s, use. of a ~ e p~noun for God, see the
Religion, from the Introduction to the Conclusion. See especially footnote
eight and Book Three of the &ligion.
,.

2
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recognize, or do not completely recognize the nature of the highest good as

comprised of developmental moments which culminate in the ethical
commonwealth based on perpetual peace. Thus with a complete
understanding of the ethical commonwealth in place in the first half of this
chapter, I will conclude the chapter with an analysis of the repercussions of my
overall approach on contemporary Kantian .scholarship as it relates to the

highest good•
.·In short, as has been previously mentioned, it is my view that the
contemponuy scholarship on the highest good:.approaches the object of pure

practical reason iA a INMer that is ~ither misguided and mistaken or in a
manner that is isolationist and·cxclusive~ In the second half of this chapter, I
will. mtet the texts of the cont.empQrary• critics and commentators on the

highest good ,and in so doing demonstrate their short.comings while· at the
same ·time demonstrating the merits of ,the tripartite developmental
intetpretation of the hlghat·good with which ·this project has ll>een concerned.

What is

the Ethical Commonwelath?

I li~ve p~otlsly tstablished. that

tl\e ethical commonwealth 1s social~

and that if is required for the overcoming of evil.
:;

~

',.·i

'

,

''/

w~ treat~d in Chapter three.
1

How and why this is the
·.

'

Now I will address how it is that the
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ethical commonwealth appears. Relative to its importance in his system, Kant

treats the ethical commonwealth relatively briefly. A detailed treatment of the
ethical commonwealth is contained in the third book of Religion Within the

Limits:of Reason Alone: and is summarized 1n what follows.
Before approaching the ethical commonwealth, it is important to
remember. the lessons learned from Chapter Four. That is, it is only when
humanity is:prepared to come out of its ethical state of nature that humanity
is able to begin to progress towatds the ethical commonwealth. This is the
case only when humanity has :made suffldem progress towatd the ,highest
politkal good. This hlgheSt political good is,• of c.'!OtU'Se, perpetual :peare. 3 In
Chapter Thtte l discussed how it was that humanity is impelled to pursue the
ethical commonwealth· and ,in Chapter Four I disrussed how it is that
humanity is impelled to leave hi5 ethical state of nature. Yct once the ethical
state of nature has been left, whett are we to•go?•:Kant explains, by giving
some conteM. to the notion of an ethical commonwealth and to the means to
its formation; as he says! "1be concept of an Ethical Coirtmonwealth is the
3

See Chapter Four for a discussion of the relationship between perpetual
peace and the ethical commonwealth. For a discussion of perpetual peace as
Kant's highest political goo4, see MM, 355 (Gregor, 161). In short, Kant
refers to. perpetual peace as the highest political good. Yet p0litical is only
that perspective ftom whidl th¢ highest good relative to right, both civil and
international, is .•perceived. .Hence in calling perpetual ·pc8;Ce the highest
political good, Kant stresses that perpetual peace is a manifestation of the
higN!St good ~ative to the perspective of the principle of right (politics).
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Concept of a PEOPLE OF GOD under Ethical Laws. "4 There are two major

issues contained within this statement. First, the notion of what is entailed by
the claim that those in an ethical commonwealth are "a people of God" and
secondly, to what extent is a people of God "under ethical laws"?. In

explaining these two notions, that of the ethical commonwealth as a people of
God and that of those very same people of God as governed by the laws of

duty, a full picture of Kant's ethical commonwealth will appear.
Kant explains how it is that an ethical commonwealth is a people of
God through differentiating the ethical commonwealth;from the juridical

commonwealth. The jwidical commonwealth for:Kant has as its keystone the
people giving themselves the law. That is•..

... if the commonwealth to be established is to be juridical, the
mass of people uniting itself into a whole would itself have to be
the law-giver (of constitutional laws), because legislation proceeds
from the principle of limiting the jredom '!f lllCh to tlwse conditions
under which, it can be consistent with the freedom tf everyone else
accurding to a common law, and because, as a result, the general will
5
sets up an external legal control.
What makes this commonwealth itself juridical is that the law is legislated
extemally, and enforced extemally. This organization would not suffice for

4This is the title of section three of the third book of the Religion.
Der &g,ff tmes ethischen gemnnen Wesens ist der Beg,ff von einem Volke Gotta
unter ethischen Gesetze. [REL, 98 (Greene and Hudson, 90)].
5

lhid., 98/99 (90).
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the ethical commonwealth because moral actions cannot be legislated

externally. Once legislated externally, actions complied with under these
restrictions are merely legal and not moral, since a moral action is one that
takes place freely, not through coercion. That is, Kant is interested in the
formation of an ethical commonwealth-free from coercion, not a juridical or
civil commonwealth-governed by means of coetcion. This ethical
commonwe~th is :a commonwealth with its underlying principle being the law
of virtue and not merely the law of the land, ·or right. Thus in the

cstahlishment of an ethical commonwealth, ·Kant explains:
•.. if the commonwealth is to be: ethiettl, the people, as a people,
cannot itseH be regarded as the law-giver. For in such a
common.wealth all :the laws are expressly designed to promote the
morality of actions (which is something inner, and hence cannot be
, ,subject te·public,human laws) whet~•, mcon1!l'8St, ·these public
laws-and this would go to constitute a juridical commonwealthare ,~cd only tm,ard, the legliltty of actions, which meets the
eye, and not toward the (inner) morality, which alone is in
·question here. 6 · ··,' ·
0

As opposed to "the people" being regarded as the giver of the laws as in a
state, the ethical commonwealth is a union of people under moral laws. Yet it
is not enough that "the people" give up the right to be the source of the law.
They must take a further step insofar as they recognize that what has
previously been only an inner law (of morality) must be submitted to as public
6

1bid., 98 (90).
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legislation, under a law-giver that the entire community may regard as the

giver of the law. Thus as a commo~wealth,
... all single individuals must be subject to a public legislation, and
all the laws which bind them must be capable of being regarded
as commands of a common law-giver. 7

Hence as a commonwealth, the ethical commonwealth requires its constituents
to be subject to its laws, and as not merely concerned with legality, their
source cannot come from the people. ff the laws were to emanate from the
ptt>ple as law-giver, their status would. be human laws.(• civil laws), and
thereby 'subject to enforcement by means of· coercion: Yet external public
enforcement of laws eannotservc as the ground for.moral action. This is the
case since moral ·action must come from the individual's commitment to

morality itself and not to her commitment to the mere legality of her action.
Thus the origin of the law..giver must lie elsewhere than in the constituents of
the•ethical commonwealth.
· It has been established that the laws under which the ethical
commonwealth is ruled are laws of virtue. Yet who is to be the giver of these
laws-the sovereign of the commonwealth? As the ''public law-giver " of the
ethical rommonwcalth, this sovereign cannot be the source of these laws.

7

sp musse,z. alk Einulne einer iJffentlichen Gesetzgebung unterwoifen werden, und alle

Gesetze, welche jene verbindm, mussen als Gebote eines gemeinschaftlichen Gesetzgebers
angesehen werllen kiJnnen. [Ibid.].
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Rather, the highest law-giver of the ethical commonwealth must be that one

for whom "all true duties, hence also the ethical, must be represented as at the
same time his commands. 118 Kant determines that God is the only possible
sovereign that would fit this criterion. In determining that God is the ethical
law..giver, the law cannot be thought of as emanating originally merely from

the will of this superior being, for then they would not be ethical laws and the
duty proper to them would not be the free duty of virtue, but the coercive
duty of law insofar as ,the .laws would then be. supei'llatural and external to
human beings. Instead, the sovereign is subject to the laws himself, he must
'

.

submit to them as well as have them be his commands.
This law..giver must also have other important qualities. He (again, the

pronoun Kant uses), must be able to plumb the depths of the human
disposition in order to ascertain the individual's true motives and thus whether
or not the good or the evil principle has sovereignty within the individual's
disposition. Furthermore, the moral ruler must be able to guarantee that "each
"

receives whatever his actions are worth. "9 This ability for discernment and
reward is Kant's criterion for a ruler in eve:ry commonwealth. However, with
•the ethical commonwealth, the stakes are much higher. For in this case, the

8

Ibid., 99 (90/91).

~ktt 99,(91).
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discernment consists of the status of the individual's moral disposition as good

or evil (not the legality of their action), and the reward consists of the
individual's actual happiness (not the right to the equal pursuit of happiness).
Hence the only possible sovereign in this instance and for this commonwealth
is God, as God guarantees the rewards for the virtuous and for the virtuous

common'Wl!alth.:

...this is,the,concept of.God as moral ruler of the world Hence
an ethical commonwealth can be thought of only as a people
under divine command, i.e., as a ptt1ple if God, arid indeed under

laws of virtue. IO
Thus those in an ethical commonwealth are a people under God. This is so
since God is the moral ruler of the world. They are a people under divine
command, as well as a people under laws of virtue. Thus with God as the ruler
of the ethical commonwealth, the commonwealth retains its status as a
commonwealth, insofar as it requires a ruler and its members are subject to a
public legislation. This ruler can be regarded as the source of legislation for
l ,

the law, however this ruler cannot at the same time be regarded as the source
of the law. The crucial difference in this distinction lies in the fact that the
ruler of the commonwealth does not create the law, he commands the law, but
the law arises elsewhere, independently of him. Thus the people of the ethical

1

9.Al,o 1st ein ethisches gemeines We.wt nur ais ein Volk imter gtJttlidren Gdl«m,
d. i. ttls tin Volk Gottes, uml z:war nach Tugendgesetzen, z,, dmken moglich. [Ibid.].
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commonwealth are under God insofar as He is the sovereign of the

commonwealth, but they are under ethical laws, as the laws that ground God
as the ruler of the commonwealth, insofar as the commands that emanate from
God, emanate from duty.
In a civil commonwealth the laws emanate from "the people
themselves" (externally), in order that the individual people may submit
themselves to the command of the ruler, insofar as he is a servant of the law
and not a random despot. In an ethical commonwealth, although the laws do
not emanate from "the people" as law-giver, the laws are present and known to
the individual people (internally). It is in this manner that they too are able ·
to submit themselves to the law, as it can be regarded as having divine rule as
the source of its legislation. In this way, God is the legislator of the law and
not merely a despotic ruler or source of the law. 11 Thus as the agent of duty's
legislation, God is at the same time a servant of the moral law. Laws of
virtue, although public, are not legislated externally. Their power comes from
their presence in the internal moral sense of individual people. Yet as
legislated, they can be recognized to be contained within the commands of a
.divine legislator for whom all true duties are at the same time this divine

11

:Kant is anxious to stress that God is not above the moral law, as

witnessed in his scathing critique of the call of Abraham to sacrifice Isaac. See
CON, 63 (Gregorll5) and REL, 187 (Greene and Hudson, 175).
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legislator's commands. 12

For it is not a question here of a civil (political) government
keeping the people under discipline, but of a government which
has as its end the essence of this people's moral attitude of will
(hence, a divine government). 13
God is the ruler of this divine government, which has as its end the correct
internal setting of the will. Consequently, people are not to be externally
forced to comply with the law, since that would leave us with a civil or
juridical commonwealth, where actions conform to the law but need not spring
from it. Rather, the people are to be compelled to internally have the law as
the ground or source of their actions, thereby working to form God's kingdom
on earth.
To summarize, the ethical commonwealth looks like a political
. '

.

~

)

commonwealth insofar as it has public laws, yet it is different insofar as it has
a different law-giver. Unlike the political commonwealth where "the people"
is the law-giver, the ethical commonwealth has God as its law-giver. God is
not the source of the law, but rather its legislator. Thus the ethical
commonwealth has its laws publicly legislated with their legislation centered in
God. As such, this commonwealth is established as ethical and not juridical

1

2REL, 99 (Greene and Hudson, 90/91).

13

.De,,n IS ist hiu nicht von

einer burgerlichen, das Volk unter Disciplin haltenden

(politischen ), sondern einer auf da.s lnnere der moralischen Gessinnung abzweckenden
(mithin giittlichen) regienmg die &lie. [CON, 67 (Gregor, 123)].
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because its goal is something inner, namely morality. In working toward the

morality of its members, the ethical commonwealth seeks that its constituents
recognize their own inner moral law as that same law publicly legislated by
means of God as the divine ruler of this "republic under laws of virtue, i.e., a
people of God. 14

The Establishment of the Ethical Commonwealth
The ethical commonwealth is an organization of which God is the ruler.
It is in this; sense termed a "people of God". In adclitlon, God as well as the
membet5 of the commoffl'fflllth recogmtt·the veracity of the moral law. The
oommoriwealth is in this sense "under ethical laws ,(laws of virtue)". 15 With
this established, I will

•now move on to our second concern, that is, now that it

is understood what it means to be a people under·God and at the same time
under ethical laws, how is this state to be brought about. In his own words, in
the title to the fourth section Gf this third book, Kant asserts, " The Idea of a
People of God can be Realized (through Human Organization) only in the

14

einer Rlpubli/c unter Tugendgesetzen, ti i.. mit einer Volke Gottes, {REL, 100

(Greene and,Hudson,.91)].
1

/ ·.

%r the source of these quotes, see footnote number three.
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Form of a Church. " 16 It is here that he discusses what in actuality human

moral agents must· accomplish in order for the ethical commonwealth (people
under God) to be brought about. In short, the way in which the ethical
commonwealth is to be made manifest consists in the establishment of a
church. Thus, to work t(:)Wards the ethical commonwealth is to work towards

bringing about a church. Cdnsistatt with this is the organization of humanity
as a divine commonwealth under God as the divine moral ruler of this

kingdom.,
For· Kant, the church providts the organizatbaalframework for
bringing Ao fruition the ethical commollWCalth. This.eeonsists in bringing
about what exists as a·"mc:re,idea ofthc union of alttbe-righteous under direct

and moral divine world govcmment"·17 .~ real and concrete in the world.· That
is, we are obligated to bring about in the world what exists as a mere idea,
insofar as the idea scnres u the "archetype of what is to be ·established by
men." 18 . What this atchetype represents, Kant tefll\S the "invisible dlurch"
which.in its heing brought about consists of the ~blc church", As the

16

Die [dee eines Volks Gottes ist (unter menschlicher Veranstaltung) nicht anders als
in der Fohn eintr'Kirche hJzujuhmr: [REL; 100 (Greene and Hudson, 91)].
·

eine ·bwfle ldei ·von tier V ereinigung al'ler Rechtschajfenen unter der gottlichen

17

unmitklbaren,, 11#1" tnoraaschm Weltr~ng.
mm, Urhilde dimt. {Ibid., l Ol (92)].

~-

wie sie jtder 11t1n Mmschm

zu stiftenden
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visible church, whose form is dictated by the invisible church, the visible

church represents the way in which the actual union of moral individuals can
come to represent the ideal of the ethical commonwealth. 19 Kant gives very
little attention to this distinction between the invisible and the visible church.
In·thc glancing mention of the distinction that he does make, it would seem
~tit: is through the invisible church as archetype that we are able t(>. perceive

what it 'is,that could be brought about with Goers assistance. As mere ·human
beings, we are, at our best, only able ;to bring about the visible church. This
visible church' as a creation of out limited human .abilities a the· best that we
can do, and it ism.small task. Although,a ~seooNIJ>est~,:dle visiblechurch is
that means through whim we are ;able to make oumelvcs :\'VOtthy of, God's
assistance and hctnce hope for the completion of the ethical commonwealth in
its form deteffllined by. the· archetype .of·the invisible qw.rc:h. 20
Once Kant establishes the status of the visible church· as following from
the invisible church, he articu.1at.es its specifics. .These speaftcs.consist of the

way in which the church.·is to be organized and the principles·upon which it is
to be based. These basic organizing principles perform a similar role to that
of a constitution in a political commonwealth. As a church, what Kant terms

19

See Chapter Two for a discussion of the relationship between an
archetypal and an ectypal object.
'

JOJlEL, 100 .(Greene and Hudson, 92).
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the "true (visible) church", that which serves as the organon of the ethical

commonwealth, the visible church must take a certain form. This form
consists of certain requirements as criteria to which the church must conform.
I have included these requirements verbatim because each of them is of great
importance as·it fllls'in the specifics of how the true visible church is to
appear. In addition, these criteria are those conditions which must be fulfilled
in order for the,visible church to serve as the vehicle for the achievement of
the ethical commonwealth. They consist of the following: 21
I. Univmali~ -and hence its munerical oneness; for
which it must possess this characteristic, that, although
divided, and ,at variance·· in unessential .opinions, it is,none
the less, with respect to its fundamental intentions,
fourtded upon basic prirtctples as must necessarily lead to a
general unification in a single church (thus, no sectarian
divisions) ..
2. Its nature (quality); i.e., puriry, union under no
tnotivating forces other than moral ones (purified of the
stupidity of superstition and the madness of fanaticism).
3. Its relation under the principle ofJrtllimn; both
the internal relations of its members to one another,
and thc·e:xtemal relations of the church to political
power -- both relations as in a republic (hence neither
a himmihy, nor an ilhmiinatism, which is a kind of
21

Kant himself introduces these requirements as follows:
The true (visible) church is that which exhibits the (moral)
kingdom of God on earth so far as it can be brought to pass by
men. The requirements upon and hence the tokens of, the true
church are the following:

Die wahre (sichtbare) Kirche ist diejenige, welche das (moralische) Reich Gottes au/
Erden, so viel es durch ·Menschen geschehen k.ann, darstellt. Die E,fordernisse, mithin
auch llie Kmnzeidtm 4er wahren Kirche sindfolgende: [Ibid., 101 (92)l
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democrary through special inspiration, where the
inspiration of one man can differ from that of
another, according to the whim of each).
4. Its modality, the unchangeableness of its constitution, yet
with the reservation that incidental regulations, concerning
merely its administration, may be changed according to time
and circumstance; to this end, however, it must contain
within itself a priori (in the idea of its purpose) settled
principles. (Thus [it operates] under primordial laws, once
[for all] laid down, as it were out of a book of laws, for
guidance; not under arbitraty symbols which, since they
lack authenticity, are fortuitous, exposed to contradiction,
and changeable. 22

Kant enumerates these four criteria as the ~ e m s of the true visible
chw:dt in order to estahlish the content of that for which we should st.rive.
Through expanding and ana.lyzing these four cri~ l will demonstrate why it
is that Kant.develops these as the criteria for the establishment of the one true

church,. and bow it is that the orte truei church comes .~ut. Kant himself
gives relatively little attm.tion to these criteria other than in their mere
statement. For him, the truth of tM true dturch being based on these criteria

as· they establish a religion based on the moral principle of reason :was
apparently self-evident and required little or no explanation. For our purposes
some explanation is required, since it is through a mligion that is-universal
(requirement #1), moral (#2), follows from freedom (#3), and is basedon a
priori principles (#4), that we are able to work towards the establishment of

22Ibid.,

101/102 (93).
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the true church which serves as the organon for the ethical commonwealth.

The true visible church has its basis in what Kant calls pure religious
faith. Thus pure religious faith shares the above four requirements since they
are the organizing principles of the true church, which is based·on this faith.

Kant uses the terms true church and moral/rational/religious faith almost
interchangeably. This is not too great a surprise since both constructs serve as
the means for establishing the ethical commonwealth. 23 Throughout this
section of Book Three l<Ju\t is seeking to establish what.can serve as the

bringing about .(or basis) for a kingdom of God (the ethical· commonwealth).
This is accompllslwd through establishing the· organization that will: serve this
end,. just as agovcmment provides the organization that seeks to establish and

secure a civil commonwealth. The establishment ;Of the ethical ·
commonwealth~ including God· as the moral law..giver and sovereign takes form
in the establishment of the true church. The true chtnd\ is ·based on

religio\W'mor:il/rational faith ,as. a requirement for its,bcing brought about.
Thus it is through faith that the church is founded.
Kant demonstrates in his first requirement that the church, with its
basis in pure religious faith, must be universal. It must be this way for all to
2

3Throughe>1,1t Book Three of the Religion Kant conflates. these terms, see
especi;dlyy REL, 100-103 (Greene and Hudson, 90-95). In what follows I will
merely accept Kant's use of these terms without questioning whether or not he
is cottect.to equate.them.
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share in the faith and thereby in the church and the ethical commonwealth.

As Kant says, "Pure religious faith alone can found a universal church; for only
[such] rational faith can be believed in and shared by everyone. "24 It is this
faith that is a rational faith that must be the basis of the church, since it would
make no sense to, have the faith rooted in anything empirical, as that is· so
impermanent: In·a typical Kantian manner, the origin of faith is not

something supernatural, or even natural, but rational.

As such, pure religious

faith is in. no. way a>ntingent;_ it is p.ne jn its nature (Kant's second

rcqw.rement), and rncmd. llootcd in -~n, this rati:QNI faith grants no one
individual or group special access to faith, :it•is-~ the case 1ihat "the

inspiration of one man,can,diffe1tfrom that of another, according to the whim
of each. "2•5 Thus as it is ,rooted in tMson and grounded in moral purity, Kant
stres,es the rway in which this pure rdigious faith is a moral rational faith.

:• ._ . As a rational, moral faith,

~

religious faith must also be rooted. in

frectdom and based on a priori priociples. In its being universal, a rational
faith is not based on anything that is contb\gen.t. As such, it is able to be
recognized in .all individuals through their cognizance Gf how it rings true with

24

Dtr teine Religumsglaube ist zwar der, welchu al/tin eine allgemeine Kirehe
grunden kann: weil er ein bwfler Vernunftglaube ist der sich jedermann zur Uberzeugung.
mittheilen Ia.flt; [Ibid., 102 (94)].
25

Ibid., I 02 (93 ).
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their hearts. Kant addresses this point directly in The Conflict of the Faculties

in his discussion of the way in which humans, merely in their being human,
are able to be aware of God and the tenets of faith, as he says:
since we cannot understand anyone unless he speaks to us
through our own understanding and reason, it is only by concepts
.·of our reason, in so far '5 they are pure inotal concepts and hence ·
infallible, that we can recognize the divinity of a teaching
promulgated to us1 26
Thus, God's teaching is equally accessible to everyone through their reason
and not through anything empiriatl,(e.g. miracles, or appreciation of signs).

Furthemore, as it els rooted in freedom, a pure religion relatts to its members
and· the political organization with which it cooperates in a manner that can in
no way tonstrain·its members~ As free, the pure moral faith is entered into
1

from an·imemal decision' and not by means of extemal· coe:rdon; ·1Freedom is
recognized by·all in its priority for relations among individuals and thus this
increases the·evidence that pure religion meets the criteria of universality. In
addition, in being based on a priori conditions, such as universality, morality
and freedom; a pure religion is not limited to being known only by those who

have been .introduced and inculcated· into its rites. Instead, in being ·based on

the above criteria, a pure faith can be "believed in and shared by everyone".
After lauding the merits of a pure faith as the only basis of a ,people

~N. 48 (Gregor, 85).
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under God, Kant recognizes, that like the moral law, the pursuit of a pure

moral faith, universal and based in reason, is very difficult for human beings in
their imperfection to pursue. Instead of the pure moral faith, we are to aspire
towards its pursuit as it takes form in a revealed faith. Kant calls such a faith
ecclesiastical·faith. It is through ecclesiastical faith as a "concept of a religion
of divine worship instead of the concept of a religion purely moral" that we
are able to pursue the true church. Although the true church should be based
on a moral rational faith; "by reason of a peculiar weakness ·of human nature,

pure faith can never be ttlied-on as much as it dese:rws, that·.is, a church
cannot be established on it alone. "27

Human weakness as it requires the pursuit of moral rational faith by
means of ecclesiastical faith is symptomatic -of the human condition insofar as
we are not purely rational or purely moral. That is, we are not completely able
to understand the,demands of the superscnsible .("Men are conscious of their
inability to know supersensible things; ").28 H we were better able to perceive
that which is required 'of our rational, moral selves, we would have no need for
ecclesiastical faith as a medium to pursue the rsational. Moral individuals,

27

Allein es ist eine besmulere Schwllche der menschlichen Natur daran Schuld, daf,
auf jenen reine Glauben niemaJs so viel gerechnet werden kann, als er wohl verdient,
nllmlich eine KiTche •uf ihn allein zu griinden. [REL, I 03 (Greene and Hudson
94)].
28

Ibid., 103 (94).
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according to Kant, are unable to accept that moral conduct is all that is

required to be a member of God's kingdom (the ethical commonwealth).
Instead, individuals have a need to perform acts of servitude and honor in
order to in some way bear to witness to their faith.
It does not enter their heads that when they fulfil their duties to
men (themselves and others) they are, by these very acts,
performing God's commands and are therefore in all their actions
and abstentions, so far as a these concern morality, perpetually in
the service ,j God,· and that it is absolutely impossible to serve God
more directly in any other way (since they can affect and have an
influence upon earthly beings alone, and not upon God). 2~
Rather than realize that moraJ.oonduct is the sole requirement of being a
citizen in God's lcingdo~ further requirements are fabti.atcd by the moral
individbals. Insofar as they are not necessary for morality, these faux
requirements are statutory. Hence, through a religion based on statutory laws
"arises the concept of a religion Qf divine warship instead-of the concept of a
religion pwdylhoral.,, 30 ·This leaves us with an empirical faith, which will
serve as a vehicle for a pure faith, allowing the pure faith itself to flourish only
once the empirical elements of ecclesiastical faith are purged.
In the enumeration of such statutory laws, their origin does not have
the same genesis as the pure moral faith, reason. Since the statutory laws are

2

9Ibid., 103 (94).

30
•••

und so entspringt der Begriff einer gotesdienstlichen statt des Begriffs einer reinen
moralischen R.tligionen. (Ibid.,].
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not present to pure reason, their source must lie elsewhere, in what Kant

articulates as a revealed state. Thus through revelation we become cognizant
of the statutory laws that reveal to us how it is that God wants to be
worshiped. Insofar as these laws are made public, they serve as the
constitution·of the church that is based on ecclesiastical faith. 31

In considering how the ethical commonwealth is to be brought about, it
remains only to consider how it is that ecclesiastical faith relates to pure
religious faith as its vehicle and thus the manner in which such an
ecclesiastical faith is to be pursued. Kant argues that the IIW\RCr in which the
ecclesiastical faith is to be punued is through its laws, based on scripture.
, Since, then, it tcmains true once for. all that a statutory
ecclesiastical faith is associated with pure religious faith as its
•. vehide and as the means· of publk union of men for its
promotion, one must grant that the preservation of pure religious
·faith undumgcd, its propagation in the same form everywhere, .
and even a respect for the revelation assumed therein, can hardly
be provided for adequately through tradition, but only through

scripture;32

31

As Kant explains:
the question: How does God wish to be honored in a church (as a
congregation of God)? appears to be unanswerable by reason
alone and to require statutory legislation of which we become
cognizant o~ through revelation, i.e., an historical faith which,
in contradistinction to pure religious faith, we can call
ecx:lesiastical faith.
Ibid., 104 (96).

.. ~Ibid., l 06 (97). ·
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It is through scripture that the statutory Jaws of ecclesiastical faith gain

currency. An important caveat of the statutes is that in no way are they to
contradict the requirements of pure religious faith. Thus, we are to interpret
scripture not solely as God's word, but rather through the "effect which its
content has on the morality of the people." As the Bible has improved the
moral worth of the people it is seen as.a moral document that has·rcvealcd
"God's statutory (and so reveakd) will. "33 Thus :revelation as contained in the
Bible gains value as it is a vehicle for the moral faith, its statutory (subjective)
aspects must not,.and do not,. come into conflict with the supreme object of
li.n.n (-H~n• ,,.1-..-;..,.. ..._,...) . th
. ral. :..:...
____..,... f·l..•----: 34
reAW,.,n
· -'""-Uf;-L S ,;,,ur--'-'·.n'"' asy---- 1 e mo
.uupiuv~w.,.u,; 0 ·I.R.1:UUU.Uty.

According to, Kant, this: critsioa is fu1.flllcd by the· one holy book that seems
to have fallen into our hands. That is, through the ]lible, Kant ,recognizes a

soun:e for the statutory laws that will serve as the basis for an ecclesiastical
faith leading to moral improvement.
How fortunate, when such a book, fallen into men's hands, contains
al.Qng with its statutes, or laws ctffaith, the• purest mor,al doctrine, of
Idigion in its completenas---a doctrine which can be :brought into
perfect harmony with such statutes ( [which serve] as vehicles for its
. ..._...1. . . . .1-n~ 3s
, ~ m.U\IUU\.:l:.RJ /•'· · t' , '· , , ·
h ..
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CON, 63
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Ibid., 52 {93).

35

Gliicklich! Wenn ein sokhes den Mmschen zu HtJntlm gekmnmmes &u:J, neben.
semm Suztutm,als Glllubenpsetzm zugleic die reinste moralische Religionslehre mit
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Thus in establishing an ecclesiastical faith, it is to be based on revelation,

through scripture, as it is contained in the -Bible. This organon serves as the
vehicle for religious faith, which when itself is brought about, will consist in
the establishment of the true kingdom of God on earth.
· To summarize, as humans, the best we can do is to pursue an
ecclesiastical faith, which has as its basis the pure moral faith;' to which we
shall eventually aspire. Through the ecclesiastical faith, founded on a holy
scripture, we are to "WOrk towards the establishment of a chmoo. · ·. Eventually
ecclesiastical faith will set\'c as the vehicle ,of our·belicf in a pure faith, devoid

of its ecclesiastical trappings, ..·Hence it is,thrt>ugh. the.establishment of a

of a people under God, and the est.ablMhment of a;people under God is the
establishment 0f the ethical commonwealth. 36

Vollstdndigkeit enthiilt, die mit jenen (als Vehifeln ihrer Introduction )in die beste
Hamumie plwaiht wettlen btnn [REL,: 107 ·(Gt-effie and Hudson 98)].
36

lumt. specitlcally articulates this conclusion in a later discussion of the
differences between ecclesiastical and pure faith. The above is a longer form of
.this·vcry same,conclli$ion, which follows, with the implicit pre.mises ind.~d:
In men's striving towards an ethical commonwealth, ecclesiastical
faith thus naturally precedes (morally this order ought to be
reversed) pure religious faith;
Der Iar&l,englllube geht also in Bearbeitung der Menschen zu einem ethischen gemeinen
Wesen naturlicherweise (Moralischerweise sollte es umgefehrt zugehen) vor dnn reinen
Religtd,,,glauben vorher; [Ibid., I 06 (97)].
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Hopes for the Ethical Commonwealth
Understood within Kant's discussion of the achievement of the ethical
commonwealth is contained the warning that regardless of what we do as
humans, it is impossible to know if we will bring the ethical commonwealth
about on our own. Instead, we must prepare the way for God to come into
the picture. and He will bring about the ethical commonwealth. With ,;:egard
to our role then in bringing about.the ethical co:mmonwealth:

... man. must proceed ,as though eN:e.rything, depended upon, him;
only on this condition dare he hope that higher wisdom will grant
the completion of his well~taltiOne<i endeavors. 37
Hence> it is only through God •$at the moral kingdom, will come to pass, yet
we must act as though its co~t;io.n depended on•~ alo:qe, ,~ we act to
bring the kingdom abeut. We are·limited•in our ability to.bring about the
ethical conunonwealth since as humans we are limited by the fact that we are
not perfect, hence "How indeed can one expect something perfectly straight to
be framed out of such crooked wood.?"38

This is the condition in which the humam race is immersed. We are

not able to bring about God's kingdom alone, just as we are not able to
,appreciate a moral reUgion alone. Yet, just as we are assisted towards moral

37

Ibid., 101 (92).
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faith -vvith ecclesiastical faith as it is presented through its statutes contained in

the Bible, we are to hope for God's assistance as we work towards our moral
betterment, thereby having "a rational faith and trust in His [God's] help". 39
Thus we are still to have hope that we shall achieve· the pure faith that will
serve as a basis for the moral religion that guarantees the fulfillmcnt of the

ethical commonwealth. Hence it is through God's help that we are able to

gradually purify ecdemstical faith, leaving behind all of its statutory content
(the empirical), and·throu.gh,divine assistance proceed to a pure religious faith

as that which will establish a kingdom.of God on earth.

· .Hence a necessary consequence of the physical and, at the same
time, the moral predisposition in us, the latter being the basis
· and-the·mterpreter of all religien;·is thatm the end: religion will
gradually be freed from all empirical determining grounds and
from all statutes which rest on history and which througn the
agency of ecclesiastical faith provisionally unite men for the
requirements of God;· and thus at last the· pure ,:religion of reason
will rule over all, "so that God may be all in all. "40
This kingdom of God, Kant makes very clear is not to be brought about by
means of external revolution. Pure religious faith will be scourged of the
ecclesiastical only as moral agents realize that the true religion is the moral one
that lies recognizably in everyone's reason. Through its recognition, the

39

CON, 47 (Gregor, 83).

40

REL, 121 {Greene and Hudson, 112) [Kanes reference is to lCorinthians
XV~28].
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human race proceeds in moral action and in hoping for God's grace insofar as

they are worthy of it. 41
In sum, the ethical commonwealth is practically possible to achieve, yet
not through human means alone. As humanity makes itself worthy of divine
assistance through moral progress, divine assistance can be hoped for and

thereby guarantee the coming of the kingdom of God in establishing a people
of God organized under, laws .of virtue in the form of a church based on pure
religious faith can be hoped for as well.

With this the final discussion of •Kant's ethical comD,10nwealth as the
consummate articulation of the highest.good, there are ~ral lessons· to be

appreciated.· ·Through the· ~thica mmmonwealth,Kant gives content to his
moral project. 'l'hat is, we are to concretely strive to bring about certain states
of affairs in the world. We are to enter into certain relationships with God
and with each other. This is JeqUired as a part of Kant's moral theo:ry, it is a
demand of the law. This is no vacuous command, but a concrete one, with
specific content to be fulfilled; (e.g. follow the law, l>ring about a republican
constitution, establish a league of peace, bring about the ethical
commonwealth).

41

is to .~y that he shall begin with the improvement of his life as the
supreme condition under which ·atone a saving faith can exist." [Ibid., 118
" ••that

(109)].
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In working to bring about the state of affairs of the ethical

commonwealth Kant has not left us without a way to proceed. From the
moment the individual realizes she is subject to the law, enters into
community to protect her rights and then further into a community that is
international and worldly in its scope, Kant's program guides her. This
guidance·takes form in the command --Bring about the highest good in the

world. And this command takes form in realizing what this command entails
as we are ettgagec:f moral individuals, striving in the face of the law. In so

doing, we are given a guide for our action, a moral ideal to pursue. In
addition, we are given a means to integrate the tlW> aspects of ourselves as a
sensuous being and as a ,superse:nuous being as Kaat .points to God as a

guarantor for·the moral .pfOject .of humanity.

The IOngdom of Goel and Jts;CJonsequences

· With this in mind, all that is left is to see· how this understanding of the
highest-good ·fairs-against its contemporary critid$11l and commentary.
Commentary on Kant's highest good is prolific. In its extensive presence in

·Kantian literature it can be separated into two basic schools of thought: there
are those
that support a conception
of the highest good and there are those
.
.
that oppose a conception of a<c highest good. In what follows, I will address
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those that oppose a conception of the highest good as I argue that they fail to

recognize the entire role of the highest good insofar as I have presented it,
resulting in a inaccurate understanding of the highest good as either
heteronomous or superfluous. After this treatment, I will address those that
support ,a conception of the highest good as I argue that they too, fail to

recognize the .fntire role of the highest good, resulting in. an exclusive notion
of the highest good insofar as it is one sided aJ\d. does not appreciate ·the many

aspects, of.the hlgaest· good, the ethical commonwealth ·based.· on ,petpetual

peace. 42
In 'AllR, with this understanding of the higMst good., as a mo:tal.1.objcct
we are requit'Cd to;pursue in its various forms; euhninating ill' thectthical: ·
commonwealth·based on perpetual peace, the playing field of,contemporuy
scholarship on the highest good will hopefully not be so antagonistic. Now,
instead of forms of the highest good competing and contradicting one another,
the IIWUfestations of the highest .good con,ple~t 9ne anotl,.er.
With regaJd to contradictory understandings of th~ ~~t .good, these
interpretations fall into the categories of understanding the highest good as

42'fhis division of the controversy over Kant's highest good is summarized
very wdl in the following article by Lance Simmons, "Kant's Highest Good:
Albatross, Keystone, Achilles Heel" Histoty oLPbUO§Ol>hy O,,artwly•.. 10; 4 .·
(October, 19~) 355-368.
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either superfluous and or heteronomous. 41 In both instances, it is my view

that these interpretations are not well founded. With regard to the
understandings that assert that the highest good is a viable part of the Kantian
project, the claims of interpretation do not go far enough. That is, the
proponents of the highest good concentrate on either an individual or a social
understanding of the highest good. 44 Again, in both instances of exclusivity, it
is my view that these interpretations leave an integral aspect of the highest

good out insofar as they do not recognize a tripartite developmental aspect of
the highest good that culminates in the ethical·. commonwealth.

The heteronomous take .oft the highest good does not appreciate that
the· highest gQOd must· always satisfy Kant•s aiterion ,of being grounded in the
moral law. 45

·

That is, the connection between the highest good and the law,

insofar as the nighest good expresses what Kant calls an extension of the law,

°The claims of superfluity and heteronomy are· made most strongly by
Lewis White Beck (see A Comment,axy on Kant's Critiqye of Practical Rewn.
as previously cited; and Thomas Awcte'r (see K;int•s ·Moral Tele<>IQgy. also as
previously cited).
44

With regard to the understanding of the highes,t good as primarily·~
individ\lal endeavor, see John Silber as previously cited. With regard to the
understanding of the highest good as a primarily social endeavor, see Sharon
Anderson-Gold as previously cited.
45

See Thomas Auxter, Jeffrie Murphy, et al., for examples of those
numbered among the Kantian commentators •
hold that the highest 'good
is heteronomous.
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is not a heteronomous extension of the law. 46 The highest good is always

conditioned by virtue, even when the highest good is seen to be in a reciprocal
relationship with the law. 47 This is the case regardless of the format of the
highest good, via the individual, politics or within humanity.
With regard to the superfluous talce on the highest good, this

interpretation does not appreciate that the highest good not only serves as a
dialectical ideal of reason* ·but it also serves as a moral ideal or guide for
conduct. 48 As was demonstrated in Chapter 0ne~ there is a very strong aspect
of the highest good that consists :of a dialectical ideal. ·Yet thiS' is not an
exhaustiw understanding of ·the ,highest good. :'The highest good consists of a
command to .pursue the highest good insofar as a

moral agent seeks to bring

about the highest good in the world. In this sense~· the· highest good
contributes somct.hing substantive to the moral project. In short, the
accusation of superfluity with regard to, the highest good is accompanied by a
far too narrow reading of what the hlghest good entails.
In those instances where ](ant scholars have supported Kant's

46

See Chapter Three. for the way in which Kant discusses the highest good
·as an extension of the law.
47

See Chapter Two for the way in which Kant discusses the highest good as
reciprocally related to the law as both its source and consequence.
4%e main proponent of the view that the highest good is superfluous to
the Kantian moral project is of course, Lewis White Beck.
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conception of the highest good, I contend that these interpretations do not go

far enough. These interpretations concentrate on either the individual49 or the
social perspective of the highest good.

50

In so doing, these commentators fail

to recognize that the highest good requires being made manifest in both ways.
The highest good is not locked into either an exclusively individual or social

manifeStation, butmther, the highest good is made manifest variously,
contingent upon the perspective of duty from which it is approached. Of
course,: in appreciating these perspectives, it must be app:reciated that they
culminate in the ethical commonwealth as the consummate articulation of the
highest good. The individual manifestations of the highest good do not
i

recognize where this complex object should lead, while the social
manifestations do not recognize where this object has originated.
It is interesting to ask why this issue has plagued Kantian scholarship.
Some of the reasons no doubt are a direct result of the presence of the highest
good in so many places in the Kantian corpus. There is never a unified and
complete discussion of the highest good from its justification to its application.
Everyone has their favorite texts and a perspective from which to meet them.

4

9The main proponent of an individual understanding of the highest good is
John Silber, but see also the work of Gerald Barnes, Terry Godlove and
Andrews Reath, among others.
50-Jne main proponents of a social understanding of the highest good are
Sharon Andersoa-Gold~ Stephen Palmquist, and Philip Rossi.
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However, it seems that Kant himself may have a more accurate insight as to

why this issue has been so problematic. In his essay Theory to Practice, as he
was addressing those he thought had misunderstood and wrongly criticized
him, Kant attempts to

explain the genesis of these ill fate<;l and ~rhaps ill

borne approaches to his work.
These exceptions are thus nothing but misunderstandings (for I
have no desire to regard them as misint~rp~tations), whose
possibfilty would be puzzling if such a phenomenon were not
explained by the human tendency to follow one's owx;i customary
patterns of thought, even in the evaluation of the thoughts of
.
51
. others and so to impose the former on tlle lat~r.
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In breaking free from our own biases, we are able to be more true to the
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Kantian project. In the above sketch, I briefly applied the tripartite
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interpretation of the highest good to the controversy surrounding it in
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contemporary scholarship.
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TfP, 281 (Humphrey, 65).

CONCLUSION
THE LESSONS KANT TEACHES:
A CONCLUSION AND SUMMATION OF THE PROJECT

.P1 ~s.pr,oj~ct~ I ~ave p~posed a,way of interpreting Kant's high~st
g009 th.•t a,t~nwt& to integrate his multifarious remarks and explanations of
this compl,ex ~bjfct~ }I\ so doiq.~:1:haye a}so. atteJllpted to dell)qnstr~te that
COO~JD.J)P!azy CO~~~f.a~9,~ ~Ve,~~ .On the v:µipt.tS pf(SCn~tions of the

highe~ go¢ in th~ corp\lS in ~ isqlati<>~st ~er. That j~, ~o~~tato,rs
on, Kant) ~hest good o~n fail to~ re~ that th~~ ~ a:pr~q~~on of the

high~st Jocxi. QCC\lIJing throughout JJ\9& of Kant'~ major wor~ and ~~l'al of
the m,ino;r WOI'~ as vvell. A result .of this failure is that Kant; commentators
often. leave.:u.~ ~th exq.usive or ~ompeting concepts of Kant's ltj.ghest good.
~ . ,~Ve$ a false ID1pression that there is not a unified concept of the highest
good i~ ,~e. Kantian corpus.

As a reSl,J,lt of t)µs 1dispar~te envif.onment in Kantian int~rpretation of

.the. highest good, I have sought to present a unified conct:ptio:n of this
complex object. In doing so,, my project concentra~d on the three
p~ntat\ons C>f the 11.ighest ~ that I a,rgue arC! present and crucial in Kant's·
202
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work. There is the role of the highest good as a unifier, as a moral ideal, and

as the ethical commonwealth. It is through this last notion of the highest
good, the ethical commonwealth, that the two former notions of the highest
good are encompassed. This leaves us with a notion of the highest good that
not only serves as a unifier and moral ideal, but also anchors Kant's
conception of God as moral guarantor, and provides an added social dimension
to the highest good.

In its social aspect., the highest good provides us with a program for its
fulfillment as we seek to .establish the· ethical· commonwealth .based on
perpetual peace. This establishment is· accomplished through a developmental
plane that takes into account the human moral agent in her individual role,
her political role· and as a member of the human race. This notion of the
highest good can bc:demonstrated ito lead to an ~tcommunity based on
th.c law of virtue and· cstablished. 1by• making manifest. Kant's notion of the
invisible churl on.earth.
With• this·. notion of the highest good in place, the shortcomings of
contemporaiy commentators on the highest good.are ·made evident. Those
who have argued that the highest good is superfluoU$ have not recognized its

complete role~ Those who have argued that the highest good is hetcronomous
have not realized that it fulfills a human need, and have not seen that it is a
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requirement of the law. Other commentators on the highest good have

concentrated too exclusively on a small aspect of its comprehensive role, such
as that means by which our action is guided, or the means by which humanity
is able to overcome evil. 1 By ending their analyses before a complete organic

conception of the highest good is atticulated these commentators have faileo
to see. the forest for the •trees. Hence,. my··interpretation·of the highat good,

in presenting it as an mganic whom present t.brougnout th¢ corpus, is. able to
address the •problems of conflict among contemporary commentatol'S, ··
.. To conclude, there, ~::l>e no doubt .t!hat·t.hei~actrine of:Kantls ·highest

goqd is compiex and' d\fCn,obscule in places.· T o - ~ this, I have proposed
1

a way of interpmuag.t.lu:. highest gooc:l.sadt•that: it, is demonstrated ,to
articulate what :Jll0tality truly Kquites.. This is the case insofar as we are

conunanded to·bring about·theltighest~ to bring the object c,f,the . moral

lflf to fruition in the<sensiblc world.

,This.task is not easy, nor is its ..

take·. into aa:ount as,much .of the .Kantian corpus as is ·reasonably possible

tlu:ough,myowr-arching approach. Ant I convinced of this approach?--only
insofar as I am convinced of anything of extreme import that appears in its
normal ambiguity and consequently without great exactness. As Kant himself
/

·,lStt the di5cussion of the previous chapter of the intetpretations of
Silber and Anderson-Gold.
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says:

...what duty is, is plain of itself to everyone, but what is to bring
true, lasting advantage to our whole existence is veiled in
impenetrable obscurity... 2
The concept of the highest good as the ethical commonwealth based on
perpetual peace is that whi~h ,c<>µ]d bring true, lasting, advan~c t() our whole
existence. But the means through which it is to be achieved ancf brought into

,:•

T

'

entirelJ ~ced of, is that in this program for interpreting the highest good,

' '' : ·, ;_;

(

\,

J

-

:

imple~u, will be veiled in impenetrable obscurity.

FlnaDy, in offetjng, ~, ab(>ve, as a.~ptiQilf9I: Ute confusion over
the concept of t h e ~ pld

anp its ~rsal irot;ll echoing, there is an

implicit challenge. My analysis has demonsu:a~ what a Kan.tian Jl\()fality
requires; thus the challenge consists in lifting the veil, revealing the means for
its existenq: and manifestation.. In.so doing; we would be well served, for
Kantian morality is neither so specific nor so antiquated that in the Kantian
~rlence we are left: without echoes of our <>wn.

2

was Pflicht sei, bietet sich jedermann von selbst dar; was aber wahren
dauerhaften Vorteil bringe, ist allemal, wenn dieser auf das ganze Dasein erstreckt
werden soil, in undurchdringliches Dunkel eingthullt ... [CPR, 37 (Beck, 38)].
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